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ABSTRACT

Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
A Case Study of the University of Massachusetts
Amherst Election - November 1973
(May 1978)

Anne L. Bryant, B A.
.

Ed.D.,

,

Simmons College

University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor William Lauroesch

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that when
there are no traditional union issues (e.g., salary or working conditions),
the political predisposition and socialization, or political culture, of
a faculty

member is more influencial in determining voting behavior than

the indices of achieved status of the faculty member (i.e.,

tenure, rank,

school affiliation, etc.)*
A stratified random sample (N = 76) of tenured and non-tenured

faculty members from the major schools of the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst were interviewed following the November 1973 vote, which re-

jected the MSP-AAUP as bargaining agent on that campus.

The results of

the 1973 election (510 pro-union votes; 718 anti-union votes; 174 chal-

lenged votes;

2

voided votes) demonstrated that there was growing unrest

in
among the faculty, but the absence of clearly defined issues left

bardoubt the reasons for faculty support or opposition to collective

gaining.
iv

The five-part interview queried faculty members on:

toward unionism in general,

(2)

(4)

attitudes

attitudes toward the (then) current Univer-

sity of Massachusetts, Amherst situation,

governance, and

(1)

(3)

perceptions of university

attitudes toward the November

1973 election.

The

fifth section gathered demographic data similar to that used in other

national studies (age, department affiliation, professorial rank, number
of years at the University, voting behavior, sex, tenure, and administra-

tive status).

Results of the interview provided clear support for the hypothesis

substantiating that:
ization itself,

(2)

(1)

there were no major issues except that of union-

a faculty member's professorial rank, departmental

affiliation, tenure status, or age had little influence on his/her voting
behavior, and (3) a faculty member's prejudgment about unionism in general
was a greater determinant in his/her voting behavior than either number

(1)

or number (2).

A few of the more interesting results of the study were:
1.

The Social Science faculty's vote, predicted to have been strongly

pro— union, resulted in an even split between the MSP-AAUP affiliate
and no union.

2.

Faculties from Natural Science, Nursing, and Physical Education

voted predominantly against the union.

3.

of Agriculture
In direct contrast to all predictions, the School

faculty voted in a clear majority for the union.

A feeling of

was the
disenfranchisement about their status in the University

primary reason for such an outcome.
v

A.

Administrative" faculty members, particularly department heads, a
group appointed by the provost, voted against the union while de-

partment chairmen were more evenly split.

5.

Faculty members generally expressed the view that faculty in higher

education

s hould

be able to unionize

been drawn by Everett

C.

(

a

similar conclusion had

Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset in a

1972 study) but the majority felt that the situation did not warrant

such a drastic change, nor were faculty comfortable with (what they

viewed as) an outside entity representing them.

6.

Directly relating to conclusion number five was the dominant theme
in the interviews of "professionalism."

One’s status as a Univer-

sity professor at a major university was viewed as the most critical

aspect of one’s career.

The majority of faculty seemed to feel

that the present informal system of communication and governance

was working satisfactorily and wanted to be seen as autonomous

professionals.

There was a strong minority, however, who believed

that the traditional form of academic governance was losing effec-

tiveness, causing a loss of power for the faculty.

A few faculty

mentioned that the real problem lay in the increasing influence of
the state legislature over University budgets and priorities.

In

retrospect, this small group predicted the results of a successful
multi-c.ampus election by the MSP in 1977

,

four years after the

Amherst Campus faculty had rejected such an action.

vi
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CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

On November 15 and 16, 1973, a collective bargaining election

was conducted at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst involving its
faculty and some staff.

It

was the culmination of one and one-half

years effort by the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP, an affiliate of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, MTA) and the Amherst

chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
Why did the election culminate in the manner it did?

What were

Which

the issues in the University of Massachusetts/Amherst election?

faculty members were pro-union?

gaining agent on campus?

Which were against

a

collective bar-

What were the prevailing attitudes during the

election of the faculty toward the University administration, toward
the various "election" issues, and toward each of the opposing faculty

groups, the coalition favoring collective bargaining, MSP-AAUP

,

and the

ad hoc Committee of Concerned Faculty (CCF)?

The purpose of this study was to determine how faculty members
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst reacted to the campaign and

election, how their reactions appeared to shape their vote, and what
governance
their attitudes were toward the University and its system of
place.
in light of the election which had recently taken

1

:

2

A sample of seventy-six faculty members was taken.

These fac-

ulty members were interviewed during April of 1974, nearly
six months

after the election.

The interview contained five sections, each of

which pertained to an area of the study's concern:
Section 1:

Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism;

Section 2:

Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current University of

Massachusetts/Amherst Situation;
Section 3:

Faculty Perceptions of University Governance;

Section

Faculty Attitudes Toward the November 13-16 Election;

4

Section 5:

Demographic Data.

The University of Massachusetts has campuses at Amherst, Boston

and Worcester.

Amherst, the largest of the three, is considered the

"flagship" campus.

Its origins were humble, beginning with the founding

"Mass Aggie," as it came

of Massachusetts Agricultural College in 1863.
to be called,

in 1867.

accepted its first class of under one hundred students

These were small beginnings for a college founded to provide

"economical and sufficient instruction in practical arts and sciences
to the class of persons who do not desire or are unable to obtain a

collegiate education."^

One hundred years later, in 1973, the Univer-

sity of Massachusetts at Amherst employed nearly fifteen hundred fac-

ulty members and professional staff, and had over twenty-three thousand

undergraduate and graduate students.

The growth of the University had

been sporadic over the hundred year period.

lliarold Whiting Cary.
t ory

of 100 Years

1962, p.

'6.

.

In 1960, there were only

A HisWalter Whittum, Inc.,

T he University of Massa chusetts^

Springfield, Massachusetts:

3

6,495 students, necessitating 366 full-time faculty
members; by 1967,
the enrollment had more than doubled creating
employment for 729 faculty

members.

By 1973, fifteen hundred professional staff were
needed to

accommodate the twenty-three thousand students.
was fast but not unique.

The University's growth

Higher education was experiencing enormous ex-

pansion during the sixties.

In fact, it has been said that this fast-

paced growth, combined with the onset of the current recession, was one
of the key reasons behind a collective bargaining movement in higher
ed-

ucation.

Although the election campaign at the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst raised a number of issues concerning university governance,

personnel policies and job satisfaction, the unionization movement at
the University of Massachusetts had to contend with one major disadvantage.

In 1973,

the faculty at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

were the highest paid faculty in public higher education in the state
and in the top twentieth percentile in the nation.

Faculty work load

was no greater than that at a major research-oriented institution, and

general living conditions included adequate office space and rolling
Amherst hills.
/

Thus, what are normally thought to be the major issues

influencing a decision to unionize

— namely,

wages and working conditions,

were missing from this campus.
But there were issues of concern to the Amherst campus faculty,

among them the more intangible matters of tne faculty share in academic

governance

,

possible future tenure quotas and general anticipation about

future job security

.

T.n

addition, some faculty and administratoi s felt

that such particulars as a campus snafu over
parking in the summer of

1973,

the appointment of Dwight Allen (former Dean of
the School of

Education)

2

to a University President's Committee, and several
other

smaller administrative decisions had angered the faculty and
enhanced
the position of those who favored unionization.

This study hypothesizes that when there are few major campus

issues in a collective bargaining election, the political predisposition and socialization, or political culture,

of a faculty member are

more influential in determining voting behavior than the indices of
achieved status of the faculty member; i.e., tenure, rank, school affiliation, number of years at the University, or "administrative" office.
Two factors mutually reinforce one another in the context of

faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining.

First, the attitudes

a faculty member holds toward unionism in general will help to determine

his or her perception of which campus issues are important and why.

Second,

these perceptions in turn help to determine that faculty members'

attitudes towards unionism in general.
This study seeks to show that it was the predisposition of the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty member towards unionism that

2

In 1974, Dwight Allen resigned as Dean of the School of Educa-

Although his resignation was concurrent with other personnel and
tion.
legal problems taking place within the School during the spring of 197a,
Allen was not implicated in that situation. He continues to hold a tenured professorship at the School of Education.

political culture of an individual refers to a composite of
and
socialization fat tors, upbringing, choice of occupation, lifestyle,
philosophical attitude.
3 The

5

was the principal determinant of his or her
vote in the November election, rather than either the faculty
member's perception of current

local issues, or his or her place in the demographic
stratification of
the University.

In this way, this study departs from other
researchers

who have argued, based on their analyses of faculty voting
behavior in

various elections, that local and demographic factors are highly
significant forecasters of election outcomes.^

Significance of the Study

The examination of the outcome of the election on the Amherst campus offers a useful case study of factors affecting the movement towards

faculty collective bargaining.

Many of the issues discussed by the

University of flassachusetts/Amherst faculty during the election were not
peculiar to this campus but remain of concern to many university and college campuses.

An analysis of the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

experience is particularly significant because it was, in 1973, one of
the few major public universities to vote "no" on collective bargaining,
as well as one of a limited number which has voted at all.

Current published research has dealt far more extensively with
the colleges and universities which have elected an agent rather than

^Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset. Professors
Carnegie Commission Report, Berkeley,
Unions and American Higher Ed u cation
This book, which provides an analysis of two major
California, 1973.
studies of faculty attitudes with regard to collective bargaining, is
used as a basis for much comparison throughout this study.
,

.

6

with those voting "no" on unionization.

This study is the only inter-

view case study of the November 1973 election.
The decision reached, whether affirmative or negative, in the

November election would have major ramifications upon the life of the
University community, administration, faculty, and students.

Previous

to November 15th and 16th, there was an abundance of activity seeking a

large voter turnout from all segments of the University.

The Chancellor's

Office urged all eligible persons to vote as did each of the faculty
groups.

The importance of this vote to faculty members is given simple

testimonial in the proportion of those voting:

ninety-seven percent

or 1,404 faculty members out of 1,449 eligible to vote.

Different researchers have suggested

a

variety of theories to

explain the differences in outcome among collective bargaining elections
on various campuses.

This study seeks to test, and to confirm or deny,

the applicability of these "predictive" theories to the balloting at the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst campus.
The benefits of such a study are varied.

Faculty members who

were involved in the organization of both the MSP-AAUP coalition and the
Committee of Concerned Faculty have expressed interest in obtaining the
findings.

One obvious reason is to enable them to design a strategy for

any future election.

They may be disappointed.

If their assumption is

that this election depended upon a faculty member’s perception of local
argues
campus issues, they will learn otherwise in this study, which

that local issues were absent in November of 1973.

Of course, when local

well hinge upon how
issues are present in potent form, the outcome may

faculty perceive them.

)

7

Delimitations of the Study

The delimitations of the study are those limits imposed within
the research design itself, and under the control of the researcher.

The sample size of the study (N = 76) constitutes five percent of the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty population.

Although a five

percent overall sample can be representative of the total faculty population, the small number of faculty members within each of the professional

schools

— particularly

Home Economics, Nursing, Business Administration,

Physical Education, Education, and Engineering could not serve as an
adequate sample of faculty attitudes within those schools.

(Each of

these schools represents less than ten percent of the total faculty popSee page 13 for breakdown by schools, the percentage and actual

ulation.

number

.

Although librarians above a certain rank were eligible to vote,
the sample population did not include librarians.

Nor did it include ad-

ministrators and students which groups were not eligible to vote.
The timing of the interviews was crucial.

When they were con-

November
ducted, four and one-half to five months had passed since the
election.

an
The emotion of the moment had ebbed, which may have been

through their
advantage, in allowing faculty members the time to sort

thoughts on the subject.

However, with the passage of time, an oppor-

of their attitudes at
tunity also emerged for a consequent alteration

the time of the election.

*

-

8

Another aspect of the timing of the interviews was important.

Although the departments had already forwarded their recommendations on
faculty promotions and reappointments to the administration, final de-

cisions had not yet been issued.

Within the same month, an announcement

from the Provost's Office had been made calling for no new faculty positions, although there were no positions cut from the budget.

Thus, ten-

sions were higher in the spring of 1974 than they were immediately after
the election.

The most accessible of the published and unpublished literature

seems biased toward the administrative viewpoint.

If

it had not been

for the NEA, AFT and AFL-CIO journals as well as the writings of Belle

Zeller and Israel Kugler, the researcher's perspective on the issues

would have been sorely one-sided.

Definition of Terms

Arbitration

.

Arbitration is the reference of a dispute by voluntary agreement
of the parties to an impartial person for determination on the basis
of evidence and arguments presented by such parties, who agree in
advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and b indArbitration, therefore, is a judicial proceeding and different
ing
t act- find
in nature from mediation, conciliation, negotiation, and
.

ing. 5

by Dr. Keith
*Unless otherwise noted, these terms were prepared
work.
bargaining
collective
Groty, Michigan State University, for his

American ArbiP ro cedures and Techn iques.
A rbitration:
York, New York 10020 (from
tration Association, 140 51st Street, New
the Pamphlet's Glossary of Terms).
5 Lab or

9

Another definition, found in Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 6
has
informal connotation:

a

more

"The submission of some disputed matter to selected

persons, and the substitution of their decision or award
for the judge-

ment of the established tribunals of justice, thus avoiding the
formalities, the delay and the expense of ordinary litigation."

Bargaining Agent

.

An organization designated by an appropriate

government agency, or recognized voluntarily by the employer, as the ex-

clusive representative of all employees in the negotiating unit for purposes of collective bargaining.

Bargaining Unit

.

A group of employees recognized by the employer

or designated by an authorized agency as appropriate for representation

by an organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

Collective Bargaining

7

Collective bargaining is a procedure

.

looking toward making of collective agreements between employer and accredited representatives of employees concerning wages, hours and other

conditions of employment; and requires that parties deal with each other

with open and fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles
existing between them.
Fact-finding

.

An individual or group of individuals appointed

to receive facts in an employment dispute to establish what they perceive

6

Ballantine s Law Dictionary
Cooperative Publishing Company, 1948.
,

.

7

Black’s Law Dictionary
Publishing Company, 1951.

,

Rochester, New York:

4th Edition.

The Lawyers

St. Paul, Minnesota:

West

10

to be the facts, and generally, but not necessarily,
make recommenda-

tions for settlement.

Mediation.
or

An attempt by a third party to help in negotiations

the settlement of an employment dispute through suggestion,
advice

or other ways of stimulating an agreement, short of dictating its
provi-

sions.

A mediator is a person who undertakes mediation of a dispute.

Conciliation is the same as mediation.
Industrial Union Model

.

In the industrial union model, an agency

whose structure is external to that of the university is certified under
law upon affirmative vote of the faculty within a designed unit to serve
as the exclusive representative for all persons within that unit.

Some

or all of the faculty within the unit are members of the agency or union.

Either the members of the union or of the unit select faculty and/or non-

faculty persons to represent them in bargaining with the employer with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment.

Normally, negotiations result in a written agreement

which constitutes a contract between the employer and members of the

...

,

bargaining unit.

8
.

.

.

Fa culty Professional Union

.

Same legal standing as the indus-

trial model but a major difference is that the leadership and the union

members also stress the professional standing of the faculty.

Most groups

Committee on
^As defined in the "Report of the Ad Hoc University
1972,
Collective Bargaining," Michigan State University, January 31,
pp.

16-17.

Unpublished.
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contending for certification as the bargaining agent in major universities reflect the professionalism of the faculty in their position state-

ments on aims and purposes.

Rationale for Research Methodology

The researcher sought to obtain as open-ended a set of responses

from faculty as was possible.

Therefore, the interview technique was

adopted rather than the questionnaire or survey method.

The interview,

although more obtrusive than the impersonal techniques of questionnaires,
is believed to produce richer data and to provide the researcher with

more access to the informant's thoughts.

If there were to be felt issues

of local significance, a questionnaire might be incapable of eliciting
them.

The questionnaire may fail to anticipate the necessary question,

and the informant must remain mute.

A directed interview, however, can

remain open-ended and permit a flexibility within the interview situation by permitting the unsolicited reply as well as the opportunity for
,

follow-up questions.

9

Another reason for choosing the interview arose during the re-

searcher's preliminary discussions with campus faculty.

Many faculty

members seemed to be skeptical of any attempts to document the election

technique, see
Por an excellent discussion of the interview
^Scjenceg_WLthJ?B££igl
Maurice Duverger, An Intr 0 ductlo_n_ toJ:he_Social
Publishers, 1964,
Praeger
York:
R^fp rnnre to Their Methodology , New
Research, New
Educational
and Diobold V: Van Dalen, Understanding
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, inc., 1962.
9

12

for fear that the research would be used for the
wrong purposes.

terview format allowed the researcher to ease these
anxieties.

An in-

She feared

that a mailed questionnaire might produce a low rate
of response.

Methodology

In order to interview a cross-section of University of Massachusetts/

Amherst faculty, the researcher constructed a sample designed to represent
the respective percentages of tenured and non-tenured faculty within each
of the schools and departments.

school affiliation

— were

These two criteria

— tenure

status and

considered by other researchers on faculty col-

lective bargaining to be the most potent variables for the study.

Boyer,

Lipset and Ladd, Carr and Van Eyck, Haehn, and Moore, in their respective
studies, cited these criteria as principal determinants of the outcomes
of a union election.

The University administration allowed the researcher access to
its current list of tenured faculty.

Unable to reproduce the listing,

the researcher copied every fourth tenured name within each school.

From this listing, she was able to draw the final sample.

The total

sample of tenured and non-tenured faculty within each major school rep-

resented five percent of the University faculty population.
The reason that the number of the researcher's population total

was 1,324 instead of 1,449 (the number of total faculty eligible to vote
"01" full-time facin the November 1973 election) is that she took only

ulty in the ten major schools.

She could not include, without greatly

13
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increasing the size of the sample, "Provost Office"
program faculty,

which incorporated faculty in special programs, the
Labor Relations
Center, and other important programs in the University.

searcher include librarians who have faculty status.

Nor did the re-

These groups were

eligible to vote.
^ letter (see Appendix
from a 1973 faculty listing.

1)

was sent to each of the 130 names taken

Approximately seventy percent of the names

represented tenured faculty members and thirty percent non-tenured faculty members.

In the letter,

the interviewer explained the reason for

the interview and gave the names of the interviewer's doctoral disser-

tation committee members, inviting the recipient to call if he/she had
any questions."^

Within ten days of the faculty's receipt of the letter,

the researcher called each faculty member to inquire (1) whether he/she

would be willing to be interviewed, and
a convenient time for the meeting.

forty-five minutes and an hour.

(2)

if yes, could he/she set up

The interviews usually took between

The interviewer allowed one and one-

half hours per interview so that after each meeting, she could pause to

review her notes, write down any additional thoughts, and get to the next
interview on time.

The interviewer found that she could conduct effec-

tively no more than five interviews per day, and, therefore, limited her

scheduling accordingly.
Very few individuals said that they would/could not be inter-

viewed and, therefore, the population to whom the initial letter was

^Doctoral Committee members changed because of the death
Joseph Burroughs.

Professor Harvey Friedman was added.

of
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sent (130) was large enough to obtain the correct sample size (N = 76).

During each of the interviews, careful notes were taken on the faculty

member's responses to each of the thirty-seven questions (see Appendix 2).

A tape recorder was not used for several reasons.

The inter-

viewer held preliminary discussions with faculty members in February
and March, and asked them whether they would feel less or more comfort-

able being interviewed with

a tape

recorder present.

that they would feel less comfortable being recorded.

They all responded
In two of the

test interview situations, the interviewer used the tape recorder and
got wh3t she felt were more elusive answers than she had obtained with-

out the tape recorder.

In addition, the Watergate tapes had heightened

people's general nervousness about being recorder "for posterity."
If, during the interview,

the researcher neglected to ask one of

the questions in Section 5, she called the individual to get the desired

information.

The blank (0) responses in a few of the tables in Section

5

indicate the people whom the interviewer could not reach.

The Interview Format

/

conceived to
The thirty-seven questions in the interview were
get faculty attitudes on a variety of subjects

— unionism,

faculty col-

local issues.
lective bargaining, academic governance, and other

The

outlined so that in
order and position of the questions were carefully

member could best reflect
each section the responses of the faculty

prejudice as possible overlapping
their genuine attitudes, with as little
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from his/her previous responses.

The following account provides a

description and rationale of each of the five sections of the inter-

view schedule.

Section 1:

1.

,

Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism

When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what comes to
your mind?
The first question was calculated to be entirely general so as

to limit the association a faculty member might make to the specifics

of the November election.

The aim was to uncover his or her general

views on unionism in society.
a short,

Often, this question was answered with

standard definition of collective bargaining to which the in-

terviewer did not respond.
the void by talking.

She waited for the faculty member to fill

This proved to be an effective device because it

was usually this second response which demonstrated the person's deeper

attitudes toward unionism.
2.

Is there a distinction in your mind between collective bargain-

ing for blue collar workers and white collar workers?

If yes,

what is the distinction?

Question number 2, concerning the difference between blue and
facwhite collar unionism, then followed as an immediate step from the

ulty member’s response to question number 1.

3.

in collective
Should faculty at a university /college be involved

bargaining?
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4.

Should collective bargaining in higher education
include any
or all of the following:
a.

economic issues;

b.

working conditions;

c.

job security;

d.

governance.

i

5.

Should faculty in higher education be able to strike?

6.

Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member of
a local or

7.

national union?

Which union?

(Explain what a bargaining unit is.)

Who would you include in a

bargaining unit?

Question number

3

dealt with the faculty member’s attitude toward

bargaining in higher education generally.

The interviewer tried, in ques-

tions 4, 5 and 7, to keep the discussion at a fairly generalized level,

again in an attempt to evoke the individual’s most general attitudes
towards unionism and higher education before introducing the issues and

specifics of the Amherst campus balloting.

question number
questions

1

6

and 2.

The interviewer found that

would be answered during the discussion produced by
If the faculty member had not already discussed a

personal or family member's membership in a union, that membership was
Although the question was

likely to be unimportant to the individual.

still asked, it never produced an answer in contradiction to the re-

sponses given in reply to question numbers

1

and

2.
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Section 2:

Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current
University of Massachusetts/Amherst Situation

1.

What did you perceive

be the major issues affecting the MSP-

tio

AAUP no-agent election on November 15 and 16?
which, if any, of these affected your vote?

Could you state
(Please prioritize)

Responses to the second half of question number
in a faculty member's answer to the main question.

terviewer proceeded to question number

2.

Is salary an issue to you?

2

1

often surfaced

In this case, the in-

without further elaboration.

Are you satisfied with your current

salary?
3.

Are "working conditions" an issue for you?

4.

Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in terms of promo-

tion and tenure at the University of Massachusetts?
5.

/

5.

Do you think that the personnel policies are fairly implemented

at this university?

Questions number

2

Are they effective?

and

3

usually got brief responses because

neither salary nor working conditions were felt by faculty to be an important issue.

Since both of these subjects are traditional parts of a

union's collective bargaining agreement, the researcher felt they should

be asked.

If there were dissatisfactions with the university as an em-

ployer, they surfaced in the faculty member's answers to questions

4

and

concerning promoIf a faculty member had had a negative experience

would be more apt
tion or tenure, the hypothesis was that this individual
to vote for a union.

member's
When it could be determined that the faculty

.
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reaction to a personnel issue did not influence his/her
attitude toward
unionism, the interviewer would proceed to the next section.
I

Sectio n 3;

Faculty Perceptions of University Governance

By placing this important section in the middle of the interview,
the researcher hoped that the faculty member would feel both relaxed and

unhurried.

This proved effective.

In most cases,

faculty would take

the opportunity to turn their attention away from the issue of collec-

tive bargaining and towards their views concerning governance on the

Amherst campus.

Because his/her ideas on personnel policies had already

been articulated in Section

2,

the faculty member could allude to the

earlier remarks by reaffirming his/her positive or negative opinions
about unionism and its possible effect on university governance.

At

other times, the faculty member sensed that he or she was contradicting

statements made in Section

2

and, in a few cases, these perceived contra-

dictions led the faculty member to volunteer the admission that if the

election were held today (April 1974), his or her vote would have changed.
1.

In what areas should faculty have influence in University gov-

ernance?
2.

Should faculty have final authority over these matters, or should
they make recommendations to the Chancellor?

To the President?

To the Board

3.

governance
In your opinion, does the present system of faculty

provide adequately for faculty voice over these matters?

well?

Fairly well?

Not very well?

Very
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4.

Do you think students should be involved in
collective bargain-

ing?

5.

Are you fully familiar with the grievance procedures?

6.

How much time would you say you spent on faculty governance

matters?

Questions

1

through

tions of shared governance.

4

focussed upon the faculty member's percep-

Question

5

was fairly routine.

Having re-

viewed many of the studies conducted by students of university collective bargaining, the researcher recognized the critical role that griev-

ance policy played in the forming of collective bargaining contracts.
She was interested in the relative importance of this area of governance

before the period of contract negotiation itself.

It would, of course,

be up to another to study the University of Massachusetts/Amherst fac-

ulty in order to determine whether the relative weight of this issue in-

creased under collective bargaining.

The responses to question number

6

varied according to the faculty member's role within the department.
Presumably, a department chairperson or a member of a departmental per-

sonnel committee would spend considerably more time on administrative
detail then would other faculty members.

One question was whether the

increased familiarity with administrative functions, accompanied by an

increased sense of power presumed to characterize faculty holding those
offices, would lessen
of such faculty.

the.

need for collective representation on the part

Question number

6,

in conjunction with the faculty

member's vote, attempted to address this inquiry.
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How do you think a union contract might affect the quality of

7.

education?
>

Question number

7

returned to the issue of collective bargaining

so as to introduce the subject of Section 4 — Local Campus Issues.

In

asking question number 7, the researcher often prefaced it by asking the
faculty member to define the phrase, "quality of education."

This phrase

is heavy with connotation (especially when asked by an Ed.D. candidate);

and so, the interviewer felt that it would be best to seek to clear the

air on this matter, and thereby avoid its pejorative entry into the re-

maining discussion.

Faculty responses to this inquiry often confirmed

their attitudes articulated in Sections

Section 4:

1

and 2.

Local Campus Issues

Section

4

contained four questions all geared toward the campaign

of the MSP-AAUP and the CCF.

Questions number

1

and

2

attempted to gain

insight into the faculty member's knowledge of the campaign issues and

perceptions of the MSP-AAUP staff and faculty members.
1.

How did you become aware of the issues surrounding the election?
From another faculty member?

At a department meeting?

CCF or MSP-AAUP newsletters?

Via "The Collegian"?

Bulletin"?

Through

University

Others?

2.

MSP-AAUP coalition?
Would you explain your perceptions of the

3.

signed a law enabling all
On November 26th, Governor Sargent
and hours.
public employees to bargain for wages

Would the
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earlier passage of this law have affected your
vote at the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst?
A.

Prior to November 15th and

Yes?

No?

had you heard about any of the

16th',

state college contracts negotiated in the past sixteen
months?

Question numbers

3

and 4 attempted to reveal the faculty's aware-

ness of issues pending off-campus, the former of which would have directly affected their own bargaining rights with the trustees.

Section 5:

The Demographic Data

The fifth section was placed last in order to permit as much in-

formality as possible.

It was in question number 10, placed in an other-

wise routine series of questions, that the faculty member was asked to

disclose how he/she voted in the November election.

If this question had

come any earlier, the faculty member might have been waried of making a

frank reply.
All other questions in Section

5

were the result of conclusions

derived by other researchers that such indices as age, faculty rank, ad-

ministrative status, tenure, years in service were significant factors
affecting collective bargaining balloting (see Appendix

2,

Section 5).

In order to correlate the findings of this study with those of earlier

demographic researchers, this data from the sample of the Amherst faculty
needed compilation.
The responses to the questions in Section

cross analyzed by computer.

5

were tabulated and

The tables incorporated in the discussion
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of Section

5

are copies of the actual printouts obtained
from the

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences," (SPSS)
Program.

Organization of the Study

It is important to set the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

collective bargaining election into the wider context of the history of

American higher education.

Thus, within Chapter II, an historical con-

text is developed, pertaining not only to the history of American higher

education, but to the society within which American academe came of age.

A society bent on creating egalitarianism was to have

a

great

impact on the tradition of elitism from which the European scholars ben-

American laws and the cases which tested these laws led to a

efited.

dilemma which American faculties would face through the years.

This con-

flict between the traditional elitism of academe and the societal egal-

itarianism is a component of each individual faculty member's predisposition.

The purpose of Chapter II is to trace how this dilemma arose

and the nature of the impact on each faculty member's vote.

Chapter III includes the analysis of the seventy-six faculty interviews.

In the course of each interview, the faculty member was quer-

ied on his/her perceptions of (1) personal attitudes toward collective

bargaining and higher education;
University;

(3)

his/her curre n t gob status at the

(2)

the faculty's role with respect to governan ce at the

Amherst campus; and (4) the local campus issues.
than related to (5) de mograph i c data

.

Section

5

These perceptions were
of the interview has
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been placed before Sections

1

through

4

in Chapter III.

The reason is

that having described and cross analyzed
the demographic data, the re-

searcher can refer back to it in her analysis
of the questionnaire sections.

Finally, an analysis of the sample interviews
would have been

incomplete if it had not included a discussion of the
current collective

bargaining literature as it related to each of the issues
arising from
the interviews.

The researcher elected to intersperse related litera-

ture with the interview results in order to place the University
of

Massachusetts/Amherst faculty sample findings in juxtaposition with
other studies and opinions.
Chapter IV provides a summary of the findings and a discussion
of each of these findings as they relate to the hypothesis of the study.

Because the interviews were computed in the spring of 1974 and a collective bargaining election has since taken place, the context of the en-

tire study has changed.

Faculty attitudes concerning unionism, however,

may not have changed so radically.

Rather the set of circumstances in

1973-1974 and 1976-1977 were indeed different, the former having been a
rare period of relative stability among faculty bread and butter issues,
the latter a period representing the state's fiscal turmoil.

An histor-

ical viewpoint is taken, therefore, in order that the reader gain a

clearer sense of what the faculty member was thinking in the spring of
1974.

Thoughts and sentiments had obviously changed drastically by

February of 1977 when the faculty at the University of Massachusetts
(from both the Amherst and Boston campuses) voted overwhelmingly in a

/ run-off election
NEA affiliate).

to support the Massachusetts Society of Professors

(an

CHAPTER

II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this study has been to assess whether, in fact,
the predisposition of the faculty at the University of Massachusetts

'

was the major determinant in the outcome of the collective bargaining
election of 1973.

The nature of predisposition and of the cluster of

associated faculty attitudes composing predisposition are, therefore,
central to the inquiry.

/

The specific cluster of attitudes with which

this study is concerned are:

1.

Individual faculty attitudes toward the role of the academic
profession;

2.

Faculty attitudes toward their individual role expectations

within the profession;
3.

Faculty attitudes toward membership in professional faculty

interest groups;
4.

Faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining.
attitudes,
To understand the origins and development of these

social roots in both Europe
it is necessary to explore the historical and

professional associations
and America of the academic profession, the

bargaining in higher eduserving faculty interests, and of collective
cation.
25
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These topics are treated in extended form as
follows:

first,

in an explanation of the origins of academic
governance in European and

American higher education; second, in a study of the development
of faculty professional associations; and third, in an historical
sketch of
the growth of collective bargaining as a feature of American higher
ed-

ucation.
The first section of the chapter provides an historical review
of the origins of American higher education, its European roots and the

intrinsic elements of that tradition which, when transplanted to America,
took quite different forms.

The America which first demanded and created higher learning was

interested in a different product than what the European universities
had created.

American ideals were different; American laws were new,

and the code of behavior for all those involved in higher education

would be seen differently by the American citizenry.

The faculty mem-

ber’s view of himself and his role is an important dimension of his predisposition.
His role expectations within academe become the framew'ork from

which he views major professional issues such as academic freedom, tenure, scholarship, and professionalism.

These are value-laden elements

of the profession which evolved over centuries but which are now being

challenged by a demanding public.

To protect themselves and these ele-

ments of their profession, faculties have created and become members of
interest groups.
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The history and objectives of associations like the American

Association of University Professors, the American Federation of Teachers

/ and

the National Education Association provide a modern parallel to the

guilds of Europe which the American academic never developed.

^ the collective bargaining laws themselves which have

a

Finally,

direct impact on

higher education and the future of the public employee have recently
come to be a part of what the faculty member has recognized as the nature of an egalitarian society.

Whether or not he chooses to use these

laws to enhance his own position is at least partially influenced by his

attitude toward the union movement, its objectives and its procedures.
The teacher associations, which once protected the academic, now have

minimal control over the important issues in the profession.

The asso-

ciations themselves, therefore, have used these new laws to increase
their own power and legitimize their continued existence.
The manner in which these collective bargaining laws evolved
and the groups affected by them contributed toward shaping the faculty's
-/

collective predisposition before the collective bargaining election at
the University of Massachusetts in 1973.

All of the elements mentioned above

— the

historical setting of

and
the academic profession, the faculty member's view of major issues

groups,
how they affect his specific role, faculty membership interest
and the collective bargaining laws

—were

in combination the components

predisposition.
of each faculty member's frame of reference or
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Origins of Academic Governance

Although the number of faculties represented by collective bar-

gaining agents continues to grow, it nevertheless remains only

minor-

a

ity within the total number of faculty in America (150,000 of 600,000).

Why has the impulse towards unionism come so late on the campus?

It is

suggested here that while the reasons are complex and are shaped by the

history of the emergence of shared governance responsibilities in higher education, much of the reluctance on the part of faculty members to

undertake to bargain collectively has been the result of the relatively
privileged status faculty members have enjoyed both in European and

American cultures.

The "professor", unlike any ordinary laborer, has

traditionally inhabited more the life of the mind than the world of what

William Wordsworth scorned as "getting and spending."

This status of

standing apart from "the madding crowd" is of crucial significance in
the reluctance of faculty, even when their material rewards have been

less than sumptuous, to take up symbolic arms against their

employer

.

The Guild

according to
The beginnings of university governance are found,
medieval universities in
Richard Hofstadter, in the creation of the two

Paris and Bologna.

In Bologna,

the students were in charge.

Coming as

they took it as quite natthey did from the wealthy and noble families,

faculty the form their studies
ural that they should dictate to their

should take.

studying canon law
Although the students might be clergy,

.

29

or lay, studying civil law, their teachers were usually laymen, and were

both free of ecclesiastic supervision and the protection of its order.
They were, thus, vulnerable to the power of their students who had be-

gun to organize guilds through which to hire their masters and in the

process to subject them "to a rigid and detailed academic discipline." 1
At the University in Paris, however, it was the faculty who or-

ganized strong guilds more typical of the powers of faculty over students

which were to become characteristic of higher education.

In Paris, the

teachers were primarily clerical (principally) offering studies in the-

ology and philosophy.
tial.

In both universities, the scholars were influen-

At Paris, the masters were looked to for interpretations of ec-

clesiastic law, and at Bologna for rulings on civil law.

And in both

universities, the faculty, in order to elect their own officials and to

....

set rules about teachings, sought to form "autonomous corporations con-

ceived in the spirit of the guilds."

2

In such guilds, in their capacity

to protect the rights of faculty members, are the origins of the norms

of faculty governance in American higher education.

The powers of the masters from the University of Paris included

what would today be called a "strike".

They could and did stop giving

benefits.
lectures whenever they needed to "bargain" for increased pay or

many
Another strategy was to move to another town, taking with them as

,„thg _CQjJiggg.«
Richard Hofstadter. Academic Freedom i n_the ,_Age_of
4.
p.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1969,
1

^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

6

^

30

devoted students as possible.

During a period of "town-gown" unrest in

1228, a number of the masters migrated from the University of Paris to

Oxford and Cambridge which developed as faculty-or icntcd institutions
and were the models upon which Harvard College, the first American college, was built.

The masters were determined to protect their preroga-

tives and banded together in their daily activities to assume their cor-

porate power.

They were often obligated upon admission to a university

to take oaths, affirming allegiance to their disciplines, to their col-

leagues, and to the university statutes.

The masters went further and

spelled out regulations governing their teaching itself.

Mary McLaughlin,

in her doctoral dissertation, concluded:

For the liberties which enabled them to exercise their intellectual
functions made possible also the corporate (researcher's emphasis)
imposition and enforcement of restrictions. Now it was the institution and its parts which not only claimed freedom but exercised

control

.

When scholarship and teaching were synonymous with the laws and

beliefs of the church, there were few problems for the masters of Paris.
Trouble arose, however, as teachers began researching areas within the
lict to the
arts and sciences, the results of which were in direct cont

tenets of the church.

A scholar so motivated might quickly become a

the city of
"heretic", such as John of Brescain who was expelled from

"Intellectual Freedom and Its Li mi tat ions
Mary M. McLaughlin.
,"
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
in the University of Paris in the
(Library
New York, 1952, p. 29.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University,
in Hofstadter s book.)
of Congress Archives, recommended
3

^

.
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Paris in 1247 when he tried to introduce theological issues into the

teaching of logic.
The lay board

The tradition of faculty self-rule in the col-

.

leges of Oxford and Cambridge universities, born in the Catholic practice of faculty hegemony at Paris and the effort to protect the prerog-

atives of clerical academics from the intrusions of lay power, ^ did not

survive the passage to America.

In the New World, there was not one de-

nomination but several, and Protestantism looked with suspicion on the
guild mentality of faculty corporatism.

In the words of Richard Hofstadter,

American Protestants did not consider that they were destroying intellectual freedom by extending the policy of lay government from
churches to colleges.
Indeed, they considered it one of their contributions to civilization that they had broken up the priestly
autonomy of advanced education and had brought it under the control
of the community.^

Once the step had been taken to admit laymen into church governance, it was not a "very drastic step," Hofstadter added, to admit into

positions of authority over the college men who were not academics, although clergymen themselves typically dominated the board membership of
the early colleges.

7

Designed to supervise the administration of the

colleges, legally the lay board became the college.

^Hofstadter
5

Academic Freedom

Ibid., p. 121.

^Ibid
7

,

lb id

.

,

p.

122.

,

pp

.

81-83.
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were clergymen, its members were the worthy and
prosperous citizens of
the community, and their authority depended
not a little on the precar-

ious financial standing the college by itself possessed.

Indeed, the

dominant theme throughout the development of American higher
education
would be the dependence upon one or another "benefactor"—
whether private or public

from whose final authority all powers were delegated.

Faculty members in the earliest American colleges were not only
subject to the authority of the lay governing board, their circumstances
also differed from those of European faculty in that there was little

demand in the colonies for professional interpretation of legal matters,
for there was no canon or civil law requiring scholarly exposition.

The

first "tutor" at Harvard was by no means the heir to the authority of an

Abelard.

The first faculty members at Harvard, for example, were in al-

most all cases studying for the ministry, and spent more time at their
own studies

—a

required three post-baccalaureate years of residence for

the Master of Arts degree

— than

they did in teaching undergraduates.

So

brief was their average length of stay at the college that the tutors
resembled far more the modern graduate student than modern faculty member.

Henry Dunster, the first president of Harvard College, lamented in

1653 that tutors came and went so fast that "ever and anon all the work

committed to them falleth agen on my shoulders."

g

In this way, with the truncation of faculty power, all of the

real decision-making "falleth agen" on the shoulders of the president

8

Ibid., p. 85.

.

.
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whose immediate powers stemmed not from his
faculty but from the board
who held the college charter.

These powers were to become deeply en-

trenched in American higher education,, and
were almost never seriously

challenged
Yet,

there were a few early cases in which the faculty
of a col-

lege attempted to enlarge their powers in the
governance of the institution.

One such instance occurred at William and Mary College
during the

1750 s.

The faculty members of the college were mostly Oxford graduates

and were, therefore, accustomed to the practice of faculty authority
at
Oxford.

After trying fervently to attain what authority they could from

the Board of Visitors,

the faculty at William and Mary eventually had to

acquiesce before the Board. 9
Thomas Jefferson's dream for the foundation of the University of

Virginia presupposed that its principal powers would be exercised by its
faculty, although nominally overseen by a Board of Visitors.

In the words

of Hofstadter,

there were to be eight schools altogether, including schools
of law and medicine.
The best available professors were to be secured, and they were to be sought abroad as well as at home, at
whatever risk of criticism from provincials and chauvinists. They
were to be paid ample salaries. They were to give lectures, not
merely preside over recitations. The students, who (with a few exceptions) would not be allowed to enter until the age of sixteen,
would be somewhat more mature than those at most American Colleges.
Professors would have relatively secure, although not absoMoreover, there would be democracy within the faculty:
lute, tenure.
an inoffensive rotating chairmanship would replace the customary
university presidency, after the fashion of the rotation of the rec.

.

.

.

.

.

tors in the German universities.-^

^Ibid., pp. 133-134.

^Ibid

.

,

p

.
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The Jeffersonian aspiration for broad faculty authority
was

never realized for many reasons, among them the slow but
steadfast control of the lay board over academic governance described
above.

The lay

board of trustees in turn incorporated its power in the president,
the
chief academic administrator.

As the years turned into decades and high-

er education became mass education, the offices of these administrators

became vast bureaucracies of administration.
The American belief in the pre-eminence of "practical" men was

powerfully held as expressed in 1848 by the Harvard historian, Samuel
Eliot

Gentlemen almost exclusively engaged in instruction and discipline
of youth are not, usually, in the best condition to acquire that experience in affairs and acquaintance with men which, to say the least,
are extremely desirable in the management of the exterior concerns of
a large literary institution.
Arrangements for instruction must be
adapted to the state of the times and to that of the world around as
well as of that within the college walls; and of this state, men engaged in the active business of life are likely to be better judges
than the literary man.
-*-*-

In this "epitaph" for faculty governance, as Rudolph termed it,

Eliot expressed the conviction of his era that the president and the lay
But, at the

board should retain fundamental control of the institution.

same time, the professional status of faculty members was growing.

In-

deed, it had begun to improve as early as 1767 when at Harvard College
the job of tutor was shifted away from monitoring a class of students

towards teaching a specific subject.

This shift, in emphasis from

^Samuel A. Eliot. A Sketch of the H istory of Harvard College
Quoted^
49.
and of Its Present State, Boston, Massachusetts, 1848, p.
York
New
iversity
Un
and
by Frederick Rudolph in The America n Co llege
Random House, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 167.
1

,

^

.
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students to subject matter, became more widespread in
the latter quarter
of the nineteenth century, and eventually
"transformed tutors into schol-

ars or instructors with professional ambitions," and would
prefigure the

emergence of discipline-based departments with their hierarchy of
instructors, assistant professors, associate professors, and prof essors

.

With the imitation in America of the German emphasis upon research and post-graduate instruction, American academic man evolved from

"jack of all trades" to the specialist of the department.

The Ph.D. be-

gan to be a prerequisite for a teacher to enter the "better institutions."

These "organization men" were more and more unlike their predecessors on
campus whose only badge, in Rudolph's words, was "an honest face and

whose only uniform was

a

rumpled, baggy old suit of clothes."

13

By the

turn of the century, the doctorate had become the emblem of professional

competence, of that "sameness of training, experience and exposure to the
ideals, the rules, the habits of German scientific scholarship."

14

But

such an accent upon the unrestricted right of research was flawed by the

realities of the American campus and the absence of job security.

Academic freedom in America

.

The concept of academic freedom was

not new to the American professor even at the turn of the nineteenth century; it had been developed and strengthened in the German university

many centuries before.

The word "lehrf reiheit

Th e American College and University
Books,
1962, p. 163.
Random House, Vintage

^Frederick Rudolph.

York:

translated meant the

^ lb id
14

.
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.
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.

New
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right of the university professor "to freedom of
teaching and to freedom
„15
o f inquiry.
To this substantial definition, American higher
education
.

.

would add the notion of freedom of speech.
This

attempt to assimilate the doctrine of free speech into the

doctrine of academic freedom (generated)
demic friction."

.

.

.

the greatest amount of aca-

For it was during this same period that the American

professoriate would turn to the studies of evolution, many following the
research of Charles Darwin.

The conflict over the content of Darwin's

hypothesis and research became enmeshed in the struggle for academic
freedom, little of which did the governing "lay boards" fully understand.

The academic struggles over Darwinism dominated the latter half of the

nineteenth century and, as Metzger so succinctly states,

implicated all that was problematic in the area of human judgement.
the great Darwinian debate was richer in significant issues
than any in the American annals of disputation.
It went far beyond
the substantive problem of whether evolution was true, and far beyond
the psychological problem of how to hold to acquired science while
retaining birth-right beliefs. Touching on the nature and sanctions
of authority, the methods and problems of verification, the standards
of scientific debate, the Darwinian controversy eventually implicated
we can
all that was problematic in the area of human judgement.
summarize these conflicts by saying that science and education joined
forces to attack two major objectives the authority of the clergy
and the principles of doctrinal moralism and that one of the effects
of this coalition was the hastening of academic reform.-*-'
.

.

.

.

.

.

—

.

—

7

15

Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger. The Development of
New York: Columbia Lniversity
Academic Freedom in the United States
Press, 1955, pp. 386-387.
.

16

Rudolph, American College

,

p.

413.

^Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom

,

p.

346.

37

In all of this turmoil, however, no organization existed to pro-

tect the academy.

The reason, Metzger explains, has its correlation to

the twentieth century development of collective bargaining.

Professors

work in relative isolation, in library stacks, not factories; and although other types of professionals had representative organizations,
the professor did not, precisely because he did not consider himself

/ primarily

a

teaching professional, rather a professor of social science

or of economics.

His allegience, therefore, was greater to his colleagues

within his discipline than to any peer group of college professors.
"Most important," continues Metzger, "there was a deep aversion among

academic men to entering into an organization whose purposes smacked of
4

The dignity of the profession, fashioned on a genteel

trade unionism.

.
code of manners, was opposed to the tactics of a pressure group.

The expansionist period

Learning in America

,

.

„18

Thors tein Veblen's work, The Higher

was published in 1918.

Although written during the

nineteenth century, Veblen*s book provided a major statement depicting
culture
the polarity between the culture of teaching and learning and the
of "big" business during the early twentieth century.

Veblen foresaw the

bureaucratization inherent in big business creeping into the expanding
institutions of higher education.

The university was quickly becoming

of its governing board
an ordinary business establishment both because

president— no longer an
and by way of the changing role of the college
of these businessmen who
academic but a manager under the domination

18

Ibid.

,

p.

470.
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were not only college presidents but
members of the governing boards.

Metzger paraphrases Veblen's gloomy but
predictable role for the college
professor.

"The universities of the nation have adopted
the hierarch-

ical gradation of staff common to business management;
the techniques of

salesmanship and promotion native to competitive enterprises,
and they
have reduced American professors to the status of business
19
hirelings."
This trend toward bureaucratization, as Metzger indicates,
was

stimulated by the growth of the modern university.

Expansion was American

higher education's code name during the early part of the twentieth century; and because of this new phenomenon, institutional practices were

changing to keep pace.

What every self-respecting small college wanted

in 1910 was to become a university; and what every university desired

was to become bigger

sion were vast.

.

The changes brought about by institutional expan-

As each college grew in student enrollment, so too would

its faculty increase.

As institutions grew, personnel policies were de-

veloped until the concept of academic tenure became synonymous with these

new policies; so much so that its original reason for existence
tion for academic freedom
themselves.

— became

— protec-

obfuscated by the personnel policies

Today, faculties and governing boards alike are questioning

the true meaning of academic tenure and its forerunner (and reason for

existence)

,

academic freedom.

They are asking what role these two corner-

stones of academe will be assigned in the implementation of a collective

bargaining agreement.

19

One example of the growth of higher education can

Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom

,

p.

452.

.

.
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be found in the history of a small agricultural college in Western

Massachusetts

A Case in Point:

The University of Massachusetts

Harold Whiting Cary has written the only history of the University
of Massachusetts.

It began in 1825 with the legislative appointment of

a committee, headed by Theodore Sedgwick,

to study the feasibility of a

state seminary which would supply "economical and sufficient instruction
in the practical arts and sciences to that class of persons who do not
v

desire or are unable to obtain a collegiate education."

20

By the spring of 1826, the committee had produced a highly pro-

gressive and unique document calling for land to be given to the community for use as an experimental farm.

The legislature was asked to give

twenty thousand dollars a year for the first two years, five thousand

dollars a year over a ten-year period for a literary fund, the total of

which the committee believed would sufficiently support the new instituUnfortunately, the legislature did not find the committee's study

tion.

worthy of funding.

However, the ideas of the 1826 document had captured

almost precisely the essence of the future Land Grant Act.

It had fore-

years before
cast a social revolution in post-secondary education forty
its time.

Massachuse tts „_A
Harold Whiting Cary. The Un iversity of
Springfield, Massachusetts: Walter Wl.it turn,
H istory of 10 0 Years.
1962 p 86
Inc
20

.

,

:

,

.

When the Morrill Land Grant Act was signed by Abraham
Lincoln
on July 2, 1862, a new direction was born for higher
education.

In less

than one year and only ten days after the conditions of the
Morrill Act

were accepted by the Massachusetts General Court (April 28,
1863), the
charter for a new college was outlined and adopted.
snafu.

There was one major

No state money had been allocated for the project.

Apparently,

it was of little consequence to the General Court that the Morrill Land

Grant Act required a state share a funding within five years of receiving
the federal funds or forfeit the grant.

President French, the college's first president, had a considerably difficult task on his hands.

The combination of reluctant taxpayers,

farmers and legislators formed some of the roadblocks to what might have

been a swift beginning.

After two presidents, numerous bills and much

conflict over the curriculum, the college opened its doors to thirtyfour students on October 2, 1867 under the leadership of William S. Clark.

Two-fifths of the students came from within a twenty-mile radius of the
Amherst site, and only two students were from outside the state.

Three-

quarters of those first students had had some experience on a farm.
faculty, though small, was an experienced group:

The

President Clark, Levi

Stockbridge who was in charge of the farm, Henry Hill Goodell, a professor of rhetoric and foreign language from Amherst College, and Professor
E.

S.

Snell in mathematics, constituted the faculty, staff and adminis-

tration.

"
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As could be predicted, the major battles confronting
the small

college were over state support. 21

According to the Morrill Act, the

state had to support the college to a minimal extent.

Even with the

state’s initial capital investment of 350,000 dollars, the
college

quickly ran short of cash and soon ran into debt.

In response to a re-

quest for additional monies, the Massachusetts legislature, believing
that the college should be completely self-sustaining, surrendered its

power of appointment over the college's Board of Trustees and, at the
„

same time, withdrew its limited financial support.

In effect,

the state

was saying, "You keep within your own budget and be accountable to your
own Board

.

In 1871,

the last thing that Massachusetts Agricultural College

wanted was fiscal autonomy.

The college went into even heavier debt.

President Clark continually requested funding from the legislature and
was as often rebuffed.

At one point, out of shear spite, Clark offered

tuition-free scholarships to eighty-eight students.

The debt increased.

This pattern continued until 1882 when Paul Ansel Chadbourne, who had

been the college's second president, was brought back to the college to
serve as its sixth president.

During his term, the budget improved, en-

abling a slight expansion of the liberal arts curriculum and a dual set
of courses to be offered:

and literary."

"agricultural and scientific'

and

scientific

Following Chadbourne was perhaps the best known of all
/

University of Massachusetts' presidents, Henry Hill Goodeil.

21

Goodell's

battle rerm-.ins
It is interesting to note here that in 1977 , the
of contenbone
the
provides
The amount of State support still
the same.
for
and
faculty,
tion for University of Massachusetts administration,
State officials.

tenure at the college was marked by a growth in faculty,
expansion of
the Experimental Station and the introduction of
a modified "elective"

curriculum.

By 1892, there was a graduate school, the first women
stu-

dents and a two-year non-degree course in "practical agriculture."

Hindsight may prove that the most significant era for the

Massachusetts college would come during the term of Kenyon Butterfield
(1906-1924).
idency.

posts

Several major events took place during Butterfield's pres-

First, he reorganized the administration by creating two new

—a

Dean of the College and a Director of the Graduate School.

Second, and perhaps his most extraordinary innovation, was Butterfield's

reorganization of the faculty into academic divisions.

—

The activities of the college staff
teaching, research and the newly
established extension work were to be administered in departmentalized units, and the twenty-three departments grouped into divisions
having common interests. The chain of responsibility was computed
by the recognition of the group of division heads as a cabinet which
would meet regularly with the president to advise on college policy. 22

—

-

Butterfield had introduced the day of specialization.

The area most af-

fecced by Butterfield's reorganization was the Department of Agriculture

which, within a few years, grew from two full-time faculty to nineteen,

creating a division with six different departments instead of the original
one.

Included in this division's expansion was the additional function

of the training of agricultural teachers for the state high schools.

Es-

tablished in ]906 with financial assistance from the state, the "Normal

Department" offered courses in educational psychology, school problems
and extension work.

22

Carv, The University of Massachusetts

,

p.

106.
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During this time, large numbers of faculty were added
to staff
the new university extension.

The idea of continuing education was not

new to these "experts" who, instead of delivering a lecture in
their
classroom, went out into the community to convey the newest method
in

agricultural technology.
All of these developments were not going unnoticed by the state

legislature which, having abandoned Massachusetts Agricultural School
in its hour of need,

now saw this dynamic college as

a

potential source

Nineteen hundred and eighteen proved to be a fateful year

of revenue.

for the college.

The state, in reorganizing its own constitution, re-

claimed the college and placed it under the supervision of
of education.

a

commissioner

Fiscal control was the objective of the legislature and

control it took, through

a

series of procedural changes.

First was the

introduction of the line budget which "made it virtually impossible for
the trustees to meet unusual demands for expenditure by transferring

funds."

23

The second innovation deprived the college of the money gained

from student tuition and from the sale of agricultural products.

These

revenues were no longer paid to the institution but had to be deposited
in the state treasury and spent only through the appropriation process.

At the same time, the state supervisor of administration created a sys-

tem of controls over all administrative and faculty appointments, salaries, titles, duties, and even the publications of the college’s staff

members.
er.

One can easily see the beginnings of increased legislative pow-

resignation of
One result of these new rules and regulations was the

#

23

Ibid., p. 141.
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a most capable and certainly one of the strongest presidents
of the col-

lege.

In May of 1924, Kenyon Butterfield submitted his resignation and,

in writing to the commissioner of education stated, "I was driven out by

this whole business of State House Control."

9/

A more lamentable cry

was never heard.
Tight state control would continue for many decades, but not without some fiscal struggle from Massachusetts Agricultural College.

Her

students were beginning to campaign for more of a broad-based education
and access to higher degrees.

Their efforts were finally rewarded in

1930 when the small college was renamed Massachusetts State College.

Nine years later, the trustees voted to grant a Bachelor of Arts degree.
After an enrollment decline caused by the depression and World
War II, applications began to increase in the middle 1940’s.

By 1945,

the returning veterans added vast numbers to a college which was hardly

able to provide for the seventeen hundred students already enrolled.

A

large building program was planned and begun; faculty were hired; and

programs were designed to reflect the needs of this new type of student.
The "GI Bill," encompassing two laws passed in May of 1973 and June of
1944, added equal pressure to the college’s enrollment figures.
In partial response to the new demands, a two-year extension

college program was established at Fort Devens.
,
1,310 students were enrolled at the army base.
,

2A Ibid., p.

143.

25 Ibid.,

172.

p.

25

By October of 1946,

:

45

Increased enrollments and an extension campus were two of the

many reasons why Massachusetts State College made the quick transition
to become the University of Massachusetts in 1947.

Only five years be-

fore, a petition for such a change had fallen on deaf ears.

During the decade of the 1950's, student enrollment doubled,
and new schools were introduced as quickly as faculty could be hired to

teach the new courses.

John Paul Mather, Provost of the University, as-

sumed the presidency in 1954; and in his succeeding six-year term, estab-

lished an even stronger college of arts and sciences, several new profesv

sional schools and a well-developed graduate school.

26

One of Mather's

most important goals was his commitment to "the development of inspired

undergraduate teaching."

Cary quotes Mather's inaugural speech, "It

will profit us nothing if we build many new buildings fully equipped
with modern gadgets and then fill these shiny new tin cans with halfbaked beans.

.

.

staff or students."

27

Mather worked strenuously toward the reinstatement of power by
the Board of Trustees over all fiscal matters.
ful.

He was partially success-

It was not until President Lederle's term, however,

that Chapter

was
648 of the Acts of 1962, giving complete autonomy to the Board,

passed.

Section 14 has become an important passage in that piece of

legislation
with respect to the elecThe trustees shall have complete authority
including terms contion or appointment of the professional staff
promotion,
ditions and periods of employment, compensation,
,

26

Ibid., p. 178.

27

Ibid., pp. 189-190.
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classification, and reclassification, transfer, demotion,
and dismissal within funds available by appropriation of the General
Court
^he trustees shall establish and make public a policy on
faculty tenure which provides for removal for just cause,
hearing
upon dismissal, and judicial review.
*

j

*

*

*

The law gave final authority to a Board of Trustees each of whom
is appointed by the governor for a three-year term.

This group of in-

dividuals has the power to dismiss and hire the staff of the University.

With the passage of this bill in 1962, the University joined other institutions of higher education in what was by then a fairly typical American

governance system.
Under President Lederle, the University grew from an enrollment
of 6,495 students in .1966 to 20,462 in 1970, the biggest ten-year growth

in the history of the college.

The increase in faculty matched the growth

in enrollment and rose from 360 faculty in 1960 to 1,134 faculty members
in 1970.
As was typical for most land grant colleges and universities dur-

ing the 1960's, "UMass" experienced an era of growth, experimentation and

lavishness.
ways.

The effects of this period could be seen in a multitude of

Expectations of those brought in during the expansionist period

remained high.

Students were promised a "great university education";

jobs were plentiful and were believed to utilize the talents of these

university graduates.

Faculty and staff were given a free hand in both

curriculum development and use of facilities.

If existing university

of the
Act of July 1, 1962, Chapter 648 (amends Chapter 75
Acts of General Laws).
28

47

resources were incapable of fulfilling a need, outside funding was

-

sought and often gained.

A problem occurred in the 1970’s, however, as expectations rose
and financial resources fell.

The faculties of universities and colleges

were seeing the effects of a receding economy as their personal cost of
living continued to rise.

In many institutions, especially community

colleges, faculty members have watched the institution grow in terms of

enrollment but have seen their own salaries remain constant.
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst has provided its fac-

ulty and staff with competitive salaries for the last decade.

Exception-

al cases had been brought to the University's attention; but on the whole,

faculty members agreed (see Chapter III) that they were adequately remunThe process by which faculty members received payment were pro-

erated.

moted

and

were granted

tenure was an extremely different issue.

The

academic personnel policy of a university requires in-depth study, continual monitoring and equitable implementation in order for faculty mem-

bers to feel that they are being treated fairly.

When financial resources

are on the increase and budgets flexible, salary and personnel policies
are usually not thought to be a great issue.

It is when a university

has to face hard times, when budgets are cut and faculty not replaced
important,
that personnel policies and salary schedules become critically

and fall under everyone's watchful eye.

were yet to
During the fall of 1973, the effects of a recession
be felt.

rate, the facAlthough general inflation was rising at a high

Amherst campus based their predic Lion.,
ulty, staff and administration at the
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for the future University of Massachusetts budget as
they had in the

past— on

a

bigger budget.

By the spring of 1974, however, some members

of the Amherst campus had seen the foreshadowing of decreased
spending.

Those department heads who were involved with budget planning had been
asked to address this issue

projections.

— not

yet in budgetary terms, but in tenure

Some of the interviews conducted for this study began to

point toward these realities.

On the whole, however, the faculty's per-

sonal basic needs were being fulfilled.

The Development of the Faculty Professional Association

What the University of Massachusetts faculty was soon to discover

was that a traditional recourse

— the

faculty association—would not be as

effective as they imagined, precisely because of a new era of collective

bargaining laws for public employees.

Other faculty groups employed by

the state were speaking to the legislature through unions which presum-

ably would carry more weight in their bargaining efforts.

National pro-

fessional faculty associations were in the process of re-evaluating
their reasons for existence while union groups were proselytizing the
faculty.

A brief history of the major faculty associations will be included
here in order that the faculty member's attitudes toward his/her membership in those interest groups can be better understood.

s

s
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The Histories of the American Federation of Teach e r
(AFT), National Education Association (NEA) and the
.

American Association of University Professors (AAUP)

Although colleges and universities bargain collectively with

many more unions than AAUP, NEA and AFT, these are the major bargaining
agents of faculties within higher education.

The American Federation of

Teachers, founded in 1919, was the only one which began as a labor organ-

ization as part of the American Federation of Labor.

It was not until

1955, however, that the AFT began to stress the importance of collective

bargaining.

Prior to that time, the AFT had negotiated what have been

termed "de facto" collective bargaining agreements between boards of ed-

ucation and teacher unions.

In fact, it was not until 1962 that the first

AFT contract was signed between the New York City Public school system
and the United Federation of Teachers, an AFT affiliate.

AFT’s history with universities and colleges began in the 1930'
29

at several prominent institutions.""

it

The purpose of these "locals" was

to identify professors with the American labor movement for the long-run

benefits that might accrue to both sides.

Many decades later, the AFT

was elected to represent Boston State College, Southeastern Massachusetts

University, Bryant College of Business Administration, and the

Massachusetts Maritime Academy, all by 1969.

By June of 1977, the

103 instiAmerican Federation of Teachers was negotiating contracts at

tutions (202 campuses).

In March of 1976,

the two largest institutions—

College, Northampton,
“"Early AFT locals were present at Smith
New Haven.
Amherst College, Amherst; and Yale College,

.
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The State University of New York and The City University of
New York-

dropped their NEA affiliation to become solely represented by AFT.
Recent talks of a merger between the AFT and National Education
Association Is only that

— talk. 30

No serious merger discussions have taken

place between the leaders of the two associations.

The National Education Association (NEA)

The NEA is the oldest of the three organizations, having been

initially founded as the National Teachers Association in 1857.

Its

purpose was to "elevate the character and advance the interests of the

profession of teaching, and.
in the United States."

31

.

.

promote the cause of popular education

In 1870,

the National Teachers Association

merged with an organization of public school superintendents and changed
its name to the National Education Association.

ciation represent just teachers

—a

No longer did the Asso-

decision which changed its image and

would later be a bone of contention among its members.

32

In contrast to

AFT, NEA resisted the notion of collective bargaining for a long time,

30

For a full discussion of possible merger considerations, see
The Chronicle of Higher Education , July 21, 1975.

Collective Bargaining
^Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. VanEyck.
American Council on Education,
Washington, D.C.
Comes to the Campus
Quoting Walter E. Oberer and Robert E. Doherity, Teachers
1973, p. 117.
School Boards and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Gua rd
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University, 1967, pp. 22-23.
3

.
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the UFT.

:

Th e Unionization of Teachers, A Case Study
Stephen Cole.
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, Chapter I.

of^

,
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believing that unionism was inconsistent with the professional goals
and status of teachers."

%

33

Because of its strong history in the elementary and secondary
sectors of education, the NEA has a growing interest in the teacher

training institutions which ultimately drew in

colleges and universities.

a

substantial number of

Instead of simply becoming part of NEA, these

teachers and administrators formed a separate entity within NEA called
7

the American Association of Higher Education (AAHE)

.

Eventually, how-

ever, AAHE wanted to focus on the needs of both its professorial and ad-

ministrative membership, whereas NEA wanted to concentrate more heavily
on teachers.
4

AAHE’s negative posture toward collective bargaining pro-

vided an additional reason for its final disassociation from NEA in 1968.

Until the mid sixties, NEA refrained from union activity, but

growing pressure from an increasing number of AFT collective bargaining

organizations proved to be too great for NEA to resist.

Even its policy

forbidding employee strikes softened as the NEA Locals began dealing

with the harsh realities of public sector bargaining.

By 1969, NEA had organized forty units primarily in the commun-

ity college sector, its strongest base at this point.

By June of 1977,

(covNEA had negotiated contracts at 145 higher education institutions

ering 207 campuses).
of their largest

33

AAUP and NEA together have joined to represent one

faculties— the University of Hawaii which includes both

Comes to Campus,
Carr and Van Eyck, C ollective Bargaining

p.

U9

J

.
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the four-year and two-year colleges of that state as well as other major

universities

Although the NEA recently moved into negotiating a wide range
of issues for their contracts, the Association, founded on the princi-

ples of a teachers' professional association, built its reputation on a

hard "professional" line.

Theodore Martin, Director of NEA's membership

division from 1925 to 1950, described unionism in the following way:
Unionism lowers the ideals of teaching. By emphasizing only the
selfish, though necessary, economic needs of teachers salary, hours,
tenure, retirement unionism misses altogether the finer ideals and
rich compensations that do not appear in the salary envelope. 35

—

—

To this degree, the NEA reflects the principles of another organization

that at one time appeared to be even less likely to become a bargaining

— the

agent

American Association of University Professors.

Association of University Professors (AAUP)

Arne r i c an

In 1915, a group of professors sought to protect "the dignity of

the profession" by forming the American Association of University ProfesAt first, the major effort of the AAUP was to:

sors.

win respectability. A bellicose attitude toward trustees,
usual postures of
a militant stand on academic freedom, any of the
great majority
the trade union, would have alarmed and repelled a
.

.

.

3^ The Chr onicle of Higher Education ,

31,

1977, p.

Volume XIV, Number 14, May

10~

Building a Teachin g Profession.
The Whitlock Press, 1957, p. 161.

35 T heodore D. Martin.

town, New York:

Middle-

^

^
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... The main goals of the Association
appealed to professors as professional men, not as employees.

of American professors.

The first major task undertaken by the Association was the for-

mation and report of "Committee A" on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure.

The Committee's report concentrated on the notion of academic

freedom for the individual professor so that he/she might pursue a field
of research,

her ability.

teach and be able to serve the public to the best of his/
The Committee outlined what it felt po be the distinction

between the legal supremacy of governing boards and their moral duty to
abide by these academic principles.

The concept of academic freedom,

however, did not come without its limits and obligations:
As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember
that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions
of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not
an institutional spokesman
.

Besides the fundamental principles outlined above, the Committee

outlined the following two proposals:

first, that if a faculty member

were going to be dismissed or demoted for reasons related to academic
freedom, he/she be given the reasons in writing and that he/she be given
a fair trial on those

charges "before a special or permanent judicial

committee chosen by the faculty senate or council or by the faculty at

36

dom, p. 478
Ilofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Free

of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
Washington, D.C.
issued in 1940, AAUP Policy Document and Reports.
The AAUP, 1973, p. 2.

^The Statement

:

.
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large, and the second proposal stated that academic
freedom be provided

security and dignity in the academic job through definite
rules of tenure

38
*

Academic freedom was clearly the goal; due process and tenure

were regarded as the necessary means.
AAUP is distinguishable from the AFT and the NEA because it is
the only organization which has always had only post-secondary faculty
in its membership.

To this day,

its membership requirements state that

one must be either a faculty member or a person certified under the fac-

ulty bargaining unit (added in 1972 after AAUP had endorsed collective

bargaining)

Although small in number, the first group of AAUP members included the most prestigious faculty of the day.

Jn 1913,

a small group

of professors from seven different colleges assembled at the Johns

Hopkins Club;, and out of that first meeting, AAUP was born.

The member-

ship was limited at first to faculty of full professor rank causing the

organization to grow very slowly.

Even though by 1922 there were 183

institutions and 4,046 members who had joined AAUP, there were many

prominent academicians who would not join.

Walter Metzger quotes from

an early non-believer:

I am opposed to anything that
The matter does not interest me.
savours of organization or the formation of societies of any sort.
The modern habit of organization I regard as a pernicious form of
The present unfavorable conditions of university life
activity.
will finally be remedied not by organization but by the refusal of

^Hofstadter and Metzger, De velopment of Academic Freedom

,

p.

481
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capable men to enter into it.
Medical School). 39

(W.

T.

Councilman of the Harvard

AAUP was troubled by the agenda conflict of organizational objectives.
On the one hand,
tion,

the AAUP tried to function as an agency of codifica-

fixing its sights on the larger aspects of academic freedom and

other professional problems.

On the other hand, it had to function as

an agency of group pressure, investigating cases and imposing penalties
in response to immediate demands.

The Committee A report, discussed earlier in this chapter, tried
to resolve this conflict in the very beginning.

The Statement of Academic

Freedom and Tenure (1915) attempted to outline general principles at the
same time as it proposed two protective measures for its faculty membership.

Though the statement was applauded as the best of its time, it did

not serve as the final answer.

AAUP to this day plays the dual role of

intercessor for a wronged individual faculty member and, through its com-

mittee structure, the policy maker for institutional faculties.
When AAUP recently entered into collective bargaining, many of
its members were disturbed by a position which they viewed as directly

contradictory to the goals of their professional association.

One mem-

ber used the Association’s Bulle tin to state his objection.
(1) our
In this state of dissent, we will try to briefly show why:
the
of
adoption
historic functions will be seriously threatened by
council’s proposal; (2) the chances are small that our influence
and
will be enhanced if we choose the collective bargaining route;
of
adherence to our historic role will, even assuming a spread

(3)

39

Ibid., p.

'«78.
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collective bargaining, facilitate the maximum contribution to
higher education.
In brief, the consequence of adopting the Council's
proposal may well be to convert the AAUP into the AUUP the American
Union of University Professionals— with a substantial change in character of its membership, its identity, and its image; sharp impairment of its ability to carry out its historic role and an indeterminately severe curtailment of the effectiveness of the Association's
staff and of Committee A. ®

—

The collective bargaining statement which was eventually adopted

by a majority of the membership sought to incorporate the Association's

goals and principles as well as to outline the policy for a chapter's

representative status.
action

— the

In a sense, it echoes the Association's first

report from Committee A in 1915 which also stressed the use

of academic tenure as a means to an end

— namely,

academic freedom.

The longstanding programs of the Association are the means to achieve
the enhancement
a number of basic ends at colleges and universities:
of academic freedom and tenure; of due process; of sound academic government.
Collective bargaining, properly used, is essentially another
means to achieve these ends; and at the same time, to strengthen the
influence of the faculty in the distribution of an institution's econ(See Appendix 3 for full AAUP Statement on Collecomic resources.
tive Bargaining.)

^

In June of 1977, AAUP had, or was negotiating, forty-one contracts

covering forty-nine campuses.

Additionally, it had negotiated contracts

jointly with NEA (Hawaii and two other institutions) and with AFT (Eastern
Montana College)

.

Virginia Lee Lussier, from the University of Delaware, did an excellent comparison of the three organizations and their positions on

^Sanford Kadish.

AAUP Bulleti n, March, 1972, pp. 58-59.

on Collective Bargaining,"
Volume 58, Number 4, December, 1971, p. 423.

^"The Statement

AAUP Bulletin,
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higher education issues. A 2

Table

2

illustrates the differences between

the three organizations in several key areas.
ings

The choice of a bargain-

agent is critical for a college faculty because the scope and con-

tent of the eventual contract will as likely reflect the union’s objec-

tives as they will the faculty’s.

In voting to elect a bargaining agent,

a faculty must decide among some very traditional organizations.

The

problem is that each of their traditions is quite separate and unique.
On November 15th and 16th of 1973, faculty members at the

University of Massachusetts voted on whether or not they wanted to be
represented to the legislature of the Commonwealth by a bargaining agent
or, as was then the case, by the administration of the University.

By

having to make such a choice, professors were calling into question,
•l

first, their own role within the academic profession; second, the role
of the University administration in that profession; and finally, the

effect of collective bargaining legislation on the individual faculty

member and on the faculty as a group.

To fully understand faculty at-

titudes toward collective bargaining and the union movement in the United
States requires at least a brief historical review of those developments.
Such a review constitutes the third section of Chapter II.

in ColVirginia Lee Lussier. "National Faculty Associations
D.C.:
Washington,
lective Bargaining: A Comparative Discussion."
July, 1974, Special
Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service,
Report Number 8.
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The Origins of Collective Bargaining
In Higher Education

Collective bargaining has a multitude of meanings to the working
people of the United States.

To the AFL-CIO member, it may mean a cost-

of-living increase or a dues increase.

To the manager of a General Motors

plant, it may mean that for eleven months out of the year, his plant runs
>

smoothly; but during the period of contract negotiations, his life and
the production level at the plant are chaotic.

Collective bargaining,

placed in the context of trade unionism, is a fairly new concept (for
the most part, a nineteenth century phenomenon); but as a general notion
of "collective action to achieve individual and group control," the mean-

ing of "collective bargaining" is as old as group solidarity itself.

Collective bargaining is often regarded as a phenomenon associated

with "blue collar" workers.

But in the period of the last

tv?o

decades,

"white collar" unionism has added important new meaning to collective bargaining.

In the past five years, it has assumed significant proportions

among college and university faculty

—a

group hitherto considered to be

quite unsusceptible to any identification with labor unionism.

Faculty

unionism, however, had its origins well before the rapid expansion of

higher education within the past twenty years.

One university governing

board began negotiating voluntarily with a union as early as 193o,

A3

but

to recognize an employee organization
"ColFred J. Lorenz.
in 1938.
for certain of its non-academic employees
_gnd_Ugi
Collggg
the
_of_
Journal
lective Bargaining in Higher Education,"
College and University
Washington, D.C.
Personnel Association

^Harvard University agreed

versltv
Personnel Association, 1971,

.

p-

3?..

61

the first major ruling on the matter of collective negotiations by uni-

versity employees came in 1951 when the trustees of Columbia University
brought before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) a case involving
the college's non-academic employees.

The NLRB ruled that it did not

have jurisdiction over Columbia University because "the activities involved are non-commercial in nature and intimately connected with the
charitable purposes (researcher's emphasis) of educational activities of
the institution" (Trustees of Columbia University vs. National Labor Re-

lations Board 97, NLRB, 427).

This ruling meant that private college em-

ployees had no legal procedure enabling them to be represented unless the

private employer agreed to a voluntary contract which was the case at
Harvard University and several other large universities.

Although many cases were heard by the National Labor Relations
Board during the 1950 's and 1960's, private higher education was not

brought within the jurisdiction of the NLRB until 1970 when the Board,
hearing the case of Cornell University, reversed the position it had
taken in the Columbia University case; and ruled that non-academic em-

ployees in the private sector did have the legal right to collective

bargaining.

It was an historic decision.

to resolve
Charged with providing peaceful and orderly procedures
the poleffectuate
best
can
we
labor controversy, we conclude that
private
non-profit,
over
icies of the Act by asserting jurisdiction
appropriate.
be
educational institutions where we find it to

4^183 NLRB, No. 41 at 13, 74 LRRM at 1275.

t
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The Board concluded, "it is no longer
sufficient to say that merely because employees are in a non-profit
sector of the economy, the opera-

tions of their employers do not substantially
affect interstate commerce.'

Soon after the Cornell decisions, the NLRB issued
the so-called

million dollar rule," stating that all institutions in
private higher
education which had an annual gross revenue of more than
one million dollars would fall under the Board's jurisdiction.^ 6

But the most radical

step did not come until the following year in 1971, when the
right of

collective bargaining was extended to faculty in private higher education, coming in a Board ruling on petition from faculty members who had

organized under the United Federation of College Teachers (AFT affiliate)
at Long Island University .

45 183

^

NLRB, No. 41 at 10, 74 LRRM at 1273.

46

Appendix E, CFR Title 29 - Labor /Chapter 1, NLRB part 103 quoted
by Faculty Power:
Collective Bargaining on Campus edited by Terrence N.
Tice and Grace W. Holmes, p. 252, subpart A.
,

47

The case which determined that post-secondary faculty members
did come under NLRB jurisdiction is an interesting one.
Two centers of
They
Long Island University petitioned for a collective bargaining unit.
wanted to be represented by the UFCT, but the Board of Trustees of the
University felt that they could use the NLRB Cornell decision (which gave
collective bargaining rights to non-academic employees only) to prohibit
UFCT from organizing.
The Trustees claimed that Long Island University
faculty were "supervisors" (and thus had no rights to bargain collectively) since they made decisions on promotions, tenure, and other policy and
"... we are
The Board, however, ruled otherwise:
personnel matters.
which
authority
of the view that the policy-making and quasi-supervisory
adheres to full-time faculty status but is exercised by them only as a
group does not make them supervisors within the meaning of Section II of
Acthe Act, or managerial employees who must be separately represented.
in
qualify
members
faculty
university
full-time
that
find
cordingly, we
every respect as professional employees under Section II of the Act; and,
therefore, are entitled to all the benefits of collective bargaining if
they so desire." As cited by Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. Van E^ck.
29.
p
1 e c ive Bar g aining Comes t o the Campus
,

.

.
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The jurisdiction of the NLRB is solely in the private sector;
but the Board's impact is nevertheless also felt in the public sector
of higher education because its cases, rulings and decisions are "judge-

made labor law," and serve as the prototypes for many state labor relations laws and state board decisions.

^

The state laws governing collec-

tive bargaining for state and local employees differ among themselves;

but all reflect in greater or lesser degree, the National Labor Relations
Act.

In summary, academic employees in the private sector who are em-

ployed in institutions with annual budgets of more than one million dollars are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB; while their counterparts
in the (non-f ederal) public sector are subject to the jurisdiction spe-

cified by their own states' legislation.
Federal employees gained improved collective bargaining rights

when President John

Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 in 1962.

F.
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Seven years later, Executive Order 11491 was issued by President Richard
M. Nixon establishing the Federal Labor Relations Council.

The Council

is responsible for the administration and interpretation of Executive

48

Ibid

6

.

of
interesting historical note: The Pendleton Act (1883)
system.
civil service
New York outlined some of the first guidelines for a
foresight:
(1) it established
great
show
Several major points of the Act
the Act create
President;
(2)
the
by
an independent commission appointed
in the selec
aid
to
job
the
to
open and competitive examinations related
for employees
established
was
period
tion of employees; (3) a probationary
job;
(4) Civil
the
on
permanency
after which time they gained a kind of
creat d
was
clause
a
advantages; (5)
War veterans qualified for certain
applied
was
system
a merit
to prohibit "payback" to politicians; (6)
passed during President Johnson s
(IPA)
Act
Personnel
The Intergovernmental
merit system.
administration outlined in greater detail a

^An

;
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Order 11491, and is a parallel in many respects to
the National Labor

Relations Board.

In contrast to the NLRB, Executive Order 11491
care-

fully limits union bargaining rights on the extant
management "prerogatives

;

and although the order did not give the federal employee
rights

to bargain for wages, it did establish detailed grievance
procedures.

The first law to affect public employees was passed in 1959 in
the State of Wisconsin; however, it was not until 1^65, in Michigan, that

post-secondary teaching personnel were specifically covered by any law.
Elementary and secondary teachers, who were the vanguard of collective

The Executive Order 11491 as amended, Section 12 states that
management officials of the agency retain the right, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations:
(1) to direct employees of the agency;
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions
within the agency and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against employees; (3) to relieve employees from duties
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons (emphasis mine)
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the government operations entrusted to
them; (5) to determine the methods, means and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted; (6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency;
(7) nothing in the agreement shall require an employee to become or to
remain a member of a labor organization or to pay money to the organization except pursuant to a voluntary, written authorization by a member
Section 10 of 11491
for the payment of dues through payroll deductions.
provides E xclusive Recognition to a labor organization (when that organiIt is important to point out here
zation has been selected and approved)
that the American labor movement has made this unique contribution to colThe union is required to represent all members of the
lective bargaining.
established unit, even though they may not be members of the union. In
France and Italy, one would normally find two or three unions in one factory one being of communist orientation, one of catholic (Christian DemoThese unions tend to
crat) and one of right wing socialist orientation.
employ the "whipsawing" tactics more often; each unit will use the demands
of the other to negotiate further items with management for the contract (s)
Finally, the order is important because it does not concern itself with
These items management rights, exclusive recognition, the bargainwages.
to
ing unit, and wages will be discussed in greater detail with regards
election.
the Massachusetts Law(s) and the University of Massachusetts
election.
MSP-AAUP
the
of
outcome
the
on
All four issues had an impact
.

—

—
—
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bargaining in education, were first legally covered in Wisconsin as recently as 1961.

It should come as no surprise that during the relative-

ly short legal history of collective bargaining within the educational

sector, the states having the most progressive labor legislation also

have had the greatest number of post-secondary institutions involved in

collective bargaining.

This study makes use of the survey conducted by

the Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service (March, 1975).^

The great majority of institutions which are now unionized are within the

twenty-five states which have some sort of legislation providing collective bargaining for public employees.

As of June 1977, 150,000 of an ap-

proximate 600,000 faculty in the United States were represented by a collective bargaining agent.

Two institutions

York and The University of Hawaii

— provide

— The

City University of New

illustrative case studies of

this survey, legislation existed in twenty-five states per
mitting collective bargaining by some post-secondary employees: Alaska
Florida
(1971), California** (1975), Connecticut* (1975), Delaware (1970),
(1974), Hawaii (1973), Iowa (1974), Kansas (1974), Maine* (1975),
Massachusetts (1973), Michigan (1973), Minnesota (1974), Montana (1974),
(1971), New
and Nebraska (1972); replacing the 1965 law: Nevada
Hampshire (1975), New Jersey (1974), New York (1974), Oregon (1972),
In addition, the states of
Pennsylvania (1970), and Wisconsin* (1974).
in
Illinois and New Mexico permit bargaining by non-academic personnel
four-year colleges.

^In

Vocational and Technical only.
'k'k

Two-year only.

separately under
***Community College faculty may be looked upon
Employee Relations Act.

,

;
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the unionization of faculties in public higher education. 52

There are

also a myriad of other very important cases, some of which
will be

The City University of New York has a tempestuous record with
organized labor. The history of the faculty's union affiliations is long
and complicated.
It begins in 1963 when the American Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO) chartered the United Federation of College Teachers (UFCT)
Local 1460.
By 1957, there were 413 faculty members in that local.
Growing side by side with this organization and representing the majority of
faculty was the Legislative Congress (LC) which had acted as the spokesman
for the CUNY faculty since 1938.
In November of 1967, the LC petitioned
the New York Public Relations Board for certification as legal representative of the CUNY faculty.
(In September of 1967, the Public Employee's
Fair Employment Act was passed by the New York State Legislature.
Its
common name is the Taylor Law. The law specifically stated that postsecondary public employees were included, New York Civil Service Law,
SS 200-12, Chapter 392 of the Laws of 1967, amended May 1, 1970.)
Almost
immediately the UFT local 1460 filed a similar petition; each wanted to
represent a portion of the university faculty. After several months of
hearings, the New York Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) examiner
ruled that two collective bargaining units were required. Therefore, in
1967, both the UFCT and the LC won the right to represent two parts of
the CUNY faculty UFCT represented the lecturers and teaching assistants
Two years
and the LC tenured and non- tenured but tenure "track" positions.
later (1969)
the LC merged with the National Education Association (NEA)
and then in 1975, merged with the AFT affiliate, the UFCT, to form a single
academic bargaining unit called the Professional Staff Congress (PSC) an
NEA-AFT affiliate.
The PSC later dropped affiliation with NEA to be totalFor more information, see Bernard Mintz, "The CUNY
ly represented by AFT.
Experience," Wisconsin Law Review Volume 1, 1971.

—

,

,

,

The University of Hawaii collective bargaining situation proved
to be a most valuable case for study because of the project undertaken by
Their study examined
Joel Seidman, Lane Kelley and Alfred Edge in 1972.
v
the voting preference of various campus faculties within the University of
Their findings included:
(1) that the more established professors
Hawaii.
with tenure and located on the most prestigious campus (Manoa) voted decisively in the first ballot (October of 1972) for the "no union" choice;
and later in the run-off election (November of 1972) for the most conservative union group, the alliance (a combination of the local unit of AAUP
It was shown that comand the University of Hawaii Faculty Association).
options which most
the
for
vote
munity college faculty were more apt to
and University PerCollege
closely resembled the trade union model the
Federation of College
Hawaii
the
sonnel Association (the NEA affiliate) and
In addition , the Seidman, Kelley
Teachers (affiliated with the AFL-CIO).
7 and Edge study compared the voting behavior of faculties from different
Sciences, departmental
academic departments. Within the School of Arts and

—
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mentioned in Chapter III as they relate to the
University of Massachusetts
election.

53

The Massachusetts Collective Bargaining Laws

The State of Massachusetts implemented a new collective bargain-

ing law.

In July of 1974, the General Laws governing public employer

labor relations were amended by adding Chapter 150E to Chapter 1078
of 1973.

— Acts

Up until that time, public employees in Massachusetts were

allowed to bargain collectively but could not bargain for wages.

The new

law changed that.

affiliation was a highly significant variable. Among natural science faculty, eighteen percent voted the "no union" option, and forty-one percent
preferred the alliance.
In the Social Sciences, on the other hand, a near
majority was won for the options with a "trade union" image forty-six percent for a combined CUPA, HGEA and HFCT.
In the Humanities, thirty-five
percent voted for one of the trade union models with thirty-two voting
heavily against all union options, forty-eight "no union," twenty-three
percent alliance, and a combined twenty-four percent for the three trade
union models CUPA, HGEA and HFCT. The run-off election in November of
1972 proved an HFCT victory; although subsequently after two years of negotiations by HFCT, the faculty rejected the final contract by a vote of
Because the contract was rejected, a new election was held
1,073 to 296.
The Hawaii faculty replaced the HFCT with a coaliin the fall of 1974.
For more
(affiliated with NEA) and the AAUP.
CUPA
tion body made up of
Bar"Faculty
Edge,
Alfred
and
information, see Joel Seidman, Lane Kelley
Number
Volume
1,
13,
gaining Comes to Hawaii," Industrial Relations
February, 1974.

—

—
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There are several cases involving university employees which
are felt to have had substantial impact upon future decisions. Those already mentioned are: The Columbia University case (97NLRB424) the Cornell
University case (183NLRB41); and The Long Island University case (see
In Chapter III, the Fordham University case (193NLRB23)
footnote 47).
of Miami
is also discussed as are the Wayne State University, University
unit.
bargaining
the
of
questions
involve
and Eastern Michigan cases, which
;
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The employer and the exclusive representative
shall meet at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the
employer's budgetmaking process and shall negotiate in good faith
with respect to
wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance,
and any
other terms and conditions of employment; but such
obligation shall
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
make a concession. 5 ^

There is more than one change in the 1974 law which has directly
effected the outcome of public sector bargaining in Massachusetts.

Both

the definition of certain terms and the range of negotiable items are
two such alterations directly influencing public higher education col-

lective bargaining.

One such definition has become an important element

in faculty unit determination.

Whereas many other state laws limit their

discussions to "employee vs. employer," the Massachusetts Law carefully
defines a professional employee as follows:

"Professional employee": Any employee engaged in work:
(1) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (2) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgement in its performance;
(3) of such character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
and (4) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual or physical processes. ^5

54

Acts of 1973, Chapter 1078, Dit of 1973, 150E, Section 6.
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From Chapter 1078, Section 1, a particularly confusing aspect
of the definition is that a "professional" employee has a distinct and
Instead of refer
different meaning at the University of Massachuset i.s
by hours, it remeasured
be
cannot
j_ng to any person whose work output
for tae pur
staff.
administrative
fers to exempt level employees in the
Massachusetts
1973
the
pose of this study, the definition contained in
Collective Bargaining Law is the one used.
.

j-

x

.
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Without the proper definition of a "professional employee," serious questions can arise as to whom the bargaining unit can include (and,

therefore, who can vote in a given election).

The NLRB controversies

over faculty bargaining units at Fordham, Long Island and Adelphi Univer-

sities are examples of the length to which such confusion can go.

A full

explanation of the bargaining unit and relevant cases can be found in
Chapter III.

56

What is critical in the definition is the notion that a

faculty member is a worker, not a supervisor; and yet, his work is of
"such a character that the output produced cannot be standardized in re-

lation to a given period of time."

The lack of specificity with regards

to productivity measurement causes one major problem.

There is no easily

determined gauge of accountability for the professional employee, i.e.,
the faculty member.

"Accountability" has recently become a major issue in public ed-

ucation nationally.

— hours

of work

The scale by which most public employees are measured

— simply

does not pertain to faculty in higher education.

The problem is that the college professor does not view accountability in
the same way that the taxpayers do.

For the professor, work satisfaction

or field
comes from an entirely different arena; namely, his discipline

of research.

Professor Harvey Friedman has pointed out that increasingly,

"professional"
For a discussion of the differences between
of higher learninstitutions
within
authority and "managerial" authority
Report D-9709 on Northeastern
ing, see National Labor Relations Board
a clear distinction between
University case. Here, Ralph E. Kennedy draws
the Vice
the authority
and
authority
the administration's bureaucratic
Unive
the
to
available
made
President who is a faculty member. Reprint
.limeo
1975.
of
fall
the
in
sity of Massachusetts Department Chairmen
graphed
56
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the autonomous individual

— the

doctor with his private practice, the

professor with his course and a group of students

— is

either choosing

to or is being forced to become part of an ever-growing mega-institution.

The small college becomes the multiversity administered by a board of

trustees and a large selection of "managers".
practice; it is more economical.

The doctor goes into group

Friedman submits that the professional's

commitment, at least partially, remains more with his colleagues than

with the clients

— the

physician's commitment is to his fellow practition-

ers and the professor's to his fellow teachers in his academic discipline.

Hie esteem level is measured within these groups, not from professor to

student or from doctor to patient.

So,

the question raised by the admin-

istrator in the college or hospital about "accountability" to the student
or client becomes clouded because the professional must consider his re-

search and his colleagues as well as his client.

Accountability to only

one group might mean a deterioration of service to another involving the

esteem level of the professional as well.
Contrary to the 1967 collective bargaining law, the new law specified the employer of the University of Massachusetts faculty.

"In the

universities,
case of employees of the community and state colleges and
any individual
the employer shall mean the respective board of trustees or

interest in dealing with
who is designated to represent it and act in its
its employees.

57
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A third innovation within Chapter 150E was the "agency
shop"

clause which leaves negotiable the duty of all employees covered
by the
unit to pay dues to the established collective bargaining agent.

^clause states

The

that if either party requests an agency shop agreement and

the other party concurs, it forces an election by all unit employees on
the total contract.

One possible result of this could be that after

months of negotiation, the contract might be defeated simply because of
the agency shop clause.

The risk is high for the bargaining agent; and

so it is not surprising that none of the Massachusetts higher education

contracts (through June of 1977) have included agency shop clauses.
Section

8

of Chapter 150E allows the two parties to negotiate a

grievance procedure which would, in the event of a dispute, be decided by

/

binding arbitration.

If the contract does not include a grievance proce-

dure and a grievance occurs over suspension, dismissal, removal, or termination, then the Labor Relations Commission may order binding arbitration

upon the request of either party.

59

"^Section 12 of Chapter 150E of Chapter 1078 of the General Laws
"The Commonwealth or any other employer shall require as a condireads:
tion of employment during the life of a collective bargaining agreement so
providing, the payment on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever
is later, of a service fee to the employer organization which, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, is duly recognized by the employer or designated by the commission as the exclusive bargaining agent for
provided however, that such
the unit in which such employee is employed:
bargaining agreement
collective
the
service fee shall not be imposed unless
been formally exehas
employment
requiring its payment as a condition of
in such bargaining
employees
cuted. pursuant to a vote of a majority of all
commen-^
proportionately
Such service fee will be
unit present and voting.
administration.
surate with the cost of collective bargaining and contract

^The commission
J

23
is established under Section 90 of Chapter

of the General Laws of the Commonwealth.
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Finally, Section

9

provides for arbitration to settle a dispute

which arises from the negotiations.

In the case of a breakdown, either

or both parties may petition the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration
to determine whether there is an impasse.
a

If

this is found to be so,

mediator is appointed to help determine a resolution to the dispute.

In the event that the mediator does not solve the impasse, a fact-finder
is appointed; and any arbitration agreed upon by both parties becomes

binding.

the two parties had not originally agreed to arbitration,

If

however, and an impasse continues, the issues are returned for further
negotiation.
These, then, are the major additions to the collective bargaining

law governing public employees in Massachusetts.

Faculty who are current-

ly negotiating either their first or second contracts will most assuredly

use the new wage provision in an attempt to gain higher wages.
tion remains:

Hie ques-

How will the law affect the remaining ununionized campuses?

And most importantly, will a unionized faculty be assured of receiving

higher wages simply because it can bargain for those wages?

What will

the state legislature's reaction be to a new series of public employee

contracts?

The answers to these questions will continue to be considered

during the next few years by all public employees, especially since the
governor has been attempting to cut down on

'profligate

spending by var

and has
ious segments of the Commonwealth, including higher education;

legislature as
been known to leave wage increase questions to the State
increase.
a way of negotiating the possibility of such an

^Established in Chapter

23, Section 7.

^

.
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What were the effects of the original law, denying wage negotiation for public employees, on Massachusetts higher education contracts?
To answer this question, a comparison is drawn of two higher education

contracts, both negotiated in 1973
in New York

— demonstrating

— one

in Massachusetts and the other

in stark contrast how two different laws in-

fluenced the contracts of two public institutions of higher education.
V

One strong cautionary note should be added.

Hie City University of New

York is a system of many colleges; therefore, the bargaining agent for
its faculties

— the

Professional Staff Congress (PSC)

— did

not outline

specific academic governance procedures for all of its member institutions.

Instead, the PSC negotiated general guidelines for its faculties.

The Massachusetts College of Art is one college within a state system.

Therefore, its faculty had (one assumes) a common purpose and set of en-

vironmental factors, making it easier to specify governance procedures
(see Table 3)

When higher education was transplanted from Europe to America,
so too was the tradition of the scholar as a man set apart from the work-

a-day world.

The European academic had an aura about him which, in the

educated men.
days of the guilds, meant that he was of an elite group of
amount of awe, and
The old world scholars were regarded with a certain

were part of

a

profession which literally cloistered them from many of

Board of Trustees
The Massachusetts agreement is between the
Faculty Federation,
Art
of
College
of the State colleges and Massachusetts
9
June
14,
CIO,
AIL
American Federation of Teachers, Local 20 j 7,
City
the
of
Education
Higher
of
New York agreement is between the Board
Congress.
of New York and Professional Staff
.
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TABLE

3

COMPARISON OF TWO AGREEMENTS

Professional Staff Congress

Article

Article

1

Recognition and Definition

2

Organizational Use of
Faculties

Relationship Between Board
and Federation

3

Use of College Faculties

Faculties and Services

4

Faculty Fringe Benefits

1

Recognition

2

Board:

7

30
6

23

25

PSC Relationships

Release Time

Appendix:

Payroll Dues
Check-off

Distinguished Professorships

Appendix:

Board’s Policy
in Appointment

Research and Fellowships
Awards

Appendix:

Promotion and
Tenure

Appendix:

Non-Discrimination

Appendix:

Definition of Work
Year

26

Welfare Benefits

27

Retirement

28

Travel Allowances

29

Waiver of Tuition Fees

4

Check-off and Agency Shop

9

Appointment and Reappointment

10

8

14

Massachusetts College of Art
AFL-CIO

Schedule of Notification
of Appointment and Reappointment

Non-discrimination

Article II:
Appendix:

9

No Strike Pledge

Criteria for
Studio Personnel

Duties of Faculty

10

Faculty Grievances

12

Statutory Responsibilities

13

Policy-Making Authority of
the Board of Trustees

8

Faculty Evaluation and Advancement

Annual Leave

31

No Strike Pledge

13

Multiple Year Appointments
for Business Manager and
Higher Education Office

12

Certification of Continuous Employ

16

Saving Clause

Workload

15

Duration and Extent

15

Appendix:

Forms for Faculty
Evaluation, and
the Professional
Data Form
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Professional Staff Congress

Article
Jury Duty

20

Complaint Grievance and
Arbitration Procedures

21

Disciplinary Actions

11

Classification of Titles

14

Professional Evaluation

19

Personnel Files

22

Increased Promotional
Opportunities

Compliance of Board Time
Schedules

5

Statement on Academic
Freedom and Responsibility

6

Participation in DecisionMaking

7

Division and Department
Organization

Information and Data

18

3

Massachusetts College of Art
AFL-CIO

Article

17

5

_

Unit Stability

16

Temporary Disability
on Parental Leave

24

Salary Schedules

32

Legislature Action

33

Duration

One can see immediately that Articles 6 and 7 make the
Massachusetts model unique.
Some authors have predicted that academic
governance is the real issue for many faculties, and they have indicated
in recent studies that faculty are as concerned about a loss of academic
and political power as they are about negotiating competitive salaries
(ACE).
If these studies are accurate, and if the economy forces salary
negotiation to a subsistence level, then governance may be the new arena
Perhaps unwittingly, the Massachusetts State
for contract negotiation.
College System has forecasted a national trend of governance contracts.
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life's realities.

The American college, however, was born into an egal-

itarian society; and because of this immense distinction, had an entirely different set of problems and concerns from the European university.

The aims of early American society and the body of laws which

arose to meet these goals placed the faculties of American higher education in a dilemma.

The elitest tradition, which had at once protected
*

scholarship and defined its power, now would be placed in the context
of an egalitarian world.

Primary to the hypothesis of the study, then,

is an examination of that European tradition, the notions of academe

that arose within that tradition and a parallel examination of the de-

velopment of American higher education concepts.
Equally important was the development of the guild's replacement
in American higher education

— the

professional association.

As is re-

vealed in the results of this study, faculty attitudes toward the various faculty interest groups placed a critical role in the results of
the November election.

The faculty were concerned not only with which

group would be most effective, but which group was most similar to the
individual.

Comments like, "I didn't like the types connected with the

MSP or CCF faculty group," were not uncommon.

Identification with the

was
appropriate representative was a key factor in this election, and

collective barinfluenced by a faculty member's predisposition toward
gaining.
higher education has been
The collective bargaining movement in

significant.

universities have
The changes wrought within colleges or

and accountability.
involved issues of governance, control

1

acuities
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facing the choice of whether to unionize or not are obviously influenced
by previous faculty elections and their results.

The National Labor

Relations Act, the various state laws and executive orders have influenced institutions of higher learning to a remarkable extent.

Of even

greater significance to the election at the University, however, was the

faculty member's attitude toward the entire union movement.

Certainly,

he/she could see what effects the CUNY bargaining election had had on
its faculties, but one's predisposition was based on a more fundamental

issue.

Does a member of academe need to be represented by an "outside

force" (as one respondent called the bargaining agent)

,

or does the fac-

ulty of the University of Massachusetts have sufficient voice/power to

represent itself to the Legislature?

That was the ultimate question upon

which the faculty at the University of Massachusetts were asked to vote.

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW

Introduction

:

History of Events Leading Up to the November Election

The decade of the sixties saw fast growth among land grant uni-

versities.

The University of Massachusetts was no exception.

The size

of its faculty kept pace with that growth, expanding from 360 in 1962
to over 1,400 faculty members by 1972.

with an expensive price tag.

This faculty growth rate came

It demanded that future student enrollments

keep pace far into the University's future.

Standard job security, ten-

ure policies, a depleting faculty turnover rate, inflation, and a fore-

casted economy of recession did not help the budgeting process at the
outset of the 1970

's.

Although an unpredicted shortage of student en-

rollments caught many private colleges and universities with insufficient
revenues, the public colleges were being flooded by student applications.

What had not been forecast, however, was a legislative funding cutback
which, in effect, had the same results for the University of Massachusetts
as the reduced enrollments had for the private college.

The general

economic recession was perhaps a problem for each university faculty member personally; but as a group, they had not experienced the effects of
the recession.

In the fall of 1973,

that was yet to come.

Long before the 1973 collective bargaining election, the University of Massachusetts faculty had been investigating the possibilities
78

.

.
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of union representation.

Although there were a few faculty who had been

members of the American Federation of Teachers, no substantial
univercommittee had been established to study faculty unionization

until early in the academic year, 1971-1972.
events took place.

During that year, two major

The first was a meeting organized by interested fac-

ulty at the University to inform and educate themselves on matters per-

taining to collective bargaining.

Speaking to approximately four hundred

faculty were a panel of experienced persons
of the CUNY unit of NEA;

— Belle

Zeller, then president

Israel Kugler of AFT; and Martin Lapidas of the

AAUP unit at Rutgers University who had been invited to speak at the

University by the faculty senate.

Also during 1971, the Faculty Senate

Committee on faculty affairs named a subcommittee to investigate and report upon "public policy, authority, mechanics, regulations and procedures,

advantages and disadvantages, experience of other colleges and universities

within and outside the Commonwealth relating to faculty collective bargaining."^

The committee’s report gave a capsuled version of the history

of collective bargaining within Massachusetts and pointed out some of the

effects of unionization on college faculties.

Perhaps the most interest-

ing passage of the report was its summary of the legal powers of the

University of Massachusetts faculty senate, to which the report was
addressed

^"Faculty Collective Bargaining: Special Report of the Faculty
171st Meeting
Affairs Committee," presented by Chairman Verda Dale at the
of
University
71-028,
Sen, Doc.,
of the Faculty Senate on March 4, 1971.
Massachusetts/Amherst
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Under the University’s autonomy statute, legal authority to

govern the University resides solely in the Board of Trustees and the

administration.

The faculty (as well as its senate) and students (rep-

resented by undergraduate and graduate student senates) have no legal
standing.

Accordingly, the faculty senate's character is "advisory" in

the sense that neither the trustees nor the administration is legally

bound to respect senate actions.
An alternative to the all-powerful Board authority was the fac-

ulty union which the report outlined in an abbreviated form:
1.

A formal structure, supported by a legally enforceable contract

providing for participation with final decisions being made on
a bilateral basis as against the unilateral decisions being

made by the University management currently.
2.

A method, based on democratic organization.

3.

A voice, with power, to develop and enforce professional stands,
i.e., peer control of these standards.

4.

Affiliation with a national organization, an opportunity to collect facts and figures as an aid to resolving cases and conditions.

5.

A dues structure adequate to provide for representation, research
and resolution.

unionization were discussed
No particularly negative results of faculty
in the Committee's report.
in the
Discussions about collective bargaining continued
the next two years.
senate and through informal sessions for

1

acuity

A panel of

81

experts, including some of the faculty members on the
original faculty

senate subcommittee, addressed the faculty senate meeting
throughout the
fall of 1972 and the spring of 1973.

Both faculty and administrative

viewpoints were heard at these sessions where both pro and con unionization opinions were aired.

The chance to learn and to speak about higher

education collective bargaining was more than adequate during the year
preceding the November 15-16 election.
The choice which the University faculty was called upon to make

on the November 1973 ballot was simple

— the

faculty could be represented

by a bargaining agent called MSP-AAUP, or they could continue as they

were and vote "no union."

The Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP)

was a group formally affiliated with the National Education Association

through a state affiliate, the Massachusetts Teachers Association

(NEA)
(MTA)

.

The MTA originally became interested in the University of

Massachusetts in the spring of 1972, sending Eduardo Robreno to the
Amherst campus to assess the potential for collective bargaining.

Robreno

discovered a small but active group of AFT members and considerable interest in a unionization election.

Faculty members of the Amherst AAUP

Chapter had organized a unionization card drive and had succeeded in
getting five percent of the faculty to sign these cards requesting an
election.

Based on this information, the MTA sent Cyril Solomons to act

as a full-time coordinator of the Massachusetts Society of Professors.

He was joined in the summer of 1972 by Arnold Schneider, a student with
the University, who became the second staff member.
197 3,

By the spring of

image.
the MSP had gained strength in numbers as well as in public

of Eduardo
Solomons left but Schneider stayed on; and with the help
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Robreno, helped the Massachusetts Society of Professors throughout the

pre-election period.
The University of Massachusetts/Amherst Chapter of the American

Association of University Professors (AAUP) became interested in the MSP
activity.

The reasons for their interest were varied, and to this date

arguable.

MSP provided the backing of a strong state-wide and national

organization.

To AAUP, that meant more backing than it could expect to

get from its national office; and in addition, the staff of MSP had con-

siderable experience in Massachusetts collective bargaining.

The local

A&UP Chapter was split on the very issue of collective bargaining for
its membership; and so a fraction of AAUP's leadership felt that if they

were to get anywhere with unionization, they had better align themselves
with another group quickly.
MSP

'

s.

reasons for seeking the alliance were simpler:

they needed

the clout which AAUP had with the more established branch of the Univer-

sity faculty.

AAUP's reputation could only help the "fresh young turk"

image of the faculty joining the MSP.

A decision was made for the two

groups to form one bargaining unit in March of 197 3.

The "professional

unity agreement" through which the MSP and AAUP Chapter agreed to operate can be found in Appendix 4.

As soon as the agreement was voted upon,

both MSP and AAUP
an executive board consisting of faculty members from

major campaign
was formed and, thereafter, decided jointly upon the
issues.

chairman of
Howard Brogan, a professor of English, was made

the MSP- AAUP Executive Committee.
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Soon after the formation of the MSP— AAUP, a committee of anti-

union faculty members coalesced calling itself the Committee of
Concerned
Faculty (CCF)

.

This organization was headed by Robert Wellman, a profes-

sor in the School of Education and author of the recent governance docu-

ment submitted by the faculty representatives to the Board of Trustees
(see Appendix 5)

.

The purpose of CCF was (in its own words) "to get all

the disadvantages of unionization publicized and discussed by the faculty.

We believe that a faculty that has all the facts relative to unionization

will inevitably reject the current efforts to unionize our campus" (from
a circular published April 2,

1973, issued by the CCF).

During the early spring, the MSP-AAUP organization issued the

necessary signature cards to the University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty.

Again, the purpose of these signature cards was to demonstrate to

the state labor relations board that there was enough interest by the

eligible voting members of a potential bargaining unit to have an election.

Once the sufficient number of cards (thirty percent) had been

signed and gathered, a bargaining organization (in this case, the MSPAAUP) could petition the state labor relations board for an election.

This was done by MSP-AAUP and the November election date set.
Both MSP-AAUP and CCF visited departments, held open meetings
for the faculty as a whole, and published a number of

sition papers on various issues.

'circulars

or po-

These papers were first distributed in

in September,
the spring (April of 1973) and continued, gaining momentum

October and November, until the eve of the election.

.
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On Thursday, November 15, 1973 and
Friday, November 16, 1973,

1,404 faculty "went to the polls" to cast their
ballots.

ninety-seven percent of the faculty voted.

Approximately

The three percent not voting

included faculty who were on sabbatical, on leave,
were sick, or unable
to attend the balloting.

510 "yes" votes:

The results of the election were as follows:

votes in favor of collective bargaining repre-

sentation by the MSP-AAUP.
challenged

votes:

votes challenged on several grounds, most

commonly, alleged managerial status (department heads, division
heads, etc.).

—2

"voided" votes.

The "no" votes constituted a majority of all votes cast.

Those votes

were sufficient in number to make it unnecessary to resolve the challenged
ballots
Between November 16 and April of 1974, when the researcher began

interviewing the faculty for this study, some major events took place.
Because these factors were referred to in the interviews, it seems appro-

priate to discuss them here.

One should remember, however, that although

they were pertinent faculty issues, they did not affect the vote, al-

though they may be influential in any future election.

Immediately after the November election, Chancellor Randolph
Bromery sent out a letter to all faculty on the Amherst campus.

The

Chancellor applauded the Amherst faculty on the results of the election,
stating that:
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In my view, the election results indicate decisive support for the
present system of faculty governance and the tradition of collegial
relations between the faculty and administration. Considering the
fact that slightly more than thirty-six percent of the faculty voted
in support of a faculty union, I also view the election results as a
mandate for the administration to strengthen its commitment to the
principle of self-government on the campus.
(Letter from Randolph
Bromery to the faculty of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
November 19, 1973)

Although many faculty at the University might have agreed with
the Chancellor’s assessment, the general feeling of those interviewed in

April of 1974 was that this letter invited
among "no" voters.

a

general shift in sentiment

These individuals felt that to interpret their "no"

votes as an indication of their acceptance of the present governing process was false; rather, they were simply asserting that their vote indi-

cated that they did not want the MSP-AAUP representing them.

Many felt

that even withstanding their mistrust of the current administration,

they were selecting the "lesser of two evils" (a quotation from one of
the seventy-six interviews)

.

To then have their votes summarized by

Bromery as a vote of support for "the tradition of collegial relations

between the faculty and administration" was, they felt, an incorrect supposition

.

A second and far more important incident occurred five months
after the election.

The Faculty Senate and Amherst administration had

increments
been working on a document which would delineate how merit

would be dispersed to the faculty.

In September of 1973, President

Trustees concerning
Robert Wood made a recommendation to the Board of

certain merit guidelines and procedures.
the Faculty Senate.

He did this without consulting

felt that
Many of the faculty interviewed in April
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the President should not have acted without Faculty Senate approval,

and that he should agree to change the merit policy to reflect the Sen-

ate's April 1974 recommendations.
Finally, a third issue weighing on the faculty's minds was tenure

quotas.

Many felt that the MSP-AAUP had tended to exaggerate the issue

in its campaign.

up" issue.

Some even said that they thought that it was a "trumped

During the spring of 1974, each department head had been

asked to do a long-range plan for his/her department, its needs, resources
expenses, and personnel projections.

Part of the planning included a

five-year projection of the percentage of tenured faculty members, their
ranks and distribution within the department.

Some faculty saw this as

being very close to setting tenure quotas for each department.

Since

the administration had denied in the fall that it was trying to set ten-

ure quotas, the faculty felt that they were being "hoodwinked".

The ad-

ministration felt that what they were asking for was not, in fact,

a

quotas system, but that good planning called for a consideration of the

number of tenured faculty within each department over the next five years

These three issues

dilemma

—were

— the

Bromery letter, the merit clause and the tenure

on the faculty's minds four and one-half months after the

election when the seventy-six interviews were being conducted.
of
An acknowledged limitation of the study is the intrusion

and the
changed sentiment during the time lapse between the election

survey.

should
The time of year, both of the election and the survey,

again be noted.

in the
Many considered November an advantageous point

because there were no crucial
year from the administration's standpoint
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budgetary or personnel decisions at that time.

Spring brought uncertain-

ty for those being considered for tenure, for
those up for reappointment,

for those requesting a sabbatical or leave of absence.

Also, during the

spring of 1974, the beginnings of the inevitable budget
cuts were being
felt and tensions were higher.

The administration had announced a pro-

jected ten percent cut in the total University budget, and therefore,
no

new faculty positions.

At that time, however, there was no projection

of having to cut existing budgeted positions.

The methodology for this study was described in Chapter

I.

The

researcher’s objective in the one-hour interview was to obtain faculty
attitudes toward unionism in general, toward the specific election held
on the Amherst campus and toward university governance.

Each set of faculty attitudes was cross analyzed with voting

preference and, in some cases, with school or tenure status.

The main

concern of the study was to determine whether the greatest influence on
a faculty member’s vote was predisposition

(attitudes which had been

nurtured over a long period of time), or the current issues affecting a
faculty member's life at the University of Massac.husetts/Amherst

.

In

several faculty collective bargaining studies, the authors have concluded
that local issues were the decisive factor in an election.
in Coll ective Bargaining Comes to the Campus

,

Robert Carr,

states that job "dissatis-

faction" is what turns a faculty member towards collective bargaining.

Dissatisfaction with one's job might cover areas such as inadequate salary, unfair governance systems.

.

.

"old guard, young turk

cont licts

(senior vs. junior faculty), or inequitable grievance proceduics.

"The

"
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complex set of factors and influences is seldom identical
at any two

institutions

.

2

The hypothesis of the present study suggested that predisposition
of the seventy— six faculty members interviewed was the key
factor, pre-

cisely because there appeared to be relatively few local issues of any
great significance.

According to the findings. University of Massachusetts/

Amherst faculty were satisfied, on the whole, with their salaries, working
conditions and job security.

dividual's tenure status.)

(This varied slightly, according to the inIf these basic factors were areas of dissat-

isfaction, individuals often were more inclined to opt toward collective

action in hopes of improving their status quo.
Each faculty member interviewed was numbered randomly for identi-

fication purposes.

In referring to an individual, every attempt has been

made to avoid, positive identification (of a particular individual) by the
reader.

The researcher took notes during the interview; but, as has been

previously stated, no taped recording was made.

Interview Resu l ts:

Faculty Demographic Data

(Section V of Interview) - Age and Voting Behavior

The age range of the faculty members interviewed can be seen in

Table 4.

Because age was correlated to voting preference, the researcher

has grouped the faculty members in four age brackets (see Table

^Carr and Van Eyck, Collecti ve Bargainin g, p. o5.

_>)

.
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TABLE

4

ACE RANGE OF SAMPLE
”

ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY

RELATIVE
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)

Did not ask age.

1

1.3

28.00

2

2.6

29.00

4

5.3

30.00

1

1.3

31.00

4

5.3

32.00

4

5.3

33.00

4

5.3

34.00

5

6.6

35.00

2

2.6

36.00

2

2.6

37.00

4

5.3

38.00

3

3.9

39.00

2

2.6

40.00

2

2.6

41.00

1

1.3

42.00

2

2.6

43.00

1

1.3

44.00

1

1.3

46.00

5

6.6

49.00

3

3.9

AGE OF
FACULTY

.
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TABLE

CONT

4

AGE RANGE OF SAMPLE

AGE OF
FACULTY

ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY

RELATIVE
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)

50.00

2

2.6

51.00

3

3.9

52.00

4

5.3

53.00

3

3.9

55.00

1

1.3

56.00

1

1.3

57.00

2

2.6

59.00

2

2.6

60.00

3

3.9

62.00

1

1.3

63.00

1

1.3

TOTAL

76

100.0
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TABLE

5

AGE RANGE BY GROUP

RELATIVE
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)

ACE

ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY

0

1

1.3

28 through 35

26

34.2

36 through 44

18

23.7

46 through 53

20

26.3

55 through 63

11

14.5
•i

TOTAL

Table

Column

76

100.0

shows, faculty voting preference among the four age brackets.

6

1

indicates a vote for the MSP-AAUP agent; Column

a vote against the union;

Column

3

2

indicates

indicates that there were individuals

in that age bracket who did not vote on November 15 and 16; and the last

column, Column 4, indicates the one person who refrained from telling
the interviewer his voting preference.
M
as having age "0

.

There is one individual listed

The researcher neglected to ask one person his age.

From observing Table 5, one can see that the median age of the

seventy-six faculty members falls between thirty-six and forty-four
years, the majority being under forty-four years old.

This is also

true of the entire faculty population at the University, and so indi-

cates that this is a representative population.
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TABLE

6

CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY VOTING

YES
AGE GROUPING
0

% of Total

1

100.0%
3.0%
1.3%
12a

28 thru 35 years

46. 2%b
36. 4%c
15. 8%d

9

36 thru 44 years

50.0%
27.3%
11.8%
7

46 thru 53 years

35.0%
21.2%
9.2%
4

55 thru 63 years

36.4%
12.1%
5.3%

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

WOULD
NOT SAY

0

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

2

0

12

46.2%
30.0%
15.8%

7.6%
100.0%
2.6%

9

50.0%
22.5%
11.8%
12

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

60.0%
30.0%
15.8%

•

7

63.6%
17.5%
9.2 %

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

Row
Total

1

1.3%

26
34 2%
.

18

23.7 %

1

5.0%
100.0%
1.3%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

20

26.3%

11

14.5%

1

Column
Total

33

43.4%

40
52.6%

2

2.6%

1

1.3%

76

100.0%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
may be read.
The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
members.
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across). The third figure c in
each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its column
(down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the sub-sample of
the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
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Table 6 demonstrates an interesting phenomenon in relation to
the Ladd/Lipset faculty collective bargaining study.

3

In the mailed

questionnaire, survey of 1969, which had 60,028 returns, Ladd and Lipset

show a sharp distinction between faculty age and voting preference.

'

Al-

though their analysis is primarily based on faculty age at different
status institutions (i.e., a range of elite, scholarly universities

through non-scholarly two-year technical schools), one can ascertain
that of faculty under thirty-five, sixty-three percent favor collective

bargaining at a comparable institution to the University of Massachusetts.
Fifty-three percent of those whose ages range from thirty-five to fortynine favor collective bargaining, and forty-two percent of faculty over
fifty years of age favor collective bargaining.

The University of

Massachusetts sample, one can readily surmise, bears little relation to
the Ladd/Lipset study.

In fact, the sample breakdown depicted in Table

6

shows an even distribution in the age categories (twenty-eight to thirty-

(thirty-six to forty-four) between yes and no votes; in the two

five) and

older age groups of faculty (forty-six to fifty-three) and (fifty-five to
sixty-three)

,

there is a preference (sixty percent/thirty percent) for

the "no union" choice.

John Livingston has outlined in an article entitled, "Collective
major reasons
Bargaining and Professionalism in Higher Education," three
pro-union.
why junior (younger) faculty are more apt to vote

Livingston's

Pr^es^^,_Uni£ns
Everett C. Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset.
Eerkeley, California: Carnegie Foun a
and America n Higher Ed ucation.
10 11.
tion for the Advancement of Teaching, 1973, pp.
3
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findings are similar to the University of Hawaii study
and to the Ladd/
Lipset report.

The junior faculty member is less apt to be tenured,

and so has less job security than his older colleagues.

His salary is

comparatively lower; and in addition, this faculty member has less
individual negotiating power.

The younger faculty member has not reached

a satisfactory status quo position in his/her career

(as yet); and, so

therefore, has not reached the higher professorial ranks which enable
the faculty member to have political or professional power within the

faculty governance structure.

In other words, from the perspective of

the junior faculty members, they have everything to gain and little to

lose by electing a collective bargaining agent.

The sample for the University of Massachusetts/ Amherst case study

was not stratified for proportionate representation of the sexes within

academic units and among status categories.

To do so would have required

a sample size that would have been beyond the capabilities of a single

However, for general interest, the researcher did correlate

researcher.

the sex of the faculty member to voting preference (see Tables

Table

8

7

and 3).

illustrates how male and female faculty members voted.

The sample indicates that the female faculty were predominantly against
the union.

From her discussion with the female faculty, the researcher

was able to surmise some of the reasons for this voting pattern.

Since

the collection of such data was outside the scope of the study, the pro-

cess was without controls; and consequently, the observations are purely

subjective.
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TABLE

7

MALE AND FEMALE FACULTY IN SAMPLE

ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY

RELATIVE FREQUENCY

Male

63

82.9

Female

13

17.1

(%)

The percentage of female/male faculty in this sample is fairly
representative of the faculty as a whole. It should be noted, however,
that this occurred by chance.

Two of the female faculty indicated that they had serious reser-

vations about faculty collective bargaining based on the history of the
industrial union model.

Unions, they believed, would not give adequate

consideration to women as an historically disenfranchised group.

Both

of these individuals expressed the same concern for minority faculty.

A maiority of the female faculty interviewed was not tenured
and had lower academic rank than the norm.

Because of these two indi-

followed the vot
cators, the female faculty should have had, if they had
split vote.
ing patterns of their male counterparts, a more evenly

.
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TABLE

8

MALE AND FEMALE VOTING PREFERENCE

DID NOT

Column
Total

33

43.4 %

40
52 . 6 %

WOULD

2
2

.

6%

Row

1
1

.

3%

76

100 0 %
.

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages may be read.
The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
members)
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Aca demic Rank and Voting Behavior

Each individual was asked in which academic rank he/she fell at
the time of the election.

In most cases, rank had not changed between

November and the date of the interview.
faculty is depicted in Table

A breakdown of the seventy-six

9.

In comparison to the ACE 1972-1973 report, the academic rank of

the sample indicates a slightly higher proportion of faculty in the senior

ranks

— 59.2

percent

—whereas

the national average is 50.7 percent.

This

national figure is steadily rising with the "aging" of the faculty population.

(Due to the current job market, fewer young faculty are being hired.

The voting behavior of the associate professor sub-sample (see

Table 10) directly contradicts what Livingston and other researchers have
found to be true for these faculty.

The University of Massachusetts sam-

ple, showing a pro-union majority of the associate professors, is unique

among studied populations.

The hypothesis being tested here would allow

for such an occurrence because, of course, predisposition allows for an

individual phenomenon among any rank of faculty member.

5

Teaching Faculty in Academe: 19 72-1973
^Alan E. Bayer.
Council on Education Research Reports, 1973,
American
Washington, D.C.:
Volume 8, Number 2, p. 17.
.

writer on the subject of faculty collective bargaining had
some definite ideas based on the effect of collective bargaining on ju"(Unions cannot) offer tenured professors greater
nior faculty status:
aljob security, since the instances of tenured faculty being fired are
really
could
The only faculty group a union
most non-existent.
members who tend to be exploited both on
non-tenured
junior
help are the
security.
salary and working conditions, as well as having little job
members bejunior
these
of
percentage
higher
to
a
Unions might well lead
substantial price- the
ing continued permanently in employment, but at a
"Should University
watering down of academic standards." (Banks McDowell,
p. 32, editorial
1972,
June
18,
e,
Glob
Faculties Be Unionized?," the Boston
5 One

.

.

•
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TABLE

9

ACADEMIC RANK

ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY

RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)

Professor

23

30.3

Associate
Professor

22

Assistant
Professor

28

36.9

3

3.9

Instructor

'

28.9

Tenure and School Affiliation

Tenure and school affiliation were considered by the researcher
to be critical to her study.

^

In an interview with Everett C. Ladd, Jr.,

co-author of the Carnegie Collective Bargaining Study, she was advised
of the same.

Studies by John W. Moore also used these two pieces of

demographic data as significant voting indicators.
Tables 11 through 14 describe faculty tenure status, faculty mem-

ber’s school affiliation, and Table 14 shows a three-way analysis of these
two factors with voting preference.

Common assumptons with reference to

these two sets of voting indicators (tenure and non-tenure) are that:

"Attitudes Toward Collective Negotiations:
^John W. Moore.
Faculty," Center for the Study of Higher
College
Pennsylvania Community
'A
Education, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1971; and J. 0. Haehn.
Senate
Academic
Professors,"
College
State
Study of Trade Unionism Among
unpublished.
of the California State Colleges, 19/0,
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TABLE

10

ACADEMIC RANK AND VOTING PREFERENCE

YES

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

WOULD
NOT SAY

Row
Total

RANK

Professor

8a
34. 8b%
24. 2c%
10. 5d%

12

Assoc. Prof.

54.5%
36.4%
15.8%
10

Asst. Prof.

35.7%
33.3%
13.2%

3

Instructor

Column
Total

100.0%
9.1%
3.9%

33

43.3%

15
65.7%
37.5%
19.7%

9

40.9%
22.5%
11.8%
16

57.1%
40.0%
21.1%

0

0%

0
0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0
0%
0%
0%

4.5%
100.0%
1.3%

23
30.3%

1

22
28.9 %

0

2

7.2%

0%
0%
0%

100.0%
2.6%

0

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

40
52.6%

2.6%

1

2

1.3%

28

36.9%

3

3.9%

76

100.0%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
members.
The third figure c
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its
column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the subsample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
.

c

.

100

TABLE

11

CROSS ANALYSIS OF TENURE STATUS

WITH VOTING PREFERENCE OF FACULTY SAMPLE
l:

YES

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

WOULD
NOT SAY

Row
Total

TENURE STATUS
20a

Tenured

42 7%b
60. 6%
26 3%d
.

.

13

Non-Tenured

Not On
Tenure Track

Column
Total

46.4%
39.4%
17.1%

0
0%

0%
0%

33

43.4%

27

53.3%
67.5%
35.5%
12

42.9%
30.0%
15.8%

0

0%
0%
0%

2

7.1%
100.0%
2.6%

1

100.0%
2.5%
1.3%
40

52.6%

0

0%
0%
0%

1

3.6%
100.0%
1.3%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

2

2.6%

47

63.2%

1

1.3%

28

36.8%

1

1.3%

76

100.0%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
may be read.
The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
members.
The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
The third figure c
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its
column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the subsample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members)
.
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TABLE

12

THE NUMBER OF SAMPLE FACULTY MEMBERS WITHIN EACH
SCHOOL

ASSIGNED NUMBER
(GIVEN AS
IDENTIFICATION)

Food

& Nat.

Resources

NUMBER OF
FACULTY
IN EACH SCHOOL

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
SAMPLE RELATIVE
FREQUENCY (%)

1.00

9

11.8

Business

2.00

4

5.3

Education

3.00

5

6.6

School of Home Ec.

4.00

1

1.3

Humanities

5.00

20

26.3

Social Sciences

6.00

11

14.5

Natural/Phys. Sci.

7.00

13

17.1

Physical Ed.

8.00

3

3.9

Engineering

9.00

7

9.2

10.00

3

3.9

76

100.0

Nursing Sciences
TOTAL
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TABLE

13

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE

ACCORDING TO SCHOOL/COLLEGE AFFILIATION

YES

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

WOULD
NOT SAY

Row
Total

SCHOOL
6a

Food

& Nat.

Res.

66. 7%b
18. 2%c
7

.

9%d
2

Business

2

50.0%
6.1%
2.6%
2

Education

3

33.3%
7.5 %
3.9%

50.0%
5.0%
2.6%
2

40.0%
6.1%
2.6%

40.0%
5.0%
2.6 %
1

0

Home Economics

0%
0%
0%

100.0%
2.5%
1.3%

10

Humanities

50.0%
30.3%
13.2%

9

45.0%
22.5%
11.8%
5

5

Social Sciences

45.5%
15.2%
6.6%
o

j

Nat./Phys. Sci.

23.1%
9.1%
3.9%

45.5%
12 5%
.

6.6%
10

76.9%
25.0 %
13.2%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

1

0

20.0%
50.0%
1.3%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0%
0%
0%
1

9.0%
50.0%
1.3%

9

11.8%

4

5.3%

5

6.6%

1

1.3%

1

5.0%
100.0%
1.3%

20
26.3%

0

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

11

14.5%

13
17 1%
.

.
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TABLE 13 CONT.

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE

ACCORDING TO SCHOOL /COLLEGE AFFILIATION
1

YES
1

Phys. Ed.

33.3%
3.3%
1.3%
3

Engineering

42.9%
9.1%
3.9%
1

Nursing

33.3%
3.0%
1.3%

/

NO
2

66.6 %
5.0%
2.6%
4

57.1%
10.0%
5.3%
2

66.7%
5.0%
2.6%

DID NOT
VOTE

WOULD
NOT SAY

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

Row
Total

3

3.9%

7

9.2%

3

3.9%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as
percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents
the number of faculty members.
The second figure b in each square is
the equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row
(across)
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which
the sub-sample represents in its column (down) - the fourth figure d
represents the percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventysix faculty members)
.

.
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TABLE

14

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL

YES

ROW
TOTAL

NO

Food and Natural Resources

STATUS

Tenured

4

2

66.7 %

66.7%
44.4%

Non-Tenured

2

6

66.7%

1

66.7%
33.3%
22.2%

Column
Total

33.3%
66.7 %
22.2%

6

66.7%

33.3%
33.3%

3

33.3%

11 1%
.

3

33.3%

9

100.0%

Business
STATUS

Tenured

1

50.0%
50.0%
25.0%

Non-Tenured

1

50.0%
50.0%
25.0%

Column
Total

2

50.0%

1

50.0%
50.0%
25.0%

2

50.0%

1

50.0%
50.0%
25.0%
2

50.0%

2

50.0%

4

100.0%

per
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as
the
represents
The top figure a in each square
centages may be read.
The second figure b in each square is the
members.
number of faculty
each row (across)
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in
which the sub-sample
The third figure c in each square is the percentage
represents the perrepresents in its column (down). The fourth figure
(seventy-six faculty mem
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample

bers)
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TABLE

14

CONT.

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

YES

ROW
TOTAL

Education
STATUS
Tenured

2a
100. 0%b
100. 0%c

40.0%d

Non-Tenured

0

0%
0%
0%

Column
Total

2

40.0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

2

2

40.0%

1

67.7%
100.0%
40.0%
2

40.0%

33.3%
100.0%
20.0%
1

20.0%

3

60.0%

5

100.0%

Home Economics

STATUS
1

Tenured

1

100 0 %
100 0 %
100 0 %

100 0 %

1
100 0 %

100 0 %

.

.

.

.

Column
Total

.

1
.
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TABLE

14

CONT.

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

YES

WOULD
NOT SAY

ROW
TOTAL

Humanities
STATUS

Tenured

5

Non-Tenured

0%
0%
0%

58.3%
77.8%
35.0%

10

12.5%
100.0%
5.0%

25.0%
22.2%
10.0%

1

9

50.0%

12
60 0%
.

1

2

5

62.5%
50.0%
25.0%

Column
Total

0

7

41.7%
50.0%
25.0%

5.0%

45.0%

8

40.0%

20

100.0%

Social Sciences
STATUS
3

Tenured

50.0%
60.0%
27.3%
2

Non-Tenured

40 0%
.

40.0%
18.2%

Column
Total

5

45.5%

3

50.0%
60.0%
27.3%
2

40.0%
40.0%
18.2%
5

45.5%

0

0%
0%
0%

6

55.5%

1

20.0%
100.0%

5

45.5%

9.9 %
1

10.0%

11
100 0 %
.
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TABLE

14 CONT.

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY

TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<

ROW

YES

NO

TOTAL

Natural /Physical Science

STATUS

Tenured

2

7

22.2%
66.7%
15.4%

Non-Tenured

1

9

69.2%

3

25.0%
33.3%
7.7%

Column
Total

77.8%
70.0%
53.8%

3

23.1%

75.0%
30 0%
23.1%
.

10

4

30.8%

13

76.9 %

100.0%

Physical Education
STATUS

Tenured

1

50.0%
100.0%
33.3%

Non-Tenured

0

0%
0%
0%
Col uinn

Total

1

33.3%

1

50.0%
50.0%
33.3%

2

66.7%

1

100.0%
50.0%
33.3%
2

66.7%

1

33.3%

3

100.0%
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TABLE

CONT.

14

VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<

YES

ROW
TOTAL

NO

Engineering
STATUS

Tenured

4

3

42.9%
100 0%
42.9%
.

Column
Total

57.1%
100.0%
57.1%

7

4-

3

42.9%

7

100.0%

57.1%

100.0%

Nursing
STATUS

Tenured

0

0%
0%
0%

Non-Tenured*

1

50.0%
100.0%
33.3%

Column
Total

&

1

33.3%

1

100.0%
50.0%
33.3%

1

33.3%

1

50.0%
50.0%
33.3%
2

66.7%

2

66.7%

3

100.0%

was in
r
the non-tenure track individual
For the purpose ot this table,
Non-Tenured category.
eluded here under the (2.00)
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1.

A faculty member who is tenured is more likely
to be satisfied

with his/her own status quo and, therefore, will
be less likely
to want to change it by voting for a faculty
collective bargain-

ing agent;
2.

Parallel to that supposition, that an untenured faculty member
is

less sure of his/her job security, and, particularly in the

era of the hard-pressed 1970's, wants a strong agency working
on the faculty's behalf;
3.

In addition,

the tenured faculty member tends to be older, has

been at the institution for a longer period of time, and has,
therefore, built up certain loyalties to the Institution;
4.

The older (tenured) faculty member has served on university-wide

committees, or at least departmental committees, and has seen a
little more of what the administration of the university does
on a day-to-day basis.

This exposure can have the effect of making less clear the line
of demarcation between the administrator and the faculty member.

The

individual with some administrative or committee experience may not be
quite as anxious to change the status quo of faculty governance for personal as well as political reasons.^

assumptions have been voiced by a broad range of authors
studying collective bargaining. The writers mentioned in this chapter
have discussed these same issues in their studies. Kenneth P. Mortimer,
and Robert Carr (co-authors of Collective Bargaining
J. Moore, J. Haehn
Comes to Campus), and many of the authors included in the Wisconsin Law
Carr summarizes most of
Lew , Volume 1971, Number 1 should be added.
these voting indicators in his analysis of the llayci Study (1169) on
7 These

,

pp.

38-65.

no

Although a slight majority of the tenured faculty sample (fiftyseven percent) voted against the union, it was not in the expected pro-

portion normally needed to counteract
nior faculty.

a

heavily skewed (pro-union) ju-

The vote of the non-tenured faculty sample was split

evenly, again contradicting national trends.

Departmental Affiliatio n and Voting Behavior

The voting behavior of the total sample generally reflected the

voting population; again, however, the small size of the sample limited
its exact correlation.

The sample broke down to 43.4 percent for the

union, 52.6 percent against, 2.6 percent not voting, and 1.3 percent who

would not say.

If the department chairpersons and department heads are

excluded from the sample (because their ballots were challenged in the
election), the breakdown is as follows:

40.8 percent yes, 46.0 percent

no, 9.1 percent challenged, 2.6 percent not voting, and 1.3 percent who

would not say.

The total population showed 36.3 percent for the union,

51.2 percent against, 12.4 percent challenged votes, and

3

percent not

voting.

Before the election, both the MSP-AAUP and CCF organization prepared lists of faculty members and their predicted voting behavior.

Sur-

prisingly, both lists were similar in their predictions, and both were

equally in error regarding some departments.

The predictions were based

campuses; and
on national averages taken from studies conducted at other

were not accuras will be shown, some of these departmental projections
ate.

sentiment among
Both the MSP-AAUP and CCF predicted anti-union

Ill

faculty in the Food and Natural Resource school.

Their predictions were

based undoubtedly on the school's long and prestigious history in the

university

the fact that the department's faculty members tended to
<

be older and the majority tenured.
posite.

The study sub-sample proved the op-

Sample faculty within the School of Food and Natural Resources

voted 66.7 percent for the union and 33.3 percent against it.

The sample

interviews reflected a strong feeling of resentment toward the administration.

Ostensible justification for such sentiment is suggested by the

"benign neglect" of this department during the years of expansion.

Re-

calling for a moment the history of the University as summarized in
Chapter II, it was apparent that over the past ten to fifteen years the
emphasis of the burgeoning university had been on the liberal arts, not
agriculture.

As the institution grew in size, the students were enter-

ing a variety of fields; "Mass Aggie" was being phased out.

Although the

School of Food and Natural Resources represented a large portion of the

University budget, the faculty members felt that they had not kept pace
individually with the faculty in other areas of the University.
one other school

— Education — did

In only

the tenured faculty members in the sam-

ple vote so heavily for the union.

Of the non-tenured Food and Natural.

Resource faculty, the same proportion (sixty-seven percent) voted for the
union, resulting in the non— tenured vote being fairly consistent with
that of other departments.
of Food
The comments made by the faculty members from the School

sentiment.
and Natural Resources were revealing of the pro-union

One

point of being hostile
individual felt terribly disenfranchised, to the

:
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about the administration's actions toward his department.

He stated

that

They (the administration) make decisions where I am concerned and
never ask me my opinion.
I changed from a twelve-month to a ninemonth contract (the school had been urging this change) and I had
to take a f ive-thousand dollar cut. ...
I had no recourse.
They sent me a memo concerning my entire future, and told me I had
three days to sign it no recourse. ...
I am personally against
unions, but they are forcing a union.
The College of Agriculture didn't get anything when the University of Massachusetts had an
expansion program. We need more faculty (recently, enrollments in
The
Food and Natural Resources have increased to a large degree)
School of Education gets all the money; but here, in Agriculture, we
don't get any.
(No. 55 )
.

.

.

—

.

.

.

.

Other faculty from the department were not as vociferous, but expressed

similar resentment toward the administration.
One pre-election prediction was that the School of Business Ad-

ministration would show a majority favoring the no-union vote.

The study

sample shows an even split, although the small size of the sample may not
give an accurate breakdown for the entire department.

The School of Education produced some interesting interviews.
/

Table 14 indicates that similar to the Department of Food and Natural
(in this
Resources, the two tenured faculty members voted for the union

case, the entire sample of tenured members).

Two of the three non-tenured

non-tenured person did
sample faculty voted against the union; the third
not vote at all.
In 1973,

percentage of
the School of Education had the smallest

tenured faculty in the University.

velopment.

There were a few reasons for this de-

the past five to six
The fast growth of the School during

sizeable increases not only in
years previous to 1973-1974 had meant
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student enrollment at the graduate and undergraduate levels, but also
in the ranks of the faculty.

Because Dean Dwight Allen often wanted to

expand a portion of the School before the University was ready for it,
<

he financed these increases in staff with what was termed "soft money."
Once hired, these faculty were often unable to change over from "soft"

money to regular state "01" account funds (i.e., they were not put on
the regular tenure track).
to the tenure system,

If the faculty had been able to change over

they (for the most part) had not yet had time to

be evaluated for tenure (six years had not elapsed since they made the

change).

Furthermore, when Dean Allen first came to the University in

1968, he fired and/or did not rehire a number of faculty members who were

near to their tenure evaluation, thus depleting even further the percentage of tenured faculty within the School.

Many of those who did stay found Allen’s leadership style difficult to accept.

They saw very fast change which, whether they agreed

with it or not, often did not include them.

These faculty members, then,

became more and more dissatisfied with the situation; (and although the
A.gr icu 1 ture

faculty looked toward the School of education as the depait

ment that had all) these faculty were in that "rich" school but were not

reaping any of the profits.
election
The School of Home Economics (which at the time of the
in this study by
consisted of eighteen faculty members) was handicapped

the small size of the sample.

Only one interview was conducted; and,

on the individual's intherefore, any analysis of that department based

terview would be irresponsible.

The interview itself will be used in the

1-IV later on in this chapter
general discussion of the interview's parts
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The School of Arts and Sciences was broken
down into three areas:
the humanities, the social sciences and
the natural and physical sciences.

The various departments within the School were
allocated to the three major areas according to the general administrative
printout sheet.

tions of voting behavior for the three segments were
generally:

Predic-

humani-

ties, pro-union; natural/physical sciences, split; and
social sciences,

pro-union.

In general, the pro-union predictors believed that the cru-

cial swing would be in the Arts and Sciences.

According to this study's sample, there was no overriding support
for the MSP-AAUP within the arts and sciences, except in the non-tenured

humanities faculty where sixty-two percent voted for the union and twentyfive percent against.

Within the social sciences faculty sample, the vote was evenly
split between union and non-union forces which was contrary to the pre-

dictions.

The departments of economics, sociology, psychology, anthro-

pology, political science, geography, communication studies, and Asian

studies are considered to have faculty members whose average political

base is liberal to liberal-radical.

National statistics show that in

1972, sixty-seven percent of those who call themselves "left-liberal"

would reject the statement that collective bargaining has no place on a
college campus, and sixty-nine percent would agree that strikes are

legitimate means of collective action for faculty.
(N = 471)

8

g

a

In that same study,

fifty-five percent of the faculty in the social sciences and

Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions

,

p.

26.

.
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humanities agreed "that the recent growth of unionization of college and
university faculty is beneficial and should be extended."

Similarly,

sixty-four percent of the faculty in the social science and humanities
areas characterized themselves as "left" or "liberal".
study (N = 60,028), the percentages were even higher

Q

In the

— seventy

1969

percent in

social sciences agreed with the concept of collective bargaining as well
as sixty-five percent in the humanities (see Appendix B for the 1969 sur-

vey results of all departments)
The social science interviews revealed conflicting attitudes

among those faculty members who felt torn between voting for a union "on

principle" and voting against the MSP-AAUP which (they felt) could not

adequately represent their interests.

One individual said that if the

union had been an AFL-CT.0 affiliate, he would have voted for a union;
but because the bargaining agent was an affiliate of NEA or MTA, it
lacked clout with the Massachusetts legislature.

At the end of the in-

terview, this same faculty member stated that if the election had been

held on that day (April of 1974), he might change his vote.
The natural and physical sciences sample faculty vote indicated

what most people predicted

— seventy-seven

percent of the faculty voted

against the union, twenty-three percent for the MSP-AAUP.

There was

of
little difference between tenured and non-tenured faculty in terms

their vote.

of
In comparison to national averages, the University

opposed to the
Massachusetts faculty in the natural sciences were more

^ lb id.,

p.

39.
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union than their counterparts in other universities.

Ladd and Lipset

summarize their findings in the following paragraphs explaining the reasons behind these sets of departmental figures:

As we have indicated elsewhere, the faculty teaching in the liberal
arts.
tend to be much more liberal than professors in most of
the professional schools, which are linked to the practical worlds
of business, agriculture and government.
Within the liberal arts,
there is constant progression from left to right, from the social
sciences through the humanities, with the natural sciences the most
conservative of the group. ... To a considerable degree, the differences among fields are not solely related to experience in the
discipline; the fields vary in the kind of students and practitioners
Thus, the "politically relevant" social sciences, conthey attract.
cerned with social problems, have recruited from the more liberal
segment of undergraduates; whereas at the other extreme, professional
fields that relate directly to the business world such as engineering, business administration and colleges of agriculture draw upon
the more conservative students.
.

.

—

.

.

—

.

The same sharp variations by discipline that we have found in other
areas of professional and political opinion can be seen in response
Social scientists give more backing to collective barto unionism.
gaining than any other group of faculty. They are followed closely
Next come the natural scientists, with professors
by the humanists.
in the business-related applied fields decidedly the most hostile to
professional unionism. 10

The faculty interviews in the School of Physical Education pre

sented a statistical problem.

Although only three interviews were needed

for the sub-sample (two tenured and one non-tenured)

were interviewed.

,

six faculty members

Because four of these six individuals held

instructor

were not tenured.
titles, it was assumed that these four individuals

A

is that its
peculiarity of the Physical Education Department, however,

and, therefore, had been
faculty often did not have an advanced degree;

creating an imbalance of tenured
awarded tenure at the bottom rank, thus

lOfbid., pp. 38-40.
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faculty in the lower ranks.

^

Because the question of tenure status was

not asked until the end of the interview, the researcher was forced to

interview more individuals than were necessary.

Two of the three sample

<

faculty members in the School of Physical Education voted against the
union, one voted for the MSP-AAUP.

The two tenured votes were split:

the non-tenured faculty member voted against the union.
The sub-sample of Engineering faculty should have contained five

tenured, two non-tenured faculty members.

However, a similar identifica-

tion problem occurred in the gathering of faculty interviews here as

happened in the School of Physical Education.

Two assistant professors

thought not to be tenured were tenured, both having been at the University
for less than five years.

Of those interviewed, fifty-seven percent voted

against MSP-AAUP and forty-three percent for the union.
As explained in Table 14, one of the Nursing faculty accounted

for under "non-tenured faculty" was not on the tenure track, but was being paid by outside grant funds.

In this particular table, the individual

has been counted in the non-tenured category, simplifying the graph considerably.

Again, the vote was fairly evenly split.

The sample accur-

School
ately reflects the low percentage of tenured faculty members in the
of Nursing:

thirty-five percent of the departmental faculty are tenured

percent.
as compared to the University-wide figure of sixty-two

what perrecent survey (1974-1975) completed by AAUP shows
rank.
each
within
tenured
centage of university and college faculty are
percentage
high
a
have
proved to
The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst
Faculty Members at United states
"Tenured
(From
of tenured instructors.
Status of the Professor,
Colleges and Universities," AAUP Survey, Economic
p. 11The C hronicle of Hi ghe r Educa tion, July 21, 1975,
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Number of Years at the University and Voting Behavlo r

The number of years which a faculty member has spent at a uni-

versity is thought to be a significant factor, reflecting many of the
same attitudinal considerations as a faculty member’s tenure status,
i.e., longevity at one institution.

The exception to this rule lies in

the number of faculty members in the study sample who reported that they

were brought to the University fully tenured.

These faculty then had

the status and stature of the tenure rank, but had not been at the in-

stitution for any considerable amount of time.

They could not be ex-

pected to be as committed to the university.
A majority of those faculty members (sixty-four percent) with extensive service to the University (twenty-three to thirty-seven years)
did vote against the union as might be expected

however

,

those with

eleven to twenty years of service chose to support the union by a two to
one margin.

Another surprising factor was the majority (fifty-four per-

cent of the sample faculty who had been with the University a relatively
short period of time (one to ten years) but who voted against the union.

Some of these faculty members were tenured but the majority were not.

Most of these faculty members were in the School of Arts and Sciences.
Once more, a demographic prediction of faculty voting behavior; namely,

number of years at the University proved to be wrong.
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TABLE

15

THE NUMBER OF YEARS WHICH SAMPLE FACULTY

HAVE SPENT AT UMASS/ AMHERST

NUMBER OF YEARS SPENT
AT UMASS

THE NUMBER OF FACULTY
IN YEARS CATEGORY

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL SAMPLE

1.00

3.9

2.00

9.2

3.00

7.9

4.00

9.2

5.00

14.5

6.00

6.6

7.00

10.5

8.00

2.6

9.00

3.9

10.00

5.3

11 00
.

1.3
.

13.00
14.00

15.00
16.00
19.00

20.00
23.00
25.00
26.00

1.3
3.9

1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.6
5.3

1.3

27.00
1.3

28.00
1.3

34.00
1.3

36.00
100.0

TOTAL

c
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TABLE 16

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY, GROUPED ACCORDING
TO THE NUMBER
OF YEARS THEY HAVE SPENT AT THIS UNIVERSITY,
C

WITH THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOR

YES

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

WOULD
NOT SAY

Row
Total

NUMBER OF YEARS
SPENT AT UM/A
23a
Al.lZb

1-10 years

30
53.6%
75.0%
39.5%

69. 7%
30. 3%d

6

11-20 years

3

66.7%
18.2%
7.9%

33.3%
7.5%
3.9%

4

23-36 years
.

Column
Total

33

43.4%

2 . 6 %'

1

1.8%
100.0%
1.3%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

63.6%
17.5%
9.2%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

40
52.6%

2

7

36.4%
12.1%
5.3%

2

3.6%
100.0%

2.6%

1

1.3%

56

73.7%

9

11.8%

11

14.5%

76

100.0%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
The fourth figure d represents the perrepresents in its column (down)
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
.

.
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TABLE

17

A DIVISION OF ONE SUB-GROUP FROM TABLE
16
(FACULTY WHO HAVE SPENT BETWEEN

1

&

10 YEARS AT UM/A)

COMPARED TO FACULTY VOTING BEHAVIOR

YEARS HERE

1-5

YES

14 a
40. 0%b

42.4%c
18 .4%d

6-10

9

42.9%
27.3%
11.8%

NO

18

51.4%
45.0%
23.7%
12

57.1%
30 0%
15.8%
.

DID NOT
VOTE

2

5.7 %

100.0%
2.6%

WOULD
NOT SAY

ROW
TOTAL

1

2.9%
100.0%
1.3%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

35

46.1%

21

27.6%

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members.
The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
The fourth figure d represents the
represents in its column (down).
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six members)

.
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TABLE

18

FACULTY MEMBERSHIP IN A "PROFESSIONAL" ORGANIZATION:
PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERSHIPS

NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO CATEGORY
ON THE LEFT

NUMBER OF
FACULTY IN THAT
ASSOCIATION

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL FACULTY
SAMPLE

No Memberships

1.00

54

71.1

AAUP

2.00

14

18.4

MSP-AAUP

3.00

2

2.6

AFT/Union

4.00

4

5.3

AAUP and AFT

2/4.00

1

1.3

MSP and AFT

3/4.00

1

1.3

76

100.0

TOTAL

.
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TABLE

19

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY MEMBERSHIPS IN A

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION WITH THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOR

ORGANIZATION

YES

No Memberships

24 a

44.4%b
72 7%c
31 6%d
.

.

AAUP

2

100.0%
6.1%
2.6%
AFT/ Union

2

50.0%
6.1%
2.6%

AAUP and AFT

0

0%
0%
0%

MSP-AAUP and AFT

1

100.0%
3.0%
1.3%

Column
Total

27

2

50.0%
67.5%
35.5%
10

4

28.6%
12.1%
5.3%

MSP-AAUP

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

33

43.4%

ROW
TOTAL

WOULD
NOT SAY
1

3.7%
100.0%
2.6%

1.9%
100.0%
1.3%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

2

0

0%
0%
0%

0
0%
0%
0%

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0

0

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

71.4%
25.0%
13.2%

50.0%
5.0%
2.6%
1

100.0%
2.5%
1.3%

40

52.6%

2

2.6%

1

1.3%

54

71.1%

14

18.4%

2

2.6%

4

5.3%

1

1.3%

1

1.3%

76

100.0%

actual numbers as well as per
The chart is set up so that both

wawsst ---=3 sL.

rxir.ssrrx

s-U.

perfourth figure d represents the
represents in its column (down). The
s)
total sample (seventy-six membe
centage of the sub-sample of the

—
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Membership Affiliation and Voting Behavior

According to the study completed by Ladd and l.ipset

in

1969, a

large majority of professors (sixty percent) at "elite”
Institutions did

not belong to any unions or professional associations.

The authors ex-

plained that this was due to the fact that faculty at these colleges
and

universities have:
1.

the most individual prestige and bargaining power,

2.

the (faculty's) fears over such issues as academic freedom are
low because threats are minimal. 12

The Ladd/Lipset study also revealed that at lower tier institutions

community and junior colleges

— association

membership was very high with

only eighteen percent of the faculty unaffiliated with any association.
Of those faculty who did Join professional associations or unions
in

the major institutions,

three-quarters were in the American Associa-

tion of University Professors.

These AAUP members, however, did not

favor unionism because, as the authors pointed out, they identified

themselves with

a

meritocratic profession

— one

In which they sought rec-

ognition for their individual (vs. collective) position within the institution.

We are reminded by Ladd and Lipset that their data was gathered

In 1969,

long before the AAUP became involved in the union movement.

The figures may have changed.

The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst sample (depicted in

Table 18) substantially reflects the national survey.

^Tbid.,

p.

41.

Seventy-one percent

.
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answered negatively to the question, "Are you a member of a professional

organization and if so, which one?"

The majority (sixty-four percent)

of those who held membership in some organization was affiliated with
the AAUP.

Table 19 shows the voting behavior of faculty according to their

membership status.

The one category which (at first) may seem contra-

dictory is the AAUP vote.

Remembering that the bargaining agent at the

University of Massachusetts/Anherst represented AAUP; it is surprising
to find a large majority

(seventy-one percent) of the sample AAUP mem-

bers voting against the MSP-AAUP.

One AAUP member explained his reason

for voting against the coalition during his interview.

Apparently, dur-

ing one of the AAUP-Amherst Chapter meetings, a merger of the two organ-

izations was discussed; but according to this individual, a majority

were against such a merger.

A vote was not taken.

Later, the execu-

tive committee of the local chapter met and voted to join with the

Massachusetts Society of Professors, alienating many of the chapter members.

"They abused the responsibility of their office," the informant

proclaimed
Four faculty members mentioned that they had worked with the

Committee of Concerned Faculty at one point or anotner during the camin
paign; but they did not answer the professional membership question

the affirmative.

The CCF did have a looser definition of membership

seemed to its backthan did the MSP-AAUF, and, therefore, may not have

organization."
ers to answer the description of "professional
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Administrative Position of Faculty
Member and Voting Behavior

Tn answer to the question,

you:

Department Head?

"Do any of the following pertain to

Department Chairperson?

Cluster Chairperson?

Program Director?"; eighty-two percent of the faculty answered that no,
they had no such designation.

Five percent said that they were depart-

ment chairpersons (some said they were "acting" or half-time department
chairpersons; these were counted as full department chairpersons).
Close to four percent answered that they were department heads, and nine

percent responded "yes" to program director.

This last title was the

most difficult to distinguish as some faculty would answer "yes" initially if they were in charge of any sub-section of their department.
For instance, a faculty member who had been asked by the department

chairperson to oversee the graduate students within that department answered "yes".

Even after clearing up this confusion with the informants,

seven still insisted that they were program directors.

In terms of the

total University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty population, this would

be much too large a percentage of the total; and, therefore, the "pro-

gram director" title was not counted as part of the challenged vote
category.

There were three reasons for asking faculty to identify any ad-

ministrative position which they held.

First, 174 votes were challenged

because of faculty's administrative status.

Second, the issue of the

this chapbargaining unit (to be discussed in more detail later on in
ter)

but upon
involves not only the faculty who can vote in an election

.

.
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the agent's election

— those

who can be represented by a single agent.

The third reason stems from the hypothesis that a department head is

more apt to vote against a union because of his administrative function.

13

Both the department chairperson and department head carry ad-

ministrative responsibilities for faculty and students, and often these
individuals teach as well.

Having been exposed to the administrative

bureaucracy, its assets and its liabilities, it is felt that the problems inherent in a large organization are more clearly recognized by a

department chairperson or head; and the lines of demarcation between ad-

ministration and faculty members are less clear.
vote indicates just that.

Clearly, the sample

The department head sample vote went three

to zero against the union, and the department chairperson vote was evenly

split

Self-Proclaimed Voting Behavior
Table 22 shows the results of the statement, "It would be helpful
to this analysis if you would tell me whether you voted for or against

the MSP-AAUP coalition.

tire interview."

he/she had voted.

It

will be kept in confidence, as will the en-

There was one individual who would not disclose how
The reason was clearly understandable as the vote,

block of individuals had
the person said, would have indicated how a
those other votes as well
voted; and this person did not want to disclose

Amherst
13 a department head at the University of Massachusetts/

for an unspecified amount of time;
is appointed by the provost usually
by the department faculty
whereas a department chairperson is elected
The department chairperson, howmembers for a specific period of time.
difference becomes, at times, indie
ever, can be re-elected; so the

gu ishable
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TABLE

20

ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION OF FACULTY MEMBER

NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO CATEGORY

NUMBER OF FACULTY
WITH TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE TITLE

PERCENT OF
TOTAL SAMPLE

None

1.00

62

81.6

Department
Chairperson

2.00

4

5.3

Department
Head

3.00

3

3.9

4 . 00

7

9.2

76

100 0 %

ADMINISTRATIVE
POSITION

Program
Director

TOTAL

.

.

.

.
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TABLE

21

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
POSITION
OF FACULTY MEMBER AND VOTING PREFERENCE

DID NOT

WOULD

Row

The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
The fourth figure d represents the
represents in its column (down)
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
members)
.

A
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TABLE

22

VOTING:

SELF-PROCLAIMED STATUS OF FACULTY MEMBER

NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO VOTING
CATEGORY

NUMBER OF
FACULTY IN
EACH CATEGORY

PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL
SAMPLE

Yes

1.00

33

A3.

No

2.00

40

32.6

Did Not Vote

3.00

2

2.6

Would Not Say

p-

oo

1

1.3

TOTAL

76

100.0%

The final three questions in Section V of the interview are illus-

trated in Tables 23 through 27.

The reason for these questions was to

see if personal affiliation with a University-wide function (such as

membership on a University-wide committee or the Faculty Senate) would
affect a faculty member's vote.

The third question involving membership

on a departmental committee or, specifically, the departmental personnel

committee was asked for a similar analysis.

Involvement with one of

the
these committees or with the Faculty Senate was thought to inlluence

he/
way a faculty member perceived the university, and therefore the way

she would vote.
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TABLE

23

MEMBERSHIP ON FACULTY SENATE

NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO CATEGORY OF
MEMBERSHIP

NUMBER OF FACULTY
IN MEMBERSHIP
CATEGORY

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL SAMPLE

Oa

1

1.3

Yes

1.00

18

23.7

No

2.00

49

64.5

Yes, In Part

3.00

8

10.5

76

100.0

TOTAL

indicates that one individual was not asked the question

.
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TABLE

24

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY SENATE MEMBERSHIP
WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR

DID NOT

WOULD

Row

The chart is set up so that both actual members as well as percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down). The fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty

members)
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TABLE

25

FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON A DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE

RELATIVE
FREQUENCY PERCENT

VALUE

ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY

Yes

1.00

41

53.9

No

2.00

11

14.5

3.00

24

31.6

76

100.0

t

Yes, Personnel

TOTAL

.
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TABLE

26

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON

DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR

MEMBER

Yes

YES

20 a

48.8%b
60. 6%c
26 3%d
.

No

Yes, Personnel

33

43.4%

1

5

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%

0

0%
0%
0%
•

2

2.6%

41

53.9%

0

1

15

ROW
TOTAL

0

9.1%
50.0%
1.3%

62.5%
37.5%
19.7%
40
52.6%

WOULD
NOT SAY

2.4%
50.0%
1.3%

45.5%
12.5%
6.6%

8

33.3%
24.2 %
10.5%

Column
Total

20

48.8%
50.0%
26.3%

5

45.5%
15.2%
6.6%

DID NOT
VOTE

NO

11

14.5%

1

•

4.2%
100.0%
1.3%
1

1.3%

24

31.6%

76

100.0%

The chart is set up so that both actual members as well as percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across'
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
The fourth figur e d represents the perrepresents in its column (down)
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six members)
.

)
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TABLE

27

FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON UNIVERSITY -WIDE COMMITTEE
t

VALUE

ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY

RELATIVE
FREQUENCY PERCENT

Oa

1

1.3

Yes

1.00

35

46.1

No

2.00

39

51.3

Yes, In Part

3.00

1

1.3

76

100.0

TOTAL

Indicates one individual who was not asked the question.

The results of the question regarding membership in the Faculty

Senate indicated that membership in that body produced
stance toward the union side.

a

more positive

A discussion of the faculty's attitudes

toward the University of Massachusetts/Amherst Faculty Senate will be

handled in Section II of the interview, and will substantiate this result.

(Bayer's study conducted in 1969 indicated that faculty who gave

to be
lower effectiveness ratings on the Faculty Senate were more apt

pro-union

.14
.

1Z>

44.
Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining^ p.
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Whether faculty had served on several departmental committees
or not made little difference in their voting behavior.

However, those

sample faculty members who had served on a departmental personnel com—
/

{

mittee voted against the union by a margin of two to one.

Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism
(Section

Questions

1

and

2

I

of Interview)

:

Definitions of Collective Bargaining

The purpose of Section

I

of the interview was to ascertain each

faculty member's personal attitude toward the concept of collective bar-

gaining and unionism in general.

Although the faculty member had been

told in the introductory letter that the interview would be about the

University of Massachusetts November election, no discussion of that
election preceded the first question.

— Question

1

:

When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what

comes to your mind?

— Question

2

;

Is there a distinction in your mind between collective

bargaining for blue collar and white collar workers?

If yss, what

are those distinctions?
far more
The faculty's responses to these two questions revealed

than a simple definition of collective bargaining.
9

for a definition of collective bargaining.)

(See Chapter I, page
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As the number of interviews progressed, it
became clear that the

placement of these first two questions was critical.

Because they were

asked first, they elicited fresh responses from the
faculty reducing the
/

f

likelihood that the definition they chose would be colored
by their own

discussion of their vote.

As the interview progressed and issues of

governance, student rights and particularly issues of tenure and depart-

mental authority were discussed, the faculty member began compensating

his/her language for what might have appeared to be a one-sided viewpoint expressed in Questions

1

and 2.

The predisposition of each faculty

member, however, had already been ascertained.
The responses to Questions

and

1

of collective bargaining and unionism.

2

produced assorted definitions

A fairly standard answer was:

"an organized group of position holders within a system" (Number 2, anti-

union).

Having given a fairly routine definition type answer, however,

the faculty member often would go on to explain how he/she felt about

collective bargaining.

"Collective bargaining is a matter of the fac-

ulty as a group, collective action vs. the individual.

It is frighten-

ing to contemplate an outside bureaucracy coming between us and the ad-

ministration" (Number

anti-union).

3,

"The differences between the blue

and white collar worker are narrowing as the development of unions is
tied to economic phenomena rather than educational.

The faculty needs

a mechanism by which it can say to the administration,

'these are deci-

sions you can't make alone'" (Number 4, pro-union voter).

"Someone speaking for me rather than having the opportunity to
fight my own battles.

.

.

•

The blue collar worker is not quite as

.
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equipped to deal with injustices because of his (lack of)
education"
(Number 19, anti-union voter).

Unions are concerned with needs of workers, not with
.

.

.

Professionals should be concerned with a product.

a product.

didn't vote

I

for the union because I've seen what happens to professional people

when they become 'unionized'.
ing but a union.

care of people.

I

The American Nursing Association is noth-

violently react to that.

We are concerned with the

The fact is that we have let ourselves become a union"

(Number 18, anti-union voter).

"Delegating your own wishes and worth to a group or person who
is then responsible to you to represent you.

You turn yourself into a

mean or average rather than an individual" (Number 38, pro-union voter).
One individual had a very personal reaction:
of a bituminous coal mine.

I

"My father was the owner

was considered a 'scab' in high school."

To the question, "Are there differences between blue and white collar

workers?"

The same person responded, "Yes, definitely!

spend my time the way

wage basis.

I

want to.

I

choose to

A blue collar worker is on an hourly

A professor does nothing you can regulate by hours" (Num-

ber 40, anti-union voter).
"Where people in a work setting with an agreed upon agenda of
items negotiate for these issues and it becomes legally binding.

white collar collective bargaining, we emphasize ownership.
collar workers would discuss worker satisfaction
voter)

.

.

In

blue

(Number 12, pro-union

—
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One person believed that his response summarized it all.

answer to Question

2,

In

Are there differences between blue and white col-

lar workers," came the response, "Yes.

A professional has a code of

ethics" (Number 30, anti-union voter).

Question

3

:

Faculty Involvement in Collective Bargaining:

"Should faculty at a university or college be involved in col-

lective bargaining" introduced what was really at issue in the interview
the possibility of collective bargaining in higher education.
al,

the faculty's responses were affirmative.

In gener-

Two-thirds answered yes

to this question, but often added a qualifying phrase such as,

on this campus," or "I tend to think yes, although

"but not

voted no in this

I

The "no" voters would tend to answer the ques-

election" (Number 19).

tion in the following vein:

"that's bothered me; it depends on what is

being bargained for" (Number 47); or "I don't know,
way but I'm beginning to

— as

I

haven't felt that

the administration gets bigger and bigger,

and grows away from the faculty" (Number 30).
The concern of another "no" voter was again the type of issues

within the contract:

"the real need of faculty is job security.

this and governance could be worked into a contract, then yes,

I

If

feel

A "yes" voter said, "we'll have

we might have a union" (Number 63).

keep control
it here within three years; we'll have to in order to

(Number 50).

A second "yes" voter responded, "yes, for a limited rea-

son— the growing administration— its

power and size.

it has.
but the faculty needs a larger voice than

such a large administration here"

(Number 23).

I

don't like unions

We shouldn't need

Although close to
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two-thirds of the faculty members in the study sample voted "no", their

responses to this question concerning the possibility of faculty collective bargaining paralleled comparable studies.

Most agreed that there

could well be collective bargaining on a college campus.

— Question

4

Question

Contract Items:

:

4

queried faculty members on possible contract items

within a collegiate collective bargaining agreement.

"Should collective

bargaining in higher education include any or all of the following:
Economic issues, working conditions, job security, governance?"

The

greatest difference among faculty responses was between those who mentioned governance and those who did not.^

Responses mentioning faculty

salaries, tenure, teaching load, or general personnel issues outweighed
two to one the individuals answering that they would include governance

items in a collective bargaining contract.

Yet, Sections II and III of

the interview (below) provide evidence that governance was considered

an important issue for faculty at the University of Massachusetts in

April of 1974.

A majority of faculty, however, did not feel that a

union could or should be involved with faculty governance.

15

The way in

employee
At the time of the election, no Massachusetts public
passed
not
was
so
do
to
them
The law empowering
could bargain for wages.
ennot
was
and
until ten days after the election on November 26, 1973,
did
interviewed
acted until the following summer. Many of the faculty
the time of the elecnot know that they could not bargain for wages at
such a law at the
Those who were aware of the possible passage of
tion.
matter to them, since
time of the election said that it did not really
salary was not an issue.
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which a few faculty members responded offers some
explanation of their
own mixed feelings on the subject.
One of my objections to collective bargaining is
that the union was
interested in governance when they should not have been.
It would
make faculty participation in governance a mockery. Governance
would be handled by union negotiators, not by faculty— a horror!
(Number 31)

In response to Question 4, another faculty member answered:

"I don't

even want to consider the eventuality (of a contract).

Professional

people should not have dictated standards or salaries.

That's for trade

union people" (Number 46).

Although faculty governance is not normally considered part of
a

collective bargaining agreement, most of the contracts negotiated be-

tween the Massachusetts state colleges and their Board of Trustees (before the November 26, 1973 Collective Bargaining Law was passed) con-

tained whole sections outlining governance systems and procedures.

These contracts have been the focus of a heated dialogue on the merits
and problems of including faculty governance in a legally binding agree-

ment.

16

According to the study sample, the use of collective bargaining

to establish governance structures remains questionable in the minds of

the University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty.

^ ror an interesting dialogue of opposing views on the
Collective Bargaining.
Massachusetts contracts, see Donald E. Walters.
Helping to Restore Collegiality " in The Chronicle of Higher Edu cation,
from William J.
November 26, 1973, p. 24j and "Letter to the Editor,
Education
Higher
of
Chronicle
The
Crane, December 17, 1973,
,

.

8
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— Question

5

:

The Strike:

Should faculty in public higher education be able to strike?
The strike is a universal right of union members in the private sector.
Its effectiveness stems from both the threat of its use by employees as

well as its actual use.

The National Labor Relations Board recognizes

that when "collective bargaining does not produce an agreement, the two

sides may turn to traditional modes of labor-management warfare, such
as the strike and the lockout.

Historically, however, the picture for public employees has been
quite different.

This sector of the work force had been denied collec-

tive bargaining completely until Executive Order 10988 was Issued for

federal employees in the early 1960's.

Since that time, not only has

Executive Order 11491 been issued, but twenty-five states have adopted

legislation (see Chapter II, footnote 51 for a list of states which
cover college employees specifically).

A few of these states even al-

low for certain segments of the public work force to strike.

1

Massachusetts, however, does not; nor do the majority of other states.
Yet, many illegal strikes have occurred in the public sector.

19

One of

three
the most recent involved the New Jersey State College system where

17 Carr and Van Eyck,

Collective Bar g aining

pp. 9-10.

,

Pennsylvania Stat. AFT
l8 Hawaii Rev. Stat. 89-12 (Supp. 1970):
A Vermont statute prohibits strikes by lo43 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971).
will endanger health,
cal government employees If, by striking, they
Alternatives
Bernstein.
C.
welfare or safety of the public. Merton
1972,
December,
Number
4,
to the Strike," AAUP Bulletin , Volume 58,
pp.

408-410.
19

Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining

,

p.

21

:

.
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thousand faculty struck in eight state colleges.

cost-of-living increase; but because of

a

state deficit, they were denied the raise.
days, resulting in no pay increase.

The faculty wanted a

nine hundred million dollar
Their strike lasted ten

The faculty were not fined nor

jailed for their illegal activities; nevertheless, they did have to

make up the school days missed. 20
The American Association of University Professors has spent con-

siderable energies determining the Association’s policy toward the faculty strike.

At first denouncing the strike, AAUP later revised its

position
It does not follow from these considerations of self-restraint (some
examples had preceded depicting instances of effective and ineffective uses of the strike) that professors should be under any legal
disability to withhold their services, except when such restrictions
are imposed equally on the other citizens.
-*

Dallas Sands argued that the strike has negligible value within

public higher education because of the "non-profit" nature of college
education.

Rather than supporting either side of the strike issue.

Sands has presented the opinion that new collective bargaining laws will

20 An interesting piece of faculty history is recalled by
The
Hofstadter concerning faculty at William and Mary in the 1750 s.
bethat
insisting
faculty put up a spirited resistance to lay control,
powers
rightful
yond the making of statutes, the Visitors had enjoyed no
of the
over the college since 1729 except in cases in which violation
of
Bishop
Since the faculty could appeal to the
statutes was alleged.
reagainst the decisions of the Visitors, they were not without

London
course, and they won a number of concessions."
134
Ac ademic Freedom p
,

Richard Hofstadter,

.

^"Faculty Participation
Summer, 1968, p. 157.

in Strikes," AAUP Bulletin

,

Volume 54,

"
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need to be designed for the collegiate institution.

In the following

rationale, he describes the difference between the public and private
sector strike.

The public employer, Sands explains, does not have the
/

(

profit loss to contend with as the private employer does; so that the impact of the public employees' strike, though felt by the taxpayer, does

not have as great an impact upon the administrative body of the public.

The strike operates as an economic sanction in industry to compel the
employer to make concessions in order to restore production and avoid
further loss of profits.
In the case of an enterprise not operated
for profit, that kind of sanction cannot be expected to operate with
its usual force.
Of course, no labor dispute is ever purely an econBoth sides to an industrial labor dispute generally
omic contest.
cultivate the support of public opinion based on considerations of
justice, nationalism, ethics, institutional loyalties, and so on.
But the absence of the economic factor from its position of key importance is a significant difference in the educational bargaining

relationship .22

Furthermore, Sands suggests that sympathy for the striking public employee

wanes fast; and without strike benefits or the employer's incentive to
move quickly, a public strike can be long and costly to the employee.

Continuation of a faculty strike beyond a relatively brief period is
apt to be counterproductive because its economic impact on the strikers increases as the strike continues while the public relations impact on the institution would have been felt most acutely at first.

"The^ Public.
A recent article in The New York Times points to
."PoliReview/'
in
Disdain of Public Employees," in Lee Dembart’s "Week
a
political
their
to
ticians find the same sentiment and are turning it
three
for
struck
In Massachusetts last week. State employees
vantage.
fines, they wen
stiff
threatened
and
firm
held
days; but when the State
Sund_ay_New_ York Tim es, June
back to work with nothing to show for it."

22

27,

1976, p. 3.
23

Education

,

C.

Higher
"The Role of Collective Bargaining in
Dallas Sands.
163-164.
Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 1971, Number 1, pp.

.
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In other words, whether the strike is legal or illegal, Sands

doubts that a strike by faculty members can effectively deny to the college administration a vital service which cannot, for a time, be foregone.
/

f

It appears that society does, in fact, tolerate interruptions, temporary or extended, of the learning process for reasons which are no
more substantial than faculty demands. Brief interruptions to celebrate athletic victories are not uncommon. Longer interruptions may
be imposed for compulsive military service.
Thus, the "essential" nature of the educational process is insufficient to support a
doctrinaire repudiation of the right to strike. 24
.

In a study conducted

.

.

with the Pennsylvania State College faculty,

individuals were asked whether or not they would resort to a strike, and

whether or not a strike might be used by a college faculty.

Their re-

sponses were then correlated to the faculty member's selection of

Only the "no representative" voters rejected the strike

gaining agent.
completely.

bar-

a

The APSCUF-PAHE* and AAUP voters felt that although a strike

is "generally undesirable and should be averted in most instances,

might be occasion when a strike was the only recourse.

1

there

AFT voters were

even less hesitant to use the strike and, in fact, few respondents felt
that the strike was an "unprofessional activity (a response most often

given by the "no representative" voters)
their findings, stating that:

.

Mortimer and Lozier summarized

"If Pennsylvania State College faculty at-

education
titudes are indicative of the broader populace of the higher
regarded as an
faculty, it may be that the strike is no longer

College and University
*The Association of Pennsylvania State
for Higher
Association
Pennsylvania
Faculties in Affiliation with the
NEA
Association,
Education
Education and associated with the National

^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

162
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unprofessional activity, or at least a sufficient reason to reject unionism.

25

Certainly, there are alternatives to the strike.
/

Arbitration,

f

both binding and non-binding, fact finding and mediation are used in
many states.

There are even some non-traditional approaches, one of

which was called the "non-stoppage" strike, and was described in the
AAUP Bulletin.
Under my proposal, a public employee union would be free to declare
a non-stoppage strike after all bargaining procedures failed to produce a settlement. Employees would be obliged to continue to work
full-time but would forego a portion of their take-home pay. I suggest that, initially, ten percent would suffice.
This money would
be paid by the public employer directly into a special fund.
In addition to paying the equivalent of regular wages, the employer
would also put into the fund an extra amount equal to what the employees have given up. This latter sum would constitute a loss to
The union would have the option periodically to inthe employer.
crease the amount of the foregone wages to employer payments, perhaps by increments of ten percent every two weeks. The public employer would have the option to require the union to switch to a
If the employer did this, the employees would
graduated strike.
continue to lose the same rate of pay; but the employer would forego services rather than pay out the additional funds. ^6
.

.

.

The article describing the non-stoppage strike was written in
1971; and since the non-stoppage strike clause has not been negotiated

into any public employer-employee contracts, one would have to say that
the suggestion fell on "deaf ears."

Anatomy of a Col
and Kenneth P. Mortimer.
lective Bargaining Election in Pennsylvania s State— Owned Colleg es.
UniverCenter for” the Study of Higher Education, The Pennsylvania State

^G. Gregory Lozier

sity, February, 1974, p. 60.
"The Non-Stoppage Strike,"
Volume 58, Number 4, December, 1972, p. 409.

^Merton Bernstein.

AAUP Bulletin,
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Question

of the interview querLed whether faculty,

5

should be able to Htrlke.
vos,

general,

The faculty responded overwhelmingly that

sti ike should be used

«i

In

ll

all alternatives had been exhausted.

Many expressed the opinion that collective bargaining would bring a

greater chance of

a

strike; others felt it was highly unlikely that the

faculty would over strike.

One person replied, "l don’t see us ns hav-

ing that much unified dissatisfaction" (Number 76).

Four people answered

that they personally would never strike but that a certain "element" of
the faculty at the University of Massachusetts might.

No correlation

existed between those voting affirmatively or negatively on collective

bargaining in the November election and those supporting or opposing the
legitimacy of a faculty strike.
various faculty attitudes.

cerning the duty which

a

The following quotations illustrate

One person expressed strong sentiments con-

faculty member has as

a

public employee; and, as

such, he felt that faculty sho.lld not be allowed to strike (Number 60).

Another responded quite simply:

effective way to bargain

is

"in collective bargaining,

with the threat of

a

the only

strike (Number 59).

One union voter remarked that "it would be a pretty sad situation

faculty struck.
for

it

that
It

(a

1

am against it.

it

the

Of course, the percentage of chances

strike) Increase with a union.

.

."

(Number 57).

Most said

they would regret a strike; although the great majority left that

was a bargainer's right, provided he was willing to live with the

costs.

One faculty member who had been quite open up until

this point

that I'd do anysaid, with a twinkle in his eye, "Now, I'd never say

thing illegal!" (Number 5).
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In conclusion, from the faculty's responses,

is clear that

it

if collective bargaining were to become a reality for faculty
at the

University of Massachusetts, the administration would be foolish to
think that when rights and privileges are at stake, faculty would resist a strike for any reason.

— Question

6

Family Membership in a Union:

:

"Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member
of a union?"

Studies on "professionalism" often mention family back-

ground as a significant factor in enabling the prediction of faculty

attitudes toward unionism.

27

These studies hold the premise that a fac-

ulty member, one or more of whose family members had been a union member,

would be far more likely to vote for a union than would someone who had
had no previous close association with a union.

This trend is also sug-

gested by the- findings of one study which indicate that a faculty member,

himself having once been a union member, would be more likely to favor

union representation on his campus.

28

In their response to Question 6,

examined the
He found that
York
City.
New
leaders of the teacher's union movement in
ensocialist
pro-union
"many of its leaders had been brought up in the
much
side.
vironment of New York's predominantly Jewish lower east
of the militant leadership in the local came from the ranks of the
those without socialist backgrounds generally came
Socialist Party.
on
from families with a strong union tradition.” S. Cole, The Unionizati

^Cole, author of The Unionization

of Teachers

,

.

.

of T eachers
28

,

p.

.

.

12.

"A Study of Trade Unionism Among State College
Haehn.
Berkeley,
Professors." Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of California,
from
typically
more
Haehn found that supporters of unionism were
1969.
those
addition,
In
skilled workers.
a family which included clerical and
support
to
likely
professors with previous union experience were more
experience.
union
previous
without
those
faculty unionization than
J.

0.
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sixteen of the seventy-six faculty members answered that
they personally
had been or were at the present time members of a union.

Nineteen re-

sponded that they had relatives who had been members of
a union, and
five of those nineteen answered "yes" to both a personal and
family mem-

bership.
s ^ ra ^ es

Thirty-six had no affiliation with a union.

Table 28 demon-

correlation between union membership and voting behavior.
The reason for asking Question

6

was to test the validity of

the theory that people who had had personal experience with a union

would more readily vote for a union.

The statistics showed that no such

statement could be made for the University of Massachusetts/ Amherst sample.

Although there were no conclusive results from Table 28, some in-

sights can be drawn from the faculty's responses.

A majority of the

"no" voters who had had a close relative (mother, father or sibling) in
a union answered that,

to some extent,

as antithetical to a union.

they saw their current profession

The faculty member valued the University as

a peer-governed institution which, even when challenged by administrative

machinations, was far better than his memory of the adversarial union.
One individual illustrated the point quite graphically:
One of the reasons why I feel so against a union here is because
when I was a boy, I belonged to a teamsters union in a canning factory.
I saw some extremely vulgar events which I now associate with
We worked hard twelve hours a day and a large portion of
unions.
our pay went toward union dues. When I walked out of the faculty
to become a teaching associate, I walked out of that part of my life
(Number 15, anti-union).

—

—

The same individual went on to say that the union did some good
the Univer
in the factory, and that he wouldn't be afraid of a union at

sity of Massachusetts.

Nevertheless, he did question whether, after its

first five years, a union would not become corrupted.
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TABLE

28

A CROSS ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL AND/OR

FAMILY MEMBERSHIP IN A UNION WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR
/
f

NUMBER OF
FACULTY

VOTED YES

VOTED NO

(1)

Personal Membership

16

5

10

(2)

Family Membership

19

8

10

(3)

Both Personal and Family
Membership

5

3

1

36

17

19

76

33

40

Previous Affiliation
With Union

(4) No

TOTAL

NOT
VOTE

•DID
-

WOULD NOT
SAY

1

(1)

1

(2)
1

(3)
(4)

TOTAL

2

1

—
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Another individual who had voted against the union
discussed

Question

6

at great length:

position of meniality.

"The blue collar image is relegated to a

Services are bought and sold which is certainly

not a way to handle any kind of skills— chattel— that

treated" (Number 66).

'

s

the way they are

When asked if he or a relative had been a member

of a union, he answered,

"no".

Later on in the interview, however, he

responded affirmatively to membership in a professional organization
the musicians' union.

The individual obviously did not feel that his

membership in a musicians' union in any way qualified him as a union
worker, again drawing a strong distinction between the professional's

"organization" and the worker's "union".

A faculty member who had started

a union on another college cam-

pus felt quite strongly that there was no need for one at the University
of Massachusetts.
v.

There's no need for a faculty union here. ... We have an immense
amount of voice. ...
I worked in a college where we didn't, and
there I helped form a union. Our salaries here are supported by a
If we
great number of people who make much less (the taxpayers)
(Number
69).
were scrutinized, we'd lose in that respect
.

One of the informants had an anti-union background but now was
in support of a union at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

.

He

felt that there were major issues in this election, and thus the reason
for his own personal shift in beliefs.

He stated that the university

and his school were being run by "tyrannical bureaucrats”; and that he

saw a union as the only way to counteract these forces.

He admitted

that he had had a very bad opinion of most unions when he had grown up.

He was raised in an area "where unions were all around

him, even though
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he had had no family member in a union.
ber of the School of Education,

I

"However," he said, "as a mem-

feel that this administration has giv-

en the green light to the School of Education administration to treat

faculty the way they want to" (Number 74).

He felt that the school's

personnel committee was "manipulated" from above.

The individual had

been at the University of Massachusetts for a number of years, and had
experienced the changes brought about by the Allen administration.

These

changes had not been positive experiences for him, and, in a sense, he

wanted to punish the University of Massachusetts administration for allowing these transgressions of faculty control.

His attitudes toward

unionism, had he not had pressing issues concerning the school, would
have probably caused him to vote "no".

However, once those issues be-

came critical enough to him, any such predisposition was suppressed.

— Question

7

:

The Bargaining Unit:

Who would you include in a bargaining unit?

Question

7

usually prefaced by an explanation of the term "bargaining unit.

was
Be-

cause many faculty members had not become familiar with it during the

course of the election, there was a basic feeling of disinterest in the
subject of inclusion/exclusion in a bargaining unit.

Only a few who

the defhad been directly involved in the campaigns knew how important

inition of membership in a unit could be.

The categories depicted in

answers to Question
Table 29 were derived directly from the faculty's

7.

little differently,
Each faculty member's answer was phrased a
of the categories in Table 29
but generally, the responses fell into one

opinions on the subject.
Only a few of the faculty members had strong

:
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TABLE

29

FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTION

7

"WHO WOULD YOU INCLUDE IN A BARGAINING UNIT?"

TYPE OF RESPONSE

NUMBER OF FACULTY

Everyone, excluding administration but
including

15

Librarians
Department Chairpersons

Department Heads

Teaching Assistants
All faculty members, Department Chairpersons,
and Department Heads

11

All faculty and Department Chairpersons

25

All faculty (excluding chairpersons and heads)

11

Anyone who meets criteria of AAUP membership

2
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One of the things that militates against a union here is that the
administration has managed to co-opt many faculty into being managers.
I'd like to see a sharp distinction between management and
faculty.
I would not include department chairpeople at first.
Later, yes, when they were really willing to represent faculty
(Number 41, pro-union).

All of the (sample) department chairpersons or heads felt that

their level should be included in the unit.

One person was quite ada-

mant about the status of the department head:
as a department head.
I

"I hold

There is no issue as long as

I

faculty status
hold academic rank.

If that argument were

am a faculty member" (Number 46, anti-union).

followed through, however, the trustees would be the only people on the

management side, since all of the academic policy-makers have faculty
rank in a department or school, including President Robert Wood.
A "yes" voter replied:

"Any administrative officer appointed by

the central administration should not be in the unit.
okay.

This issue was not discussed by MSP-AUP

.

All others are

That's why they lost

(Number 74).

That the bargaining unit was not an issue in the election is not
the important point.

election.

The unit will be a critical issue of any future

One consideration which none of the informants mentioned was

faculty.
the inclusion of the Boston campus and/or Worcester campus

The

campuses, not had
November election had not included either of these two
the election.
the issue of their inclusion surfaced during

The study

to mention a system-wide
sample, therefore, would have had no reason

bargaining unit.

tor the
That option, however, became a serious issue

hearings on that subject during
university, as demonstrated by the lengthy
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November and December of 1975, and January and February of 1976, the results of which can be seen in Appendix

7.

Recent history has shown that the system-wide unit is more pow-

erful in determining wage increases and other faculty demands.

Hawaii,

Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maryland, New
Jersey, Washington, New York, Delaware, Vermont, Nebraska, Connecticut,

Alaska, Massachusetts, and Maine all have multi-campus institutions which

have organized into single bargaining units within the past five to six
years.

There are forty-two system-wide units covering 247 campuses out

of the total of 544 campuses which have collective bargaining.

29

It is

likely that this trend will continue as state and city budgets become

more hard-pressed, and as faculty members have to compete with other segments of the public sector for limited financial resources.
The bargaining unit is a subject about which there is a prolif-

eration of opinion.

Connecticut and Hawaii are the only two states which

legally define the faculty bargaining units while other states simply

.30

„
t
stipulate which public sector groups are allowed to bargain.

The NLRB has taken an "ad hoc" approach to each collegiate decision.

or
One of their recent cases has some relevance to the University

Massachusetts.

concernIn October of 1974, the NLRB reached a decision

ing the University of Miami (146 NLRB 1148).

For the first time, the

update of The Chronicle
They are listed in the May 31, 1977
10.
p.
Hi gher Education Volume XIV, Number 14,
29

of.

,

stipulates univerMaine law, which took effect July 1, 1976,
campus.
sity-wide bargaining rather than campus by
30
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NLRB excluded medical school professors from a faculty collective
bar-

gaining election.

The Board

s

three— member panel cited the physical

separation of the medical school (in Miami's case, it was on the same
campus but still distant from other university facilities, the lower

student-teacher ratio, the medical school's year-round operation and
twelve-month faculty contracts, and its higher faculty salaries.

Cer-

tainly all of the aforementioned particulars hold true for the Worcester

medical campus of the University of Massachusetts. 11
Also, in the Miami case, the NLRB excluded deans and part-time

faculty from the faculty bargaining unit, but included associate and

assistant deans who teach, department chairpersons, all full-time faculty, and researchers.

Although a private institution and, therefore, sub-

ject to the National Labor Relations Act and not a state labor law, the
case may become a precedent; and, with all of its relevant features,

should be noted.
The definition of the bargaining unit is most crucial before a

university's first election.

Not until the unit is decided upon by

either a state labor relations board (or its equivalent) or the NLRB
can the rest of the election proceedings take place.

32

In its definition

21

The Massachusetts State Labor Relations Commission found
the Worcester campus to be a separate unit, October, 1976.
32

If, when the
Nor does an election necessarily take place.
percent supthirty
initial
labor organization is attempting to get its
fifty percent
than
more
port cards in order to hold an election, it gets
go to the
may
union
of the employee's signatures of support, the labor
At
election.
an
employer directly and request to be certified without
labor
the
with
petition
this point, other labor organizations may file a
contending organiza
between
election
an
occurs,
If this
board as well.
69.
Carr and Van Eyck, Collectiv e Bargaining, p.
tions is held.
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of a bargaining unit, the NLRB has stated
that a unit is defined accord-

ing to those persons who have "similarity of
duties, skills, wages, work

ing conditions, past bargaining history or
patterns in the industry in-

volved,

the appropriateness of a unit in relation to the
organization

of the company, and finally, where there is a question
of professional

status or craft cohesion, the employees' wishes." 33
Carr and Van Eyck have pointed out six major issues involved in
unit negotiations, three of which are pertinent to this study:
1.

Multiple campus issue;

2.

Faculty fragmentation issue;

3.

The department chairperson issue.

The multiple campus (multi-campus) issue which was mentioned

earlier is critical to higher educational institutions as a whole, not
just their faculties.

The City University of New York (CUNY) provides

an excellent example of the complex bargaining unit.

sity of New York is another similar case.)

(The State Univer

A brief history of the col-

lective bargaining events at CUNY can be found in Chapter II, footnote
52.

The discussion below will concentrate on the advantages and disad-

vantages of a multi-campus unit for both the faculty represented and
the administration of such a system.

CUNY is governed by a single governing board, a set of univer-

sity-wide administrators and an integrated budget.

For these reasons,

and the obvious political reasons (of size and, therefore, bargaining

33

Ibid., p. 73.
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power), it would seem to have been advantageous to the CUNY faculties
to be represented by only one unit; yet many of the faculty within the

CUNY system believed that they might benefit more from separate units

because their institutions had unique characteristics.

City College and

Hunter College were two such institutions where historically different
types of students and faculty had been attracted, thus setting them

apart by their prestige and autonomy of budgeting and curriculum design.
However, the combined faculties of the different campuses soon recognized
that a single multi-campus unit would profit all of them to a far greater extent than each could expect to gain from a separate unit.

They have

been proven correct at least in the area of compensation, as current salary schedules have shown.

A comparison of CUNY faculty salaries in 1968-

1969 to salaries in 1974-1975 shows that the average compensation at

Manhattan Community College rose from the eighty-second percentile in
1968 to the ninety-fifth percentile in 1975.

average ranks highest in the country.

3A

At present, the CUNY system

More recent problems with the

entire New York City budget have caused a desperate situation for the
CUNY system, students and faculty.

The faculty union, however, has been

a strong voice between city and university discussions.

parItem 2, the faculty fragmentation issue, has proven to be

Massachusetts.
ticularly interesting and relevant to the University of

Worcester— is
Although a three-campus university, one of its campuses—
a medical school; and as such,

34

is thought to be a distinct entity from

See Th e Chronicle of Higher Education

,

June 9, 1975, pp. 8 9
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the other two campuses.

The University of Miami case has already pro-

vided the illustration of how a medical school faculty was treated.

In

1971, Fordhara University and the AAUP brought a petition before the NLRB
/

(

requesting two separate bargaining units

— one

to represent law faculty,

the other a regular unit of Fordham University faculty.

The Board

found in favor of AAUP and two units were established. 35
In direct conflict to the NLRB decisions at Fordham and at the

University of Miami, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)
denied AAUP's request seeking a separate unit for the medical faculty at

Wayne State University.
viewpoint.

Here, then, is an example of the public sector's

The MERC examiner found that "it would unduly fragmentize a

teaching faculty unit if individual schools or colleges were permitted
to have separate representation, especially where one of the parties was

seeking the broader unit."

36

It may be that the Michigan decision had

more to do with the institution being public than with the actual description of the particular unit.

A larger bargaining unit can negoti-

ate with greater clout for its share of the legislature’s budget; one

bargaining unit also avoids the "whip-sawing" technique often resorted
to by two or three smaller units.

MERC undoubtedly saw the case as a

precedent and so, sought to simplify its own and the state

s

future.

Terrence Tice and Grace W. Holmes, Editors. Faculty P ower:
The Institute
Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Colle ctiv e Bar gaining on Campus
for Continuing Legal Education, 1972, pp. 255-272.
35

.

36

Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargainin g., p. 99.
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Finally, the department chairperson issue is one which finds
the NLRB highly inconsistent.

In defining a department chairperson,

the question arises, "Is the department chairperson a

not?"

If the chairperson is,

'supervisor’ or

then he/she is ruled out of a bargaining

unit and onto the administration's side; or In bargaining terminology,
the chairperson becomes "management".
At Long Island University, two agents were competing for fac-

ulty representation in 1971.

The American Federation of Teachers was

the only contender at the C. W. Post Center and wanted department chair-

persons excluded from the unit.

At the Brooklyn Center, AAIJP and AFT

(two rivals) wanted chairpersons included; and in this instance, the

university concurred.

Even with both sides requesting inclusion of de-

partment chairpersons (as was the case at Brooklyn)

,

NLRB ruled that

they be excluded in both cases because they had authorities and respon-

sibilities similar to that of a supervisor.
In the same year,

the NLRB contradicted this first decision in

another Fordham University case and included department chairpersons in
the unit.

One month later, the NLRB ruled on a University of Detroit
The

bargaining unit petition, again including department chairpersons.
history of NLRB demonstrates case after case of distinct and varying

decisions on the inclusion/exclusion issue of department chairpersons.
The one critical

issue in the eyes of the Board seems to be whether

chairpersons "effectively recommend" faculty personnel decisions.
problem with this criterion is that

a

The

chairperson's authority could be

of the current
directly dependent upon the control and philosophy

"
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administration.

The fluctuation of NLRB decisions should serve as a

warning to any university which believes the issue is simply
resolved.
In contrast to the private sector,

the state labor relations

boards have been more consistent in their decisions; and up until
1971,
they ruled that department chairpersons should be included in a bargaining unit.

37

Michigan's Board proved to be an exception, however; and

at both Eastern Michigan and Wayne State Universities, the Labor Commis-

sion excluded department chairpersons because "the chairman exercises

more than mere group responsibility for the affairs of his department

.

3^

Carr and Van Eyck pointed out in their analysis of this decision that
no distinction was made between the "ability" to make recommendations

on personnel matters to the deans and the "effectiveness" of the chair-

persons' recommendations once made.

The authors note that perhaps the

labor boards and councils are not familiar enough with the nature of

collegiate institutions to make beneficial decisions for either the faculty or the institution.

The notion of peer review and shared gover-

nance is unique to higher education, and could be confusing to a labor
board which is familiar only with industrial management questions.
David Wollett has summarized this plight in an article published
in the Wisconsin Law Review

,

1971:

"Excellence In faculty performance

individual efforts that go beyond norms or deviate from standard practice

— may,
37

in a system of collective negotiations, be discouraged or

Ibid.

,

p.

108.

-*®Ibid.

,

p.

109.
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repressed In order to gain uniformity in
performance and equality in re-

wards."

Collective bargaining agents tend to favor policies
that treat

all employees alike.

For this reason, collective bargaining in
higher

education is particularly problematical because there
are so many different types of employees in one unit.

Whether a larger unit can speak

for those differences and equitably represent them
is at best problematic.

He concludes the article by saying:

"The question is whether and

how collective negotiations can function in higher education without
erosion of the values for which higher education presumably stands."
Perhaps this should be the prime inquiry.

Kenneth Mortimer, in the Pennsylvania State College study, queried
faculty attitudes on the scope of the bargaining unit.

Those who disa-

greed with the definition determined by the state labor relations board

wanted a less inclusive rather than more inclusive unit.

The majority

(61.5 percent) agreed with the definition of "all full-time teaching

faculty members, department chairpersons, part-time teaching faculty, and

librarians without faculty status."

Their fear was quite obviously that:

The creation of large bargaining units across campuses in state
university systems (in which every type of institution from twoyear agricultural schools to major universities are included in the
same units) and among teaching and non-teaching professionals within institutions would lead to a homogenization of both faculty and
other professional personnel in higher education institutions .^0

aq

"The Status and Trends of Collective NegotiaDavid Wollett
tions for Faculty in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review Volume
1971, Number 1, pp. 18-32.
.

,

/|0

Kenneth P. Mortimer and G. Gregory Lozier. "Collective BarImplications for Governance." University Park, Pennsylvania.
gaining:
Center for the Study of Higher Education, 1972.
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The new University of Massachusetts bargaining
unit includes a

wide variety of teaching faculty and staff at
the Boston and Amherst
campuses. (see Appendix

7

for definition of unit).

The question which

remains is, has the Massachusetts Commission served the
University well
(and its faculty) by including such a broad unit?

The new contract and

time will tell.

Professionalism

The questions incorporated in Section
a

major area of consideration

— the

I

of the interview raise

notion of professionalism.^

41

The

It has often been said that the professional is one who professes.
There are more components to this complex individual than this
one ability, however; there are aspects which set him apart by his education, motivation, autonomy, "professional" standards, and code of conduct.
What is a professional? The following definition of a professional
is taken from- Professional Educatio n by Edgar H. Schein:
"The professional has been identified as having several traits:
(1) the professional has
a strong motivation or calling; (2) he possesses a specialized body of
knowledge acquired during a prolonged period of education and training;
using his expertise on be(3) he is apt to have a service orientation
half of a client.
Professionals form professional associations which
define criteria of admission, educational standards, licensing, or other
formal entry examinations; career lines within the profession; and areas
The ultimate criterion of professionof jurisdiction for the profession.
alization, according to most sociologists, is the achievement of "autonomy"
which implies (1) knowing better what is good for the client than anyone
else.
(2) subjecting one’s decisions only to the review of colleagues;
and (3) setting all one's standards pertaining to jurisdiction of the profession and entry into it through peer-group associations. These characteristics give rise to professional 'communities' implying a common sense
of identity, self-regulation, lifetime membership, shared values, a common language, clear social boundaries, and strong socialization or new
members." The professor within this context has an identity of his/her
ovm as a teacher; the professor has a mission (teaching), "but he has
neither professional training as a teacher nor a well defined client
The professor's training has been in a specific discipline; his
(p. 12).
client (the student) is often not dealt with on individual terms (one designs a course to teach a group of students something), but rather as
knowledge. At
part of a society to which the professor must impart his

—

.

.

^
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word

professionalism", or some derivation of it, came up
consistently

in faculty responses to Questions
2, 3, 5, and 7, where the faculty mem-

ber’s self-stated identity as

a

professional was reiterated throughout

the interview.

Although the conflict of "professional vs. employee" is not new,
the process of unionization did cause the concept to rise anew for faculty.

As more than one faculty member put it, "the administration forced

us into the role of employee" (Number 29).

That being the case, many

felt that a union would be the only way to effectively have a voice in

order to counteract the sense of powerlessness which the notion of "em-

ployee" evokes.

Ronald

C.

Brown summarizes the sentiments of what many

of the faculty said:

By established custom, professors are independent persons who seek
a type of self-government which can maintain their ideals of academic freedom, professional autonomy, and professional status. To
many professors, the thought of a faculty union poses a threat to
these ideals because they believe a union, with its industrial relations concepts, would encroach on their professional status.

Before the AAUP finally decided to open up the option of collective bargaining to its members, it also voiced similar distress signals:

Edgar H. Schein. Prof es
times, Schein says society becomes the client.
in
a series of Carnegie Com10th
Some New Directions
sional Education:
McGraw-Hill
California:
mission Higher Education profiles. Berkeley,
Book Company, 1972, pp. 9-12.
,

"Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate,
Education,"
An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining in Higher
William and Mary Law Revie w, Volume 12, Winter, 1970, p. 331.

^Ronald

C.

Brown.
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The American Association of University Professors is deeply
committed
to the proposition that faculty members in higher education are
officers of their colleges and universities. They are not merely employees.
They have direct objectives to their students, their colleagues and their disciplines .43

The role of "professor" is quite different from the role of the

elementary and secondary level teacher.

This latter group of individuals

is not as concerned with their disciplines or the research aspect of the

college professor’s job.

Indeed, one definition of the professor clear-

ly distinguishes him from a "mere" teacher.

The professor innovates, stimulates and deals with abstract relationships; the teacher, by contrast, conserves and transmits.
Hence, the instruction that falls legitimately under the hand of the
university man is necessarily subsidiary and incidental to the work
of inquiry.
.

.

.

Hence, it does not have to become a conflict for the university

professor that K-12 teachers are unionized; since the two educators have
far less in common than one might guess from a superficial glance.

As

Alan Wolfe so succinctly stated, "there is something positive about the
word "professional", especially compared with one of its opposites
,

word

it

amateur

43
Bu lletin ,

— the

45
.

From the "Statement on Faculty Participation in Strikes," AAUP
Summer, 1568, p. 157.

"Teachers and Professors: Subject Matter
Jessie Bernard.
Academicians
Areas " in The Professors: Work and Lifestyles Among
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Charles H. Anderson and John D. Murray, editors.
Schirkman Publishing Company, Inc., pp. 30-32.
,

,

45

"The Professional Mystique," in An End To PolitAlan Wolfe.
Alan Wolfe. New
T he Caucus Papers by Marvin Surkin and
ical Science:
Basic Books, 1970, p. 290.
York:
,
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Wolfe sees the notion of professionalism as that
which sets
apart the elite from the proletariat.

Even before the trend toward fac-

ulty collective bargaining began, Wolfe noted that:

Academics have become more and more concerned that a proper
definition of a professional role be developed. ...
In other words,
this attempt to define professional conduct is a political
act,
among other reasons, because it is really an attempt to define political conduct.

A personal and political sense of control--the ability to affect
one

s

environment is very much the sense of the following passage pub-

lished in the AAUP Bulletin:
In speaking of the ideals of the university professor with respect
to his work, we are brought inevitably to the general concept of professionalism.
I tremble at introducing the word.
It invites the
worst kind of logomachy, especially since professionalism is so often
invoked as a weapon as a way of attracting prestige and superiority
when used about one's own work; and a way of‘ telling someone else
that he shouldn't do something we don't want him to do when used
about his.
Professionalism represents a particular set of beliefs (and) ideas.
(which center).
principally upon three
conceptions that of specialized expertise, of autonomy and of service.
Autonomy is exercising that competence which is an important ideal of professionalism. The professional himself must have
final responsibility, though with advice and consultation among colleagues, to determine how his work is to be done.^ 7

—

.

.

.

.

—

.

.

.

.

.

.

Here one begins to sense the faculty member's need for individ-

ualism, for his own sense of autonomy, within the university system.

There was the individual who was afraid of the union because he did not

46

Ibid., p. 292.
47

"The Strike and the Professoriate,"
Sanford Kadish.
Bulletin, Volume 54, Summer, 1968, p. 161.
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want

someone speaking for me, rather than having
the opportunity to

fight my own battles" (Number 19).

One faculty member saw the notion

of individuality as the difference between
blue and white collar workers
(his response to Question 2):

ferences.

.

.

.

"Historically, in my mind, there are dif-

White collar workers have considered themselves as be-

ing able to have individual negotiations as opposed
to collective needs"

(Number 24).

Central to this concept of professionalism is the faculty member's
individual autonomy. This autonomy is derived from the belief that
a faculty member s technical knowledge, skills and experience as
they relate to his academic discipline should permit him to determine for himself the conditions under which he will work, and the
problems with which he will deal. 48

Lozier has hit upon one of the major conflicts in a university

system of governance

— the

individual vs. the collective, or autonomy of

the individual vs. the political autonomy of a group.

arose in several of the faculty interviews.

This tension

The faculty member (Number

42) who stressed peer review and a system of shared governance so vehe-

mently was really saying that she wanted to retain a collective (in the
sense of collegial) form of government; yet she felt that a union would
take away her individual bargaining rights with the administration.
She was concerned, too, about the amount of time faculty had to spend
on committees and on administrative work in order to have a "shared"

system of governance.

48

Other faculty members felt that their system of

"Changing Attitudes Toward the Use of
Gregory Lozier.
Volume 25, Number
Strikes in Higher Education," T he Journal of CUP
2, April, 1974, p. 41.
g

.

,

^

:
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shared governance was failing; that the administration had
increasingly

more power; and hence, the faculty peer review system and Faculty
Senate
lacked the clout to override administrative decisions.

The faculty had

lost their political power as a collective, and yet were afraid of losing their autonomy as a peer group to union officials.
The faculty's failure may have had more to do with the size of
the institution than any overt irresponsibility of the faculty or in-

versely any machination of the administration.

Burton Clark, in a chap-

ter entitled "Interpretations of Academic Professionalism," has noted

that
As campuses increase in size, complexity and internal specialization,
there is less chance that the faculty will be able to operate effectively as a total faculty in college affairs.
The professional-in-the organization presents everywhere this special kind of problem.
He gains authority, compared to most employees, by virtue of
his special knowledge and skills; he loses authority compared to a
man working on his own, by virtue of the fact that organizations locate much authority in administrative positions
.

.

.

.

The bureaucracy of the Amherst campus administration was not, in
the final analysis, what brought about a union; however, in 1977, the

bureaucracy of the entire university system was most influential.

A fac

ulty's collective need to save their university from an outside force
^

which might lower their individual or collective status is more likely
to be the reason for unionization.

The concern for one's professional-

ism, if attacked sufficiently, will not dwindle, but will increase.

A

"Interpretations of Academic ProfessionalClark.
America edited and inism," in The Emerging University and Industrial
Heath and Company,
troduced by Hugh Hawkins. Lexington, Massachusetts:
1970, pp. 92-93.

^Burton

R.

,
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real threat to the autonomy or professionalism of the faculty
member

will not produce a retreat into the research and teaching of
one’s disc ^P^-i- ne

Rather, the threat will be translated into a quick seizer of

*

power by the faculty as a group.

To get that power,

faculty will do

their best to form a union which can retrieve that sense of profession-

alism they feel they have lost.

—

Organizations of professional employees both those which call themselves unions and those which do not will increasingly take their
rhetoric from the.
professional model (as exemplified by doctors
and lawyers), their goals and status aspirations from the academic
model, and their tactics from the union model.
In brief, they will
do their best to look and sound like professional societies; but,
if necessary, will act more like unions.

—

.

.

An interesting aspect of the pre-election period was the attitude and strategy used by the University administration.

Outward appear-

ances would have suggested that their* s was a "laissez faire" strategy.
Some believed that in actuality, the administration used the entire con-

flict of professionalism to its advantage in a well-executed plan.

Appendix

8

(See

for a discussion of the Michigan State University election.)

One example of this strategy can be seen in a letter sent from former

Chancellor Oswald Tippo to all faculty on November twelfth, three days

before the election.

His letter urged a negative vote and outlined sev-

eral of his own thoughts on the upcoming vote.

The message was aimed at

the professional status image of each individual faculty member and of
the campus as a whole.

In this capacity,

Tippo called for the.

fective.

50

Joseph Garbarino.
Industrial Relations, Volume

.

the letter was extremely ef-

.

Prof essional Negotiations in Education,"

,r

7,

1968, p. 274.
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community of scholars.
and faculty (to) devote their primary
attention to the ancient functions of teaching and seeking the
truth. ...
We are all decision-makers, and we are all officers
of the University.
I reject the proposed adversary relationship
between faculty and administrators, for the industrial model of
management vs. employees is inappropriate for an academic community
which aspires to excellence. 51.

.

In his predictions, Tippo had indeed forecasted some unfortunate

trends for a faculty which adopted unionism; however, many felt that
these trends would come because there was no collective bargaining.

Tippo predicted that collective bargaining would cause "power and deci-

sion-making (to) increasingly move to Boston."

Tippo believed that the

union would force decision-making into the city, away from campus.
However, an article in the August 6, 1975 The Amherst Record out-

lined the already growing discontent of the Amherst campus faculty with

President Wood's office.

The "Hay Report," a study done by Hay Asso-

ciates for Wood's staff, had called for increased centralization of the
three campuses.

The faculty, and particularly the MSP members of the

Amherst faculty, were not overjoyed with the results of the thirtythousand dollar study.

52

In addition,

the University of Massachusetts

budget for fiscal year 1975-1976 indicated increasing problems between
President Wood, the legislature and the Governor.

Many faculty members

union;
felt that this budgeting process needed some help from a strong

printed in
"^The Letter was published by the CCF and was also
signed by
editor,
The Amhe rst Record on November 14, 1973, "to the
Oswald Tippo, Professor of Botany.

"Discontent With Wood Growing Among Faculty,"
Andrew Marx.
4.
The Amherst Record August 6, 1975, pp. 1 and
^2

,
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and that pressure would need to be applied both in the
President's

office and in the Statehouse.
In Tippo's letter,

the closing sentence calls upon the faculty

at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst to remember their elite

status, a theme Chancellor Randolph Bromery would repeat a day later.
"For these and many other considerations,

I

ask (for cooperation from)

all faculty colleagues who share with me the dream that one day a great

state university will arise at Amherst.

..."

Another example of the administration's strategy can be seen in
the letter from Chancellor Randolph Bromery to the faculty sent a few
3

days before the election (November 12, 1975)

(see Appendix 9).

Again,

this letter attempted to persuade the faculty of the elite place held

by the Amherst campus in the community of universities.

This, in effect,

played upon the faculty member's sense of professionalism and autonomy

within his own university.

History has demonstrated that unionism has

proliferated in the junior colleges and in the "emerging" four-year state
colleges.

.

.

.

which are so organized that essential autonomy which is the critical
component of the professor's job interests is threatened or appears
This is why the problem is not seriously raised
to be threatened.
in the universities of the first rank, where professorial autonomy
and control are imbedded in the structure of government; no amount
of ideology will convince most of these professors that they are
53
employees for their essential purposes.
The letter from Chancellor Bromery appealed to that professional

sense of the professor as a member of one of the elite universities

"Academicians as Bargainers with the University,
22-28, 1970, p. 27.
Issues in I ndustri al Society Volume 3, Numbers

^Jack Barbash.

,

—
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where the traditions of scholarship and peer-evaluation
are valued."
Had the letter been sent further in advance of the
election, the MSP-

AAUP could have used it effectively against the administration
by calling them

elitists

,

and appealing to those faculty who professed ideo-

logically to be pro— union.

As it was, the letter came at just the cor-

rect moment (from the administration’s viewpoint) because all it did

was raise the issue in the minds of the undecided.
Both Tippo and Bromery, as well as the University of Massachusetts

administration, knew quite accurately what the real issues were; and
they used them extremely effectively:

the faculty member is an individ-

ual, academic professional, part of a system where collegeality and one's

discipline is critical to the life blood of the institution.

Because

there was no issue of enough concern to the faculty in November of 1973,
the MSP-AAUP could not muster what should be a union’s major strength

the need for collective action (a different form of collegeality perhaps)
to present either an alternative solution to the problem or at least to

combat the present administration.

Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current
U niversity of Massachusetts Situation

(Section II of Interview)

The second section of the interview attempted to find out wheth-

with the
er the faculty member was generally satisfied or dissatisfied
the dis
university as an employer; and if dissatisfied, the nature of

satisfaction.

After an open-ended first question on election issues,
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the interviewer raised questions regarding
compensation, satisfaction

with working conditions, personal acceptance
of promotion and tenure
policies, and then general satisfaction with personnel
policies.

If

any of these "bread and butter" issues had been of
tantamount concern
to a majority of faculty, a union group would have
had a much easier

uime establishing its campaign strategy.

The reason for this is that

unions, historically, have done well by their constituents in the areas
of compensat ion , working conditions, and job security.

Correlation of Local Issues to
Faculty Voting Behavior

Question 1

•

What did you perceive to be the major issues affect-

ing the election on November 15th and 16th?

Could you state

which issues were the most important to you?

The answers to Question

1

have been categorized in Table 30.

The MSP-AAUP and the CCF organizations, as well as most faculty at the

University of Massachusetts, predicted that the lack of issues during
the Amherst election would be the main reason why the union would lose
the election.

It might be interesting to point out, however, that fol-

lowing close on the heals of a faculty member’s "no-issues" response
was usually a comment about the polarization factor between the faculty
and administration.

Most respondants felt that this polarization had

not reached a critical enough point for them to choose a union over the

Faculty Senate.

Others felt that the point of antagonism had been

reached, and that a union was the only way for the raculty to have its

share of the power.

One "yes" voter reflected that.

.

.
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TABLE

30

TYPE OF RESPONSES TO MAIN ELECTION ISSUES

NUMBER OF
FACULTY MEMBERS

RESPONSES (In Categories)
There were no issues.

Polarization between administration and faculty.

14

Whether outside "force" (i.e., a union) should
speak for us.

^2

Tenure quotas, or the fear of losing the tenure
process.

10

Whether faculty governance works at this
university.

9

Need to be able to deal more effectively with
legislature.

4

Fear of losing my individualism.

2

Parking.

2

Would give faculty more say/departmental autonomy.

2

p Dwight Allen (anti-School administration)

Salary.

.

2
1

..

:
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(f

the feeling which the faculty has gotten over the past few years is
that they've been sold down the river.
There's been pressure from
the administration and from the students on the administration, but
not from the faculty for anything. All these should be together.
The trouble is there's no one looking out for our interests (Number
29).

(Another "yes" voter replied)

voted for the union because I feel that the faculty doesn't have
the opportunity to participate in University governance.
The administration is making all the decisions without consulting faculty or
students.
The administration should be here to do the clerical stuff.
Faculty and students should make the decisions.
I can't even see
my Dean! (Number 9)

I

The third most significant issue was the one of outside inter-

vention by a union.

Many faculty responded to the question by stating

their concern over an "outside force" speaking for the faculty.
also is echoed the personal autonomy question:

Here,

"If a union were ac-

cepted, we would have lost direct impact and our own bargaining which

already exists.

It would have been a Boston matter between the union

and the President's Office.

frightening" (Number

An outside force would be frightening, just

3)

One individual saw many of the questions and issues raised by
the MSP-AAUP as problems which might well exist in the future.
ly,

the issue was one of principle

—whether

Large-

faculty should be represented

with the present
by an outside union or (whether the faculty) was happy
system.

to the past
The union pointed to future problems rather than

or present" (Number 45)
a personal problem
The issue of tenure was discussed both as

faculty as a whole.
as well as a projected one for the

If an individual
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was not tenured, he would be more likely to answer that tenure was an
issue.

The answer which most resembles the general response was that

of Number 64

:

Tenure quotas.
Can a vote for the union help the situation? I
don’t know, perhaps.
I don't think that the union would have allowed
contracts for non-tenured people.
I’m glad the union lost, but I
am also pleased that the election was so close. ...
I wouldn't
mind if one hundred percent were tenured in my department as long as
I had some sav in who would be tenured.

The person epitomized the feeling, which the majority of faculty
gave, that the union was not a natural outgrowth of the present faculty's

direction.

This person spoke of the union "allowing" contracts for non-

tenured people.

But presumably, the union would consist of faculty rep-

resentatives who would have the authority to make such a decision.

Re-

sponses to this first question demonstrated that most faculty (even yes
voters) think of a union as a foreign body.

They consistently chose

words like "them" and "it".
The issue of faculty governance was felt by some to be the most

important issue in the election.

Rather than taking up the discussion

of faculty participation in academic governance here, the researcher

discusses governance as a whole when Section V of the interview is re
viewed in Chapter III.
pointed to the
Four particularly well-informed faculty members

legislature as being the pivotal force in a union movement.
P.

Kenneth

movement toward
Mortimer's study provided strong evidence that "the

collective bargaining has been,
the collectivization of faculty through
of decision-making authority in
in part, a result of the centralization

"

.
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state boards of higher education, state
governments and state legislatures

.

The study which he and Lozier conducted
on the Pennsylvania

faculty found that although a small fraction
of the "no representative"

vote (itself a minority vote) did not agree,
"the vast majority of the
faculty.

.

.

supported collective bargaining as a means to promote
their

interests in the legislature and administrative chambers
of the Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania."^
The four faculty at the University of Massachusetts who answered

that the power of the legislature eventually would be the faculty’s rea-

son for electing a bargaining agent did not make their statements lightly.

Each one seemed to have thought through the union question extreme-

ly carefully.

Each one voted for the union.

Only one had worked di-

rectly for MSP-AAUP; two had tenure; two had not yet been evaluated.

As

one respondent explained:

The question is to what extent Wood and the Chancellor are strong
enough to counter the moves of the legislature. The allocation of
funds is the key, of course. The Chancellor's Office always seems
to take the position
"let’s do the best we can: wait and see."
But as the money gets tighter, the problem for the University gets
greater. You can’t hire new faculty; you try to limit promotions
and raises; merit gets affected; and at the same time, you accept
more students; classes get larger; and a fewer number of topics can
be offered. All of this leads to an atmosphere of anti-experimenFactation.
It’s an expensive way to save money in the long run.
I just don't
ulty salaries suffer, but students eventually pay.
This year,
feel that Wood and the Chancellor fight hard enough.
our department got cut back on Teaching Assistantships next year,
who knows what it will be (Number 65)

—

;

^Mortimer and Lozier, "Anatomy,"

p.

7

of conclusion.
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Another fortune teller predicted:

"Next year, there will be no

cost-of-living increase because the legislature will figure that groups
can bargain for increase in salary if they want it" (Number 50)

.

(Not

only was there no cost-of-living increase in 1974, but merit was elimi-

nated also.)

What could happen if the University's fiscal budgets were

reduced on a yearly basis is that even the President and the Chancellor

might begin to consider the merits of having a strong union force behind them as opposed to an ineffectual Faculty Senate.

Correlation of Satisfaction

With Jobs With Voting Behavior

Questions 2,
issues:

3,

4,

and

5

all concerned faculty "bread and butter"

salary, working conditions, promotion, and tenure.

— Question

2

Is salary an issue to you?

:

Are you satisfied with

your current salary?

— Question

3:

Are working conditions an issue for you?

— Question

4

Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in

:

Massachusetts?
terms of promotion and tenure at the University of

— Question

5

are fairly
Do you think that the personnel policies

:

implemented at this university?

Question

2

Are they effective?

studied several
was asked chiefly because, having

to clarify that salary was not
AAUP salary schedules, the author needed
A few members
For most faculty, it was not.
an issue for the faculty.

.
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of the School of Agriculture and one in Nursing
felt that relative to

other faculty in the University, their salaries were
not equitable.

The

vast majority, however, felt that they were adequately
compensated.
Three even felt that they were overpaid, but stated that
they were not

complaining
Most faculty felt that working conditions (Question

constitute an issue for them, nor for other faculty.

3)

did not

Again, two faculty

members from the School of Food and Natural Resources felt that their
classes were too large, and that they could use some new office furniture (Number 55).

"I haven’t even had a new file cabinet since

(over thirty years ago)

.

I

came"

Eight to ten faculty mentioned that the merit

policy was an issue for them.

The policy on merit increment for the

fiscal year 1974 had just been decided (see introduction to Chapter III),
and undoubtedly had heightened the faculty's sensitivity to it.

One in-

dividual was aware of previously negotiated union contracts where the

merit system had been disbanded.

He felt that the MSP-AAUP might have
At this point, the interviewer

attempted the same had it been elected.

would proceed to Question

5

in order to find out whether it was the ac-

tual merit policy or the administration of that policy which was of con-

cern to the informants.

For the most part, it was the implementation

of the policy which bothered the faculty.

On the fourth question, most tenured people answered that they

had been fairly treated.

Some mentioned other faculty members who had

not been as equitably treated as they had been.
ing of a departmental colleague or, in

a

They were often speak-

few instances, the faculty
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mentioned the

Jarvesoo case" which was decided in her favor one week

before the election. 55
To a great degree, the responses of the individuals
on Questions
4 and 5

depended upon their school affiliation.

The Schools of Food and

Natural Resources and Nursing again seemed to have murkier policies;
and
therefore, their memoers felt that individual faculty members were not
as fairly handled as they should be.

Natural Resources responded:
a while.

system.

A member of the School of Food and

"No, you sort of say to hell with it after

It takes four to five years to find out how to get through the

The University of Massachusetts is the best in the state, but

extremely disorganized" (Number 70).

Two members of the School of Edu-

cation also felt that the personnel policies were not equitably imple-

mented

.

The humanities and social sciences departments had apparently

clearly delineated personnel policies because their faculty members felt
that the departmental committees were as fair as possible.

Part of the

acceptance by faculty of the personnel policies obviously related to
the Dean's fairly consistent approval of departmental recommendations.

Only one faculty member (Number 11) in these two schools mentioned the
level above the department, stating that during the spring of 1974, his

department's personnel committee had recommended six people for tenure,
and only three had been granted tenure.

He implied that it was more a

The Jarvesoo case involved a nepotism ruling which had caused
qualiDr. Jarvesoo to be fired twenty-three days before she would have
the
fied for retirement benefits after eleven years of employment at
University of Massachusetts.
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sign of the times than a poor decision by the Dean.

Clearly, the fac-

ulty responding to these questions were not concerned
over the basic
job security issues.

Those who did express personal concern constituted

a slight minority.

Both the M->P-AAUI’ and the CCF prepared full and thorough news—

letteis stating their positions on the various issues pertaining to the

faculty at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst.

Often closely dated

newsletters from each of the two groups answered each other's accusations pointing out inadequacies in the other's arguments.

The two groups

dealt with the issues fairly and in a responsible manner.
Obviously, many issues were raised between April of 1973 and

November of 1973 (the heaviest period of campaigning).

To list them

all would be repetitive; however, those issues which were discussed the

most often were:

tenure quotas, the Morris and Wellman documents and

general governance policies, increased power vis a vis, the Amherst ad-

ministration and the President's Office, grievance procedures, and budget formulation (including campus autonomy).

Section II, Question

1

The faculty responses to

reflected these issues to some degree, although

the majority felt that these issues were not critical enough to change
the present system.

Salar y

Although salary was not a concern to the University of Massachusetts
counfaculty members, it has been a large issue to faculties across the
try.

Collecti\e
An unpublished study entitled "An Impartial Review of

.

.
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Bargaining

at Michigan State University documented the
current effects

of collective bargaining on salary at that time
(March 9, 1971)
1.

At Central Michigan University,

there was a 12.5 percent salary

increase including fringe benefits, 7.1 percent of which was
straight salary increase.

However, the report adds, the admin-

istration had budgeted an eight percent increase anyway.
2.

At CUNY, substantial increases have occurred during the past

four years.

3.

At Rutgers University, a nine percent increase, and again, a

quotation is added from Dr. Martin of Rutgers saying, "I tend
to think the amount would have been much the same"

(without a

union)

4.

Southeastern Massachusetts University responded to the inquiry
by saying yes, substantial increases had been gained through

collective bargaining.

Five percent annual merit increases had

been given (which is less than the University of Massachusetts

average increase up until 1973)

56

"An Impartial Review of Collective Bargaining by University
Faculties," prepared by the Michigan State University Faculty Affairs
Committee, March 9, 1971, pp. 8-10. To the question, Has there been
an appreciable increase in faculty salaries since collective bargaining
was initiated? If so, was it necessary to reduce staff and/or programs?'
Central Michigan
The following University representatives gave responses:
and Dr.
Kantor
University Professor Brite and Dr. Ping; C.U.N.Y. Mr.
Mintz; Rutgers— Dr. Martin and Dr. Peskin; Southeastern Massachusetts—
Dr. Swartzman.
Dr. John and Dr. Orze; St. Johns Professor McCarrick and
1

—

—

—
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5.

At St. John's University,

the increase was substantial:

twenty-

one percent across the board in a two-year period (twelve percent in 1970-1971, and nine percent in 1971-1972).

In the same document,

the faculty group interviewed a labor re-

lations professor at Michigan State, Dr. Charles Killingsworth

.

His

comments are certainly relevant to any study which attempts to compare
faculty salaries before and after collective bargaining.

It is extremely difficult to get any figure that clearly shows mone-

tary gains as an effect of unionization. Many good statisticians
have tried to do this and have yet to arrive at a figure that is
generally accepted. Your question to me, and in your survey, makes
the assumption that it is possible to determine the effect of unionization.
That assumption is false because it assumes that all that
has happened in any case is the initiation of collective bargaining
How can you separate the
procedures.
It isn't a good question.
effects of collective bargaining from the effects of a general inflationary period, for example?57

David Wollett has quoted Mr. Justice Jackson who made the point

twenty-five years ago that collective bargaining tends to favor policies
that treat all employees alike.

Wollett

's

article agrees with the gen-

eral homogenization premise:

The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with
suspicion on such individual advantages. Of course, where there
of
is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity
employees, it is possible for the collective bargaining to pre
scribe only minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave
but the majority
certain areas open to individual bargaining.
individual
bargain,
employment
the
rules, and if it collectivizes
.

57

Ibid., p. 29.

.
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advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result. 58

Lad and Lipset, in their study, say that "unionization inevit-

ably fosters policies that seek to eliminate salary differentials among
those in a given job category, other than those linked to seniority."^ 9

They examine several different colleges where the merit incre-

ments have been deleted and/or made more. uniform.

At CUNY,

for instance,

there was no money allocated for merit in 1971; and the union received

much criticism from its faculty for that occurrence.

The next year,

the teaching faculty received a 3.5 percent general increase and 1.5

percent available for "differential increments."

The key distinction

S

was that the power of decision-making for such individual raises had
shifted from the administration tc peer review.

"This eliminates the

power of administrators to implement the so-called "star system," the

emphasizing of "quality" or prestige distinctions among faculty.
The authors proceed to describe a situation which had occurred before

unionization took place (1966) at one of the CUNY colleges where the faculty, as a whole, had been voted an eight percent salary increase.

Un-

fortunately, the local college president had the authority to allocate
five percent of the eight percent, the result being that one faculty

58

as
Case, Company, V. NLRB, 321 vs. 332, 338-339 (1944),
Nego
"The Status and Trends of Collective
cited by David H. Wollett.
Education," Wisconsin Law Review, Volume
Higher
tiations for Faculty in
1971, Number 1, pp. 18-19.
59

J.

I.

Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions

60 Ibid., p. 71.

,

p. 69.

r
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member received a thirty-two percent increase while
no more than three percent increases.

a

In California,

few faculty got

local AFT and NEA

units have opposed individual merit increases (as compared to across the
board) in the California University and State College System.
A 1971 study done on the Michigan Community College System con-

cluded that:

.

.

salaries were more homogenous before collective

bargaining within colleges, disciplines, degree and experience levels,
and for all colleges in the study.

There was a greatei difference be-

tween high and low salaries after collective bargaining

.

"^

At another institution,' a differentiated salary structure was

negotiated in instead of out of a contract.

"At Oakland University in

Michigan and elsewhere, faculty representatives have attempted to negotiate a superstar clause which would permit paying highly distinguished

faculty off scale.”

62

Generally speaking, it seems apparent that the

faculty can negotiate into their contract the types of salary structures
that the majority of that faculty wants.

63

61

Christine E. G. H. Gram. "Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Faculty Salary Structures in Michigan Community Colleges.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971, pp. 91-92.

Kenneth M. Smythe, Tracy H. Ferguson and Karl J. Jacobs. "InP owe
stitutional Differences: Questions and Answers,” in Fa c u 1 1 y
Holmes
Grace
and
edited by Terrence Tice
Coll ective Bargaining on Campus
62

.

,

p.

76.

unique
contract negotiated in December of 1974 stipulated
compensation proIt was reported that "as part of the
compensation.
of Tranklin
member
faculty
each
vided in a newly negotiated contract,
to cut one
entitled
is
Hampshire)
Pierce College here (in Rindge, New
time. of
the
Perhdps
use.”
cord of wood on college land for personal
negotiation,
of
piece
that
with
year and the setting had something to do
Volume IX, December 2, 1374 p. b.
TVio Chronicle of Higher Education
6 3 One

,

,
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Working conditions are usually a part of a collective
bargaining
agreement; but for faculty collective bargaining
contracts, they range

from a description of office space, to class size,
to a description of
the academic calendar.

Working conditions were not predicted to be a

concern to faculty; and neither the CCF nor the MSP-AAUP highlighted
this issue in their campaigns.

work space:

The Amherst campus faculty have adequate

classroom hour load is less than most other public post

secondary institutions and teacher/student ratio, though steadily increasing, is not out of the ordinary.

Responses to Question

3

indicated

that, in fact, working conditions were not an issue.

T enure

The subject of tenure was of great concern to the faculty, al-

though it was. not seen as a direct issue in the November election.

Sat-

isfaction with personnel policies was fairly consistent, as was evidenced

by the faculty's responses to Questions

4

and 5; although when they men-

tioned tenure, it was usually to point out inconsistencies between the

tenure policy and the implementation of that policy.
For the most part, untenured faculty members were worried about

future decisions with regard to their own job security.

Only a few ten-

ured faculty articulated an awareness of the national (and local) trends

6/

in
*For an excellent series of articles on working conditions
see
employees)
the college and university sector (for non-academic
and Univerfour articles by James P. Begin, The Journal of the C ollege
,

/

May, 1971, and
sit y Personnel Associ a tion , December, 1970; March, 1971;
September, 1971.
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away from

sure fire

tenure.

Those individuals who expressed concern

over the University of Massachusetts tenure policy felt that
the problem lay not at the departmental level, but with the Dean.

One individ-

ual who had just gone through his tenure review period expressed his
re-

sentment of that process to the interviewer:
tenure problem.
as pawns.

I

"I went through an awful

wish that faculty were evaluated as faculty and not

They (the administration) want faculty who will put the ad-

ministration in a good light" (Number 23, affirmative voter).

Others

mentioned that although they had been told that faculty were judged pri-

marily on teaching ability, they knew that research played a primary
role in tenure evaluation.
One faculty member realistically looked forward to his own tenure review period:

"So far,

tenure is fair; when I came here four years

ago, there were no quotas; there are now and there will be when

evaluated.

I

am

It's not the administration's fault; it's the changing times"

(Number A3, a negative voter).
One person summarized these sentiments for his colleagues:

"I

was never convinced that tenure was an issue in the election, yet faculty were afraid that they would lose their departmental authority.
The latent issue was fear that things would be changed by a union" (Num-

ber 12, an affirmative voter).
A survey on tenure policies conducted by the American Council
of faculty acon Education compared tenure policies and the percentage
in 1972 and
tually granted tenure at major universities and colleges

1974.

in the
One of the most startling statistics is the change

188

percentage figure for the number of institutions granting tenure to one
hundred percent of all those who were formally considered for it in 1972
vs.

1974 (see Table 31).
In public universities,

one.

the shift from 1972 to 1974 was a marked

In 1972, 14.8 percent of the institutions surveyed granted tenure

to one hundred percent of its faculty; whereas in 1974, only 3.6 percent

of those universities granted tenure to all faculty.

Instead, the pub-

lic universities shifted to a policy of granting tenure in only fifty-

one to sixty percent of the cases.

The results of these fairly lenient

policies (1971-1972) can be seen in Table 32 where the percentage of
tenured faculty had increased from forty-one to sixty percent of fulltime faculty being tenured to fifty-one to seventy percent tenured fac-

ulty in 1974.
At the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

,

approximately sixty-

two percent of the faculty were tenured in 1973-1974 following the na-

tional trend for public institutions.
In the great majority of instances, tenure has been written into

substance.
collective bargaining agreements and has retained its name and

Collective
to the 1976 Chronicle Handbook on Faculty
eighty-five percent of all colleges and universities hasten-

According

Bargaining,
There
in recent years.
ure systems, a figure which has remained constant
tried
York
Union College in Schenectady, New
are, of course, exceptions.
addi
In
faculty over two years ago.
a svstem of renewable contracts for
Hamp
Washington,
in
State
Evergreen
tion, experimental colleges such as
nave
California
in
College
shire College in Massachusetts, and Johnston
an
Means
B.
Howard
renewable contracts instead of a tenure system.
A_CJironicle or. Higher Educ.at iog^gdb_^..
Thilip W. Sernas, Editors.
Editorial .roject
Washington, D.C.
Thr ill ry Col lective Bargaining
:

.

for Education,

1976.
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TABLE

31

TENURE COMPARISON
1971-72

Public
Universities

Private
Universities

100 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

14.8%

9.7%

81-99 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

29.7%

25.8%

percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

15.7%

22 6 %

.-61-80

.

1973-74

Public
Universities
100 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

3.6%

Private
Universities

2

.

2%

81-99 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

27.8%

22.9%

61-80 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure

30.6%

30.8%
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TABLE

32

TENURE COMPARISON
1972

Percentage of
Full-Time Faculty
With Tenure
41-50%

Public
Universities
-

Private
Universit ies

28.9%

32.3%

51-60%

25.0%

38.7%

61-70%

15.6%

19 4%

71-80%

5.5%

0.0%

.

/

1974

Percentage of
Full-Time Faculty
With Tenure

Public
Universities

Private
Universities

41-50%

12.0%

16.7%

51-60%

39.4%

53.3%

61-70%

30.2%

24.2%

71-80%

9.4%

5.7%
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In Hawaii, the low priority given
to a tenure policy in the original

AFT contract led to a rejection of
that contract by a majority of the
unit members.

They chose a NEA-AAUP affiliate to
represent faculty at

the University of Hawaii. 66

While the argument has been previously raised
that the concept of
collective bargaining and tenure may be incompatible,
the experience to date has resulted in no significant
erosion of the tenure
systems.
Of course, the tenure systems in public
institutions,
which are dictated by statute, will see little
change as a result
of collective bargaining as long as tenure
legislation remains intact.
Even in private institutions, our research reveals that
to
date, only two tenure systems have disappeared as a
result of collective bargaining. o7
-

In 1973,

the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education

completed a major study of twenty-six hundred institutions of higher education.

The Commission, representing the Association of American Col-

leges and the AAUP examined faculty attitudes toward tenure and the

percentage of faculty tenured at those institutions.

Keast and Macy,

co-chairmen of the Commission, commented:

ft ft

°Philip Sernas reported faculty at the University of Hawaii voted
down the proposed collective bargaining agreement 1,301 to 279.
"The
pact would have given the university’s administration the option of appointing faculty members on a renewable five year basis." The untenured
probationary period could have been extended indefinitely with the consent of the administration.
The contract would not have totally abolished tenure.
The article says that faculty, presently covered by tenure, would retain it.
Rejection of the contract did cause another elec"Hawaii Faculty
Philip W. Sernas.
tion where an NEA-AAUP agent won.
Turns Down Union Contract," The Chronicle of Higher Education December
,

3,

1973, p. 1.
67

"Grievance-ArbitraTracy H. Ferguson and William L. Bergan.
on the ColUnionization
in
Administration,"
Contract
and
tion Procedures
Law
University
and
College
of
Journal
lege Campus, reprinted from
and
College
of
Association
National
through the joint cooperation of the
Information
Bargaining
University Attorneys and the Academic Collective
Service, Summer, 1574, p. 385.
,

^

.
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acuity unionization is increasing rapidly, and
it would be naive
to suppose that faculties will long
accept the uncertainties of
regular contract review without seeking the
protection of collective
bargaining. The drive for job security will surely
lead to virtual
tenure, based on seniority or some like principle,
or to some system
similar to civil service. b °

The Commission made forty-seven recommendations.

were:

In brief, they

that the basic traditions of tenure be strengthened within
every

college and univeisity; that improved methods for evaluating teaching

performance be studied; that there be an openness to student input; and
that non-tenured faculty have input into evaluation procedures.

The most surprising aspect of the study comes in Recommendations
19 and 20

(Number 19)

The Commission recommends that in formulating its faculty staffing
plan, each institution develop policies under which an appropriate
number of tenure positions, when they become. vacant are available
for allocation to any unit when they may be needed, or for temporary suspension, or for elimination (Number 20).
The Commission
recommends that each institution develop policies relating to the
proportion of tenured and non-tenured faculty that will be compatible with the composition of its present staff, its resources and
projected enrollment, and its future objectives. In the Commission's
nearly unanimous judgement, it will probably be dangerous for most
institutions if tenured faculty constitute more than one-half to
two-thirds of the total full-time faculty during the decade ahead
,

.

The statement certainly appears to be advocating a tenure quota
system, yet in the October 29, 1973 issue of The Chronicle

,

there is a

front page headline, "AAUP Council Votes to Oppose Tenure Quotas."

The

68 William R. Keast and John W. Macy, Jr.
Faculty Tenure: A
Tenure in HighAcademic
on
Commission
Report and Recommenda tions by the
1973,
Publishers,
Jossey-Bass
San Francisco, California:
er Education.
p. 17.
69 Ibid.

,

pp. 48-51.
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article goes on to summarize the statement adopted by Committee A
on
Academic Freedom and Tenure by saying, "For a university to adopt limits
on the percentage of faculty members that can be given tenure.

.

.

is

to depart from a basic feature of the system of tenure and thus to weak-

en the protections of academic freedom."

It would seem that the two

opinions, both authorized by AAUP, are in conflict.

It is no wonder

that the issue of tenure quotas was so confused at the University of

Massachusetts/Amherst in the fall of 1973 and in the spring of 1974 when
the interviews' were conducted.

The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst

administration had done exactly what the Commission had suggested in
the recommendations above by asking department chairpeople and heads to

make five-year departmental projections, including tenure openings.

The

University of Massachusetts faculty, however, responded to these planning
reports w ith "ah-ha:
T

tenure quotas."

But since no tenure percentage

had been stipulated, the administration counteracted that institutional

planning did not mean tenure quotas.

The confusion may not rest with

the Amherst campus alone.

The Commission made strong statements against state-wide or "mul-

ti-versity" policies concerning individual campus tenure.

Although it

saw a need for multi-campus system planning, the Commission obviously

was troubled by the evidence of growing bureaucracies and decisions

made on a system-wide basis.
heart of
One of the final recommendations strikes right at the

collective bargaining (Number 44).
in colleges
The Commission recommends that collective bargaining
and
tenure
and
freedom
and universities not extend to academic
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related faculty personnel matters, and that grievances
involving
issues of freedom and tenure be referred to academic
procedures
outside the collective bargaining process. 7 ®

Perhaps their warning came too late because many faculties, both
air.

the University of Massachusetts and at other institutions, have
stated

that they see tenure as one part of a collective bargaining agreement.

Quoting from the Mortimer and Lozier study, "The Pennsylvania State College faculty were essentially of one mind in their opinion that every-

thing from salaries to curriculum to tenure and promotions should be

negotiated in an agreement for their colleges." 71

William McHugh, in an article following the Commission’s actual
report, points quite accurately to the complicated nature of grievance
and tenure policies.

Often these policies can be and are changed on an

annual basis by faculty senates and boards of trustees.

With a collec-

tive bargaining contract, "it may not be unilaterally changed by the

governing board during the contract term."

72

What McHugh is saying is

that many problems with tenure policies or with an individual tenure case

can be solved in an informal setting rather than confronting a set of

Nevertheless, any faculty which is used to the relative

legal statutes.

70 Ibid
71

.

,

p.

90.

Lozier and Mortimer, Anatomy , p. 73.

"Faculty Unionism and Tenure," in Keast
McHugh.
and Macy, Faculty Tenur e, p. 207.
7

^ William F.

7

\abor boards

in New Jersey and Michigan recently issued deci-

negotiate
sions limiting the subjects on which (public) colleges must
could
colleges
that
stated
boards
both
In essence,
with faculty unions.
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job security which tenure commands will not readily give it up; nor will
a standard union seniority system be taken up by faculty in its
stead.

Faculty Perception of University Governance
(Section III of the Interview)

Having discussed the faculty member's basic attitudes toward

unionism and toward election issues, the interview now turned toward
t

the more general subject of academic governance.

Section III of the in-

terview queried faculty on their perceptions of the Faculty Senate,
shared governance, faculty power within the decision-making process, and
finally, whether they thought that a union might effect the "quality of

education" at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst

.

As in the pre-

ceding parts, references will be made to various works directly pertaining to the issues involved in academic governance.

Academic governance may be one of the most studied and least
understood subjects in higher education.

Somehow, the real workings of

a faculty senate never become public enough to do the student of gover-

nance much good.

As Harold Hodgkinson put it,

governance is hard to

"There is no
not be compelled to negotiate over issues of governance.
negotiations may
reason whv the system of collegiality and collective
Board, whose case
not function harmoniously," said the New Jersey Labor
affirmative ac
involved issues at Rutgers University such as budget,
of faculty posinumber
tenure,
on
tion, the academic calendar, quotas
on
representation
faculty
and
tions, studies of faculty productivity,
negotiaten
be
to
law
by
required
committees. None of these issues were
Two Courts
Philip W. Sernas.
by Rutgers with its AAUP faculty union.
Education,
Higher
of
The_Chronjxle
Limit Topics That Must Be Bargained,"
February 17, 1976, p. 8.

.
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study, for some of the same reasons
that sexual behavior is hard to study.
In our culture, both are considered
private acts, not to be performed in
74

public."

^u-e--tlons

1

and

2

Areas of Faculty Influence in Academic Gover-

:

nance.

Question

1:

In what areas should faculty have influence in
univer-

sity governance?
I

Question 2:

Should faculty have final say over these matters or

should they make recommendations to the Chancellor, President

and/or Board of Trustees?

The first two questions sometimes were asked together and often lead di-

rectly into a discussion of the Faculty Senate (Question

3)

The respondents felt that the three most important areas of fac-

ulty governance were curriculum, personnel policies and teaching loads.
They varied, however, on the extent to which the faculty's authority

would be final.

A majority (fifty-five percent) of those answering

"personnel policies" to Question

1

responded that faculty should have

complete and final control over personnel decisions, though the administration should be able to "review" those decisions.

The minority

opinion was that although faculty should have major influence on personnel decisions (and they hoped that the administration would accept

74

"College Governance: The Amazing
Harold L. Hodgkinson.
Thing Is That It Works At All," Report 11, Eric Clearinghouse on Higher
Education, July, 1971, p. 1.
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the faculty s recommendations), the Chancellor
should have the final

veto power.
The faculty did not specify whether curricular matters should
be under its final authority or should take the form of a
recommendation
to the Chancellor.

It was the interviewer’s understanding that faculty

wished curriculum matters to be totally within the realm of its purview
as they are now.

Presently, the Chancellor acts as the spokesman to

the President who then presents any new programs before the Board of

Trustees.

It seems that in the curriculum area,

the faculty did not

feel that their authority had been overstepped as they did in the area
of personnel.

One faculty member (Number 61) commented, "the faculty should

demand to know more; the administration is the only one to know the to.

tal personnel. process ”

Again, returning to the Keast and Macy report

on faculty tenure, a recommendation is made "that each institution de-

velop and systematically use a plan for communicating its personnel policies to its faculty and give special attention to new appointees.
terms of conditions of service should be clearly spelled

out.^

The

Cer-

tainly, part of communication effectiveness relates to the ever increasing size of an institution and its burgeoning bureacracy.

Several faculty expressed their sense of frustration and alien-

ation from the university because of a fast growing mega-campus.

^Keast and Macy, Faculty Tenur e,

p.

57.

.
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Recommendations arc absurd; this university is a very big business.
It is run in the guise of a democracy, but it is
not one.
The
university should not have a zillion appeal boards. The number of
powerless committees is overwhelming (Number 21, affirmative voter).
A negative voter said that:
It depends on the size of the university; it's unrealistic to expect that faculty will participate in governance in such a large
university; only that they can participate to the extent that we
can participate in the United States government. At Amherst College (he says), they are small enough to participate; all they need
is a president and a treasurer (Number 14)

Whether the increasing size of

a

university is particularly

problematical or not, it may become the number one reason for collective bargaining.

Four individuals suggested that the faculty should select the

administrators, thereby making the administration report to the faculty.
One person mentioned that he would rather see the faculty review admin-

istrative decisions than the current opposite system.
A hypothetical, departmental personnel system was described by
one faculty respondent which included a collective decision-making

scheme on all merit, hiring, promotion, and tenure procedures.

The en-

tire department would be evaluated in the personnel process so that

each of the individual department members would be considered according
to what he/she contributed to the total expertise needed within that

department.

Thus, if one member was a good teacher, liked it, and did

off his
not want to spend too much time doing research, he could trade
to
teaching capabilities with another department member who preferred

do research.

fac
The department would always remain balanced, but each

his/her area of strength
ulty member could have more flexibility within

.

.
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The evaluation of faculty members would, of course, be based on a de-

partmental system as well.

The researcher was interested in this model

but queried whether a faculty member would become too narrowly specialized within such a system.
One lone faculty member would have preferred to see the univer-

sity administration have more power.

status quo," he said (Number 35).

needless to say.

"Faculty power is preserving the

He represented a minority opinion,

Some viewpoints, though, clearly reflected a hesitancy

to give faculty ultimate power over university governance.

The faculty as a group should have more authority than the administration or students; but the administration can have an overview
Faculty can be just as
of the situation which the faculty can't.
repressive as administrators.
the faculty has kept out innovative programs (Number 11)
.

In response to Question

1

.

also came a request by one person for

more faculty input in the area of departmental budget allocations.

All

other faculty who mentioned the budget implied that their concern was
the.

total Amherst campus budget.
One realist summarized his colleagues' request for more fiscal

control.

"The faculty wants to have a hand in expenditures, but not in

the raising of funds.

I

would like a benevolent dictator provost.

don't want to do administrative work;

I

I

want time for my research

(Number 69)
ranged from
Faculty control over areas of university business

abdication.
total authority over all matters to complete

For instance,

should have "no authority
one faculty member said that she felt faculty

financial aid" (Number 17); while
in terms of student admissions and

6
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another felt that faculty should have complete review of all
student
services.

Collective bargaining will affect university governance.

question remains, how?

The

The possibilities have been outlined as:

The complete replacement of traditional procedures by the bargaining process; the emerging of a dual but co-existing form of governance as indicated by (a) the incorporation and protection of traditional procedures within the contract; or (b) the development of
separate systems of faculty participation (one for negotiable economic and personnel matters, the other for educational policy issues
which may or may not be negotiable); or finally, (c) the improvement
of senate operations in competition with bargaining to the point
that the bargaining agent is undermined ^6
.

In a sense, then, the real question lies in whether or not col-

lege faculty have perceived their system of academic governance to be
fair before they vote for a collective bargaining agent.

If sufficient

power is lacking, then a faculty might use the negotiations to improve
its lot in the college or university.

are a good example of this phenomenon.

The Massachusetts State Colleges

Before bargaining came to Boston

State and Worcester State Colleges, for example, faculty had what amounted
to a very powerless faculty senate arrangement.

The collective bargain-

ing contracts outlined not only college-wide faculty governance mechanisms, but stated provisions outlining departmental procedures as well.

Each of these first two contracts have been re-negotiated and improved

upon since they were first written; but, nevertheless, set a precedent
making the
for the other Massachusetts State College contracts,

"Faculty Governance and Collective BargainJames P. Begin.
paper produced by
An Early Appraisal," Special Report H-5. A
ing:
May s, 1974,
Service,
the Academic Collective Bargaining Information
7

pp.

1-2.

7
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Massachusetts State College System negotiations unique in an era of industrial model bargaining.

Binding Arbitration
Traditionally, a conflict in academic governance is handled in
one of two ways:

the faculty has a review process and/cr the adminis-

tration decides the issue.

Many faculty contracts have shown the inclu/

sion of a binding third party arbitration rather than a total process
of peer review.

A key difference emerges between procedures in contracts negotiated
by affiliates of national associations and other grievance procedures.
Peer review is virtually always a part of non-contract and non-affiliated contract procedures, although binding arbitration seldom is.
In the contracts with affiliated (AAUP, AFT or NEA) faculty units,
binding arbitration is most often included while peer review is not. 77

Some universities, such as CUNY, have included binding arbitration for some parts of their contract but left peer review for personnel, tenure and promotion decisions.

Arbitration is involved only when

there needs to be a decision regarding whether or not the negotiated

agreement bylaws have been violated.
volved

,

When "academic judgement" is in-

a committee of three tenured faculty reviews the case.

78

A
naAs

tional organizations become more and more familiar with higher education,

more of these compromises will find their way into the legal agreements.

"Management of Conflict:
David W. Leslie and Ronald P. Satryb.
in che
Collective Bargaining and the Proposed Research Directions,"
Journal of CUPA Volume 25, Number 2, April 1974, p. 20.
7

,

the Board of Higher Education of the
Congress/CUNY,' October 1, 1973,
City of New York and Professional Staff
This agreement expired August 31, 1975.
pp. 23-24.

^"The Agreement Between
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Peer Review Process

Some faculty do not feel that the peer review
process is neces-

sarily always democratic.

Wisconsin Law Review that.

Wollett points out in his article from the
.

.

"the process of 'peer' evaluation is

sometimes viewed by the large number of junior faculty
members as

a

de-

vice by which the elders maintain control at the department
79
level."
In the majority of cases,

the University of Massachusetts junior facul-

ty would have disagreed with this statement.

Most felt that at the de-

partmental level, governance and personnel policies worked as equitably
as possible.

One of the best known authors on the subject of faculty collective bargaining is Joseph Garbarino.

In an article entitled "Creeping

Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market," he spoke of the effect of collective bargaining on peer review.

One suspects.
that in those key institutions in which the untidy,
unsystematic process of peer evaluation has worked with demonstrated
success, the introduction of procedures that can be defended before
an arbitration or perhaps a judge will incur a real cost in quality.
.

.

Several people have made dire predictions concerning the effects
of collective bargaining on university governance.

One such individual

was later to become the chairperson of the MSP-AAUP Executive Committee.
Howard Brogan forecasted that "uniformity and the centralization required

7 ^Wollett,

"Status and Trends," pp. 8-9.

80 Joseph Garbarino.

Market

,

"

"Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor
Carnegie Commission in Higher Education a draft, p. 23.

—
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for campus-wide bargaining and contract administration will
further af-

fect university governance by reducing departmental and school autonomy.

,,81

This obviously was written long before he became involved with

the MSP on the University of Massachusetts campus.

Some have suggested an interim solution to the aimlessness of a

faculty senate or the ruthlessness of a bargaining agent.

More than one

University of Massachusetts faculty member pointed to the "Wellman Report"
/

(Senate Document T73-098), as it is commonly called, as an attempt by
the faculty and the University to reach an equanimical governance agree-

ment, at least for the time being (see Appendix 5).

On April 4, 1973,

the Board of Trustees voted to accept this document, thereby establish-

ing the powers of the board, the president, the campus administrators,

and the campus governing bodies in university governance (which, on the

Amherst campus, would be the Faculty Senate and Student Senate).
cluded as part of the report is

a

In-

statement affirming the Trustees' en-

dorsement of the 1966 statement on "The Government of Colleges and Universities" adopted by the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP)

,

the American Council on Education, the Association of Governing

Boards of Universities and Colleges, and the 1970 "Statement on Student

Participation in College and University Government."
The document was applauded by many faculty and administrators,

was willing
and pointed to by the same as an indication that the Board

"Faculty Power: Pretense and Reality in Aca
^Howard Brogan.
Volume 40, Number 1,
domic Government," Jo urnal of Higher Ed ucation,
January, 1969, pp. 26-27.
8
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to adopt a tripartite system.

Others felt that because it left so much

in the realm of the Faculty Senate, it would be
a powerless document.

— Question

3

:

The Faculty Senate

In your opinion, does the present system of faculty governance

provide for faculty voice ovet these matters adequately?
Responses to Question

3

often were natural continuations of the

discussions preceding this specific query concerning the structure of
academic governance.

Faculty would expand upon their answers to the

authority/influence questions (Numbers

1

and 2) in a longer discussion

of the Faculty Senate.
Of those responding to the question, sixty-four percent said no,

the Faculty Senate does not adequately provide for faculty voice over

these matters.

This majority clearly negated what Chancellor Bromery

stated in his post election letter.

With two exceptions, all of the

faculty who voted affirmatively in the November election.
the Faculty Senate was an ineffective body.

.

.

felt that

The sixty-four percentage

figure indicates that there was a large number of "no" voters as well

who felt that the Faculty Senate was powerless.
Some of the respondents answered in general terms that they did
not think that the Faculty Senate had enough clout; others were more

specific.

"People who represent our school do not report back to the

department" (Number 5, affirmative).
an advisory body to the Board.
that

— legally"

Another:

"The Faculty Senate is

I'm not sure it can be any more than

(Number 67, negative).

"We don't even have the control

affirmative).
that students do over their own budget" (Number 71,

I
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served on the Senate for four years.
a lot of noise.

tive).
I

It is a rather powerless

Power rests where the money is" (Number
10, affirma-

Another member responded, "I was a member for six years,
but

m afraid

I

wasn't overly impressed" (Number 28, negative voter).

A few were very positive about the Faculty Senate:
gives them a voice; everyone

iously

body—

I

"Yes, it

know who is a member takes it quite ser-

(Number 33, negative voter).

A second positive Faculty Senate

viewer felt that the idea of a Faculty Senate was good, and that it had
great potential; but then hesitated adding that "faculty senators

should do a better job" (Number 56, negative).
One faculty senator explained his opinion of it:

person to be asked that question.
member.

I

I've sort of been a Faculty Senate

went to the first three meetings, but

pettiness, the pure greed.

I

"I'm a bad

I

was upset by the

was astonished by the behavior.

It was

the on-campus equivalent of Nixon's tax returns" (Number 37, affirmative).

A similar opinion came from a fellow member:

for the students to come and see how we behave!

"I was ashamed

The majority of fac-

ulty senators are irregular in attendance and have a negative effect"
(Number 69, negative).
The Faculty Senate is an old model of governance.

writes of its prototype in the medieval universities:
ters, the universities

Hofstadter

"In internal mat-

had the prerogative of self-government.

They were

autonomous corporations, conceived in the spirit of the gilds; their mem—
.

t

craft.
bers elected their own officials and set the rules for the teaching

82

Hofstadter, Academic Freedom

,

p.

6.

.
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It was not until the founding of AAUP in 1915 that the coalales-

cence of faculty members in American higher education really began.

Little did many of its founders imagine that in 1972, the Committee

would draft a statement leading to the pursuit of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining, in offering a rational and equitable means
of distributing resources and of providing recourse for an aggrieved
individual can buttress and complement the sound principles and practices of higher education which the American Association of University Professors has long^ supported.
From its vantage point
as the paramount national organization in formulating and implementing the principles that govern relationships of academic life, the
Association has the unique potential, indeed the responsibility, to
achieve through its chapters a mode of collective bargaining consistent with the best features of higher education. ^3
.

.

.

What would be the effects of collective bargaining on a faculty senate
James Begin has studied some of the major collective

model specifically?

bargaining agreements in an attempt to assess those results.
he states:

In general,

"There is no evidence to support a conclusion that collective

bargaining has led to a significant dismantling of the traditional institution-wide or system-wide governance procedures such as senates or
n
faculty councils."

84

saying
Begin quotes President Boyd of Central Michigan State as
Central Michigan State
that one result of collective bargaining on the

talking about govFaculty Senate has been that "the Senate has stopped

ernance and started governing.

,,85

October 1972, pp.
83AAUP "Statement on Collective Bargaining,"
(See Appendix 3)
52-53 of "Redbook".
8 /4

Begin, "Faculty Governance," p. 2.

85 Ibid

.

,

p

.
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At Rutgers, where AAUP is the bargaining agent,
academic gover-

nance has not been altered significantly by the contract.

The relation-

ship of the bargaining unit to the Rutgers Faculty Senate is
a fairly

informal one and one that permits a good deal of "back and forth" without necessitating specific procedures spelling out how one body approaches
the other.

Begin gives an example of this flexibility:

Changes in the tenure system and the development of a faculty academic study/leave plan originated in the bargaining forum, and then
were submitted to the Senate for its recommendations. Neither of
these items appeared in the contract, though bargaining agent input
was important in stimulating and shaping the policy changes. 8 ^

A more formalized situation appears at St. John's University

where a special senate committee has been formed to coordinate the activities of the bargaining agent and the Faculty Senate.

In this same

study, Begin found what he believed was another result of collective

bargaining, a decrease in interaction between administrations and senates.

The author hesitated to give specific reasons for this occurrence

because it is difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of these relationships before an agreement was negotiated.

Nevertheless, Begin found

that an open sharing of information had diminished.

"In some instances,

where the issues deliberated in the Senate were in the part primarily
those presented to it by the administration, the senates (had) started
to act rather than react, often without consulting the administration

prior to acting.

.,87

8 ^Ibid.,

p.

6.

87 lbid.

p.

8.

,
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One very interesting study, completed in February
of 1975, demon-

strated that collective bargaining had radically
changed both the attitudes toward and practices of academic governance
within six community

/

colleges adopting collective bargaining. 88

,

Michael Falcone questioned faculty and administrators concerning their opinions about governance before the collective bargaining
agreement had been reached and then again after the signing of the contract to see the effects of collective bargaining on campus governance.
(The responses of faculty and administrators were not separated.)
The
data from the survey has been summarized as follows: thirty-three percent of the respondents indicated that faculty and administrators shared
equally in decision-making before collective bargaining, sixty-three percent said that the sharing occurred only after collective bargaining had
come to the community colleges.
Regarding the policy on academic freedom, forty-two percent of the respondents believed that their institution
had some form of an established policy prior to collective bargaining,
while thirty-four reported that a formal policy did not exist. Approximately sixty-one percent reported that after collective bargaining, a
formal written policy had been written, while twenty percent reported
that none had been negotiated.
Prior to collective bargaining, sixtysix percent indicated that their institutions had formal tenure policies;
eighty-eight percent reported that after the introduction of collective
bargaining, a formal written policy on tenure had been established. Only
fifty percent believed that collective bargaining had more clearly defined
the respective roles and responsibilities of faculty and administrators.
Eighty- three percent of the community coliege respondents said that collective bargaining had changed faculty-administration relationships, including sixty-four percent who felt that this change was toward an adverFalcone summarizes that section by stating that "adsary relationship.
versary relationships rru.iv be inherent in the industrial type bargaining
process which is still prevalent in higher education. One would hope
that professionals in higher education will develop methods of bargaining more consistent with the principles of shared governance, collegial
relationships, and common goals" (p. 4). Mr. Falcone did not ask faculty
and administrators to comment on the relative amount of shared governance,
collegial relationships, and common goals before the entrance of c.ollecFifty-three percent betive bargaining at those six community colleges.
of faculty; fiftystatus
the
enhanced
had
movement
lieved that the union
iacult\ would
bargaining,
collective
without
six percent indicated that
The facconcludes,
Falcone
making.
have little or no voice in decision—
does
self-government,
of
ulty Senate, once touted as a major mechanism
faculty
the
as
base
power
not, in most cases, operate from as strong a
The faculty union is gaining recognition as a legal entity capunion.
faculty,
able of making an enforceable contract and effectively guarding
that
extent
To the
even in times of economic recession" (p. 4).
rights
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The power structure within a university
faculty itself has be-

come the subject of some debate.

Burton Clark has suggested that the

majority of academic administrative matters
(in large universities) are
handled by the faculty oligarchs who function
as quasi-administrators
of the faculty.

These faculty members serve because of their
scholarly

prestige, but mostly because they have made
academic governance their
business.

He explains that the majority of faculty members
have acqui*
N
•

esced to these oligarchs.

/

The theme of oligarchic control has also

been picked up by Thomas McConnell and Kenneth Mortimer in their
study
of the University of California at Berkeley and Fresno State.

"An ex-

ample of a more easily documentable relationship between political and

academic governance lies in the oligarchic control of organizations.

.

.

oligarchic behavior is a highly probable, though not inevitable, feature
of organizational life."

89

(The oligarch fits Clark’s description.)

McConnell, however, would rather see this kind of faculty imbalance than

what he believes would occur with the advent of collective bargaining.
"Individuals wi.ll lose freedom of action if they are represented by an

faculty have participated more fully in personnel and educational decisions, one might conclude that the concept of shared authority has been
advanced by collective bargaining." The problem with trying to correlate the results of this study with a major university or four-year college is that, for the most part, faculty members in community colleges
have not usually had as strong a model for academic governance as in the
"Collective Bargaining: Its
senior institutions. Michael A. Falcone.
Effects on Campus Governance," Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, Washington, D.C., February 1975, Report Number 6.
89

The Faculty in
R. McConnell and Kenneth P. Mortimer.
for Research and
Center
California:
Berkeley,
Governance
Universi ty
23.
p.
Education,
1971,
Higher
Development in
T.

.
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exclusive bargaining agent, and faculties will lose power corporately

when an external organization serves as the collective bargaining
agent."

90

McConnell believes that collective bargaining would "doom

the system" of shared governance.

The problem may lie in what the governance of the collegiate

institution entails.

Over ten years ago, Brogan painted a realistic

view of what it could be.
/

%

Naturally, if the faculty does not get to discuss vital issues, the
members (of the Faculty Senate) become bored with their participation.
Administrators are always complaining about the bad attendance at meetings and the little faculty participation in them.
They use these inadequacies as evidence of the disinterest of the
faculty in running the institution.

The result is that the real power ends up by default back with
the administration.

92

In this reality of a corporate power hierarchy governing colleges
and universities, the assortment of faculty councils and senates
becomes part of an academic charade, embroiling faculty for the

The Redistribution of Power in Higher EduBerkeley, California: Center for Research and Development in
cation.
Higher Education, 1971, pp. 41-42.
9®T. R. McConnell.

•^Brogan, "Faculty Power," p. 27.
92

0n July 28, 1970, the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
colleagues dechapter of the AAUP sent a letter and memorandum to its
law on
bargaining
scribing the effects of the Massachusetts collective
student-"unicameral
what had been proposed to the faculty in 1969 a
interesting for its dis
Faculty Senate." The document is particularly
within the present
cussion of the relative power of a faculty senate
Memorandum on Recent
legal structure of the university. "Background
Faculty Representation.
Issues Concerning University Governance and
AAUP, University of
Representation,
Prepared by the Committee on
(Mimeographed)
Massachusetts, Amherst, July, 1970.

—
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most part in endless dispute and debate, with final decisions
made
by the administrative-trustee combination. 93

Another predictor of gloom and doom was the former president
of the University of Michigan, Harron Hatcher.

His opinion of what

(

real negotiations" are like between university staffs and union leaders is clear.

What began as presumptive bargaining in good faith results all too
often in outright economic warfare, calling upon tribal rituals,
an archaic script for the actors, irrational round-the-clock sessions to reach a settlement to meet an artificial deadline, and
collective bludgeoning, in a heated-up mood of strife, with the
slogan of get all you can and everybody else be damned.

The bombastic comments are nevertheless shaded by the fact that

collective bargaining is taking place, has involved faculty governance,
and probably will increasingly do so as several things transpire.

The

scarcity of resources is quickly forcing faculty and administrators to
focus in on the issue of power:

who allocates what to whom

.

This con-

sideration may increasingly bring academic governance into the collective bargaining arena.

The sample faculty interviews demonstrated no

overwhelming sense of collegiality between the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst faculty and its administrators.

Therefore, one must question

whether collective bargaining would destroy any great bilateral or even
tripartite models.

The ultimate strength of the University vis a vis

93 Israel Kugler and Ralph S. Brown.
"Collective Bargaining for
March, 1970, p. 82.
LVI
Volume
,
the Faculty," Liberal Education
,

(unpublished) as
Senate:
Faculty
The
quoted by Ronald C. Brown, "Professors and Unions:
Education,
Higher
in
An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining
Winter
1970, p. 271.
Number
2,
Volume
12,
Review
and Mary Law

^Address by Harron Hatcher, September

22, 1966

_
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the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may be the pivotal risk which faculties, administrators and unions must test.

The national situation in higher education boils down to a power

crisis

It is not that institutions of higher education have had a great
-

.

deal of power in the past and are losing it.

It is that people

(parents,

students and taxpayers) are questioning the value of a college degree.
The pressure on legislators to fund our public universities (to the extent' that they were in the 1950's and 1960 's)

is quickly diminishing.

The university cannot use the old expansion arguments, or even arguments
of subsistence since higher education itself is being challenged.

95

In one of the articles included in Tice's collection, Allan Smith

has assessed faculty power and academic freedom from a personal standpoint.

Academic freedom involves:

1.

The power to choose one's colleagues;

2.

The ability to declare one's own work assignments; and

3.

The power to determine the content and function of the courses
one teaches.

or"Ultimately," Smith says, "the decision as to whether faculty should
losses in
ganize will be determined by an assessment of the gains and

faculty power.

,,96

the decreasing impor95an article in the New York Times outlined
on the college deplacing
are
classes
tance which the middle and working
degree is not re
the
two,
jobs;
Why? One, it is not getting them
cree
the de
addition,
In
take training.
lated to the kinds of jobs which do
college
the
on
return
dine in relative income shows that "the rate of
Gene Maeroff, "Study of College
investment has fallen significantly," by
York JTimes, August 14, 1975, p.
Degree Finds Its Value Declining," New

.

Tice and
"Should Faculties Organize," in Terrence
Power pp. 119-120.
Grace Holmes, editors, Facul ty
96 Allan Smith.

,
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Platt and Parsons look at faculty power in a different light. 97
They distinguish between power and influence and ascribe the
faculty's
role as depending more on influence than power.

The faculty has, in a

sense, functional authority more than formal authority (which is as-

signed to the adminis trator— trustee bailiwick) because each faculty member within the body of faculty can have individual relationships on

which he can build collective victories.

If this functional authority

or influence is effective, faculty power can be strong.

however, the individual faculty member has no recourse

If it is not,

— his

lack of for-

mal and stated authority places complete control in administrative hands.
E.

D.

Duryea and Robert Fisk, in an article entitled "Impact of

Unionism on Governance" have credited college and university administrations for the advent of collective bargaining.

Ineffective or repressive administrations have stimulated unionism
as a counter-force to authoritarian presidents or governing boards.
the need for serious retrenchment by most state governments
has reinforced intrusions which threaten the continued viability
of governance based on shared authority. 9 ^
.

.

A lack of power by one group (whether it be faculty, administration or students) in a tripartite system of shared governance means an

imbalance, and thus a mockery of "shared" authority.

If,

in fact, the

"Decision-Making in the
Influence and Power Exchange in Continuing Education,"
Academic System:
Authority and Chan ge, edited by Kruytbosch
in The State of the University:
Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970.
and~Messinger
97 Gerald Platt and Talcott Parsons.

.

"Impact of Unionism on GovDuryea and Robert S. Fisk.
San
Vermilye.
ernance," in The Expan ded Ca mpus, edited by Dyckman W.
107-109.
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1971, pp.
98

E.

D.
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faculty has no power (or has misused that power), the option of collective bargaining will surface.

— Question

4

:

Student Participation in Collective Bargaining

V

"Do you think students should be involved in collective bargain-

ing?"

The issue of student power is a very real one, and at the time of

the election was beginning to build strong momentum.

At the Massachusetts

State Colleges of Fitchburg, -North Adams and Salem, students already

were represented at the bargaining table.

The October 29, 1973 issue

of The Chronicle of Higher Education ran a story entitled, "Three

Massachusetts Colleges Allow Students to Sit In on Faculty Bargaining."
The article by Philip Sernas gave the University of Massachusetts faculty

cause for concern since at all three of the colleges, Eduardo Robreno
had agreed

— in

bargaining.

fact urged

— the

participation of students in collective

The Committee on Concerned Faculty reprinted the story and

sent it to all University of Massachusetts faculty on November fifth ex-

pressing its doubts about such an arrangement.
the CCF newsletter said,

"...

The article demonstrated,

how students can become mere pawns in

union negotiations" and "how these 'professional negotiations

can go

awry and tip the bargaining balance in favor of the administration
(November 5, 1973, CCF Newsletter).

concerned
The Amherst campus faculty was not the only group
for their own rights
about the prospect of students acting as negotiators

tried to gain a role as
During the CUNY negotiations, the Student Senate

observer and was rebuffed by the faculty.

The New York Board of Higher

convincing the CUNY
Education supported the student's request, thus

:
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faculty that student representation would only work against them.

In

an often quoted passage, Belle Zeller, the President of the Professional

Congress, said

ministration Quivers.
ulty.

.

all the students have to do is holler and the ad-

We are fighting to preserve the power of the fac-

.

Zeller's comments v/ere partially a response to an article released
by the University Student Press Service on CUNY in January of 1971 by
George McCough (a student)

A high ratio of tenured faculty will, in the long run, mean higher
tuition and fees and a stagnant curriculum.
Since neither of these
can be regarded as being convergent with student interests, unconditional student support of faculty in tenure disputes is at least
counter-productive and clearly contradictory 100
.

Alan Shark, who was Chairman of the CUNY Student Senate in 19721973, also argued against reduced teaching loads and higher salaries

with which the Board was in agreement.

In as early as 1971,

the National

Student Association came out with a fairly negative stance toward faculty

collective bargaining terms because the Association felt that students
might lose the little power they have.
The 1969 Carnegie study (part of the Ladd/Lipset study) showed
that faculty were particularly apprehensive about student participation

increases.
in decisions such as faculty appointments, promotions, salary

"Unionism and the Content of Education: What
quoted in Ladd and
are the Bounds?," New York Times January 8, 1973,
Lxpset, Pr ofessors Union s, p. 90.
9^A. h. Raskin.

,

l°0 George McCough.
23, 1971.

A Letter to the Editor, Congress N ews, August
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and tenure grants.

Only 5.8 percent of the faculty respondents believed

that students should have "control" or "voting power" on
committees

where faculty personnel decisions were being made.
In a paper written by Neil S. Bucklew, Vice Provost of Central

Michigan University, the author presented a convincing rationale on why
students will be involved in bargaining within a short period.

Mr.

Bucklew traced the beginnings of the student movement to the 1920’s and
•

-

1930 ’s when the first student "unions" were started.

He pointed out

that these student unions were not bargaining units but the facilities

funded and operated by students involving extracurricular activities
such as housing, meal service, athletic programs, bookstores, etc.

Fol-

lowing the establishment of these came a more formal student government

association in the 1940's and 1950's.

Again, the majority of issues to

come before the student governments were extracurricular.

By the 1960 's,

the formal structure of student government was beginning to give way to

special interest groups whose primary aim was basically the same as student governments but whose method resembled more of the "whipsawing"

techniques of bargaining.

The late 1960

's

demonstrated to college fac-

ulties and administrators just how critically effective the student

movement could be.
Bucklew points to three possible student governance models within the collective bargaining structure.

First, a claim by students for

power to
an "exclusive representation" role with the resulting right or

disbandappoint student members to governmental committees; second, a
council or strucing of splinter groups and the creation of an omnibus

independence pattern or the
ture; and third, as Bucklew calls it, the
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"extra-university" model where students would form a corporation or a
union and negotiate with the university as the employer.
/

A landmark case involving students who were both employees and
"third party" candidates was the Teaching Assistants Association (T.A.A.)
vs.

the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1969.

The Wisconsin law did not cover teaching assistants (TA's), but
the University of Wisconsin decided to recognize the Association as the

exclusive bargaining agent for these students/teachers

The scope of

.

t

bargaining which was identical to that allowed for classified state employees covered only certain specified conditions of employment, and was
limited by a statutory "management rights" provision.

The TA’s, however,

V7anted salary negotiation and educational planning included in their

contract.

After

a

fusion over the law

long period of negotiations, a strike

— the

University of Wisconsin.

— and

much con-

TAA finally neogtiated a contract with the
Some of the critical contractual issues were:

the inconclusiveness of the state law making the situation extremely dif-

ficult for both the TAA and the University; the lack of a mechanism for

expediting joint decision-making; the question of who was the employer
(for TA’s it could have been the University, the state or even the TA's

department faculty members); and finally, the problem of educational

planning (an offshoot of joint decision-making).

Presumably, many of

bargaining union
these same issues would arise under a regular student
situation.

from both
The result was a contract filled with compromise

"limited duty to bargain.
sides covering conditions of employment and a

^

218

Any disputes concerning the scope of the contract were to be submitted
to binding arbitration.

1

^1

Alan Shark, a one-time student in the City University of New
York, is the director of the Research Project on Students and Collective

Bargaining.

In a paper entitled, "Current Status of College Students

in Academic Collective Bargaining," Mr. Shark outlines some of the ef-

fects which faculty collective bargaining has had on students.
•

Their

/

fears. Shark contends, are well-founded.
I

Students fear the loss of rights gained by much struggle over the
past fifteen years.
they fear that increases in salaries and
fringe benefits negotiated by the faculty unions will, at least
partly, come out of students' pockets in the form of higher tuition
and (finally) students fear that strikes will interrupt their
education. ^-02
.

.

.

.

.

To protect their rights, students have lobbied for legislation,

undertaken court action, been student observers on a team, and have
tried to be included in negotiations as an independent third party.

Montana, April of 1975, a law was passed

— the

first in the nation

In

— to

give statutory recognition to the right of students to participate in
the bargaining process.

Shark quotes from the law:

"Collective Bargaining in a University.
lOlArlen Christenson.
Association,
The University of Wisconsin and the Teaching Assistants
TAA Dispute
Campus
Madison
pp. 210-228; "The University of Wisconsin,
J. Poe;
Eleanore
and
of 1969-1970: A Case Study by Nathan P. Feinsinger
229-274.
both in the Wis consi n Law Review Volume 1971, Number 1, PP
•

,

"Current Status of College Students in Academic
Collective Bargaining
Collective Bargaining." Published by The Academic
2-3.
Information Service, Washington, D.C., pp.
Shark.

.
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The student government of an institution of higher
education may
designate an agent or representative to meet and confer
with the
Board of Regents and the faculty bargaining agent prior
to negotiations with the professional educational employers to observe
those
negotiations and participate in caucuses as part of the public
employers’ bargaining team; and to meet and confer with the Board
of
Regents regarding the terms of agreement prior to the execution of
a written contract between the Regents and the professional
educational employees.

The Associated Oregon Student Lobby recently achieved an even

more substantial role.

In early June of 1975, the Oregon legislature

passed a bill granting students an independent third party role at the

bargaining table.
In Maine, a bill has been passed which gives students the right
to caucus with the Board of Higher Education prior to negotiations, and

gives them the right to sit at the bargaining table.

Students in California, Wisconsin and Washington are working

hard on legislation that would grant them observer status.

In California,

they are seeking the right to see all written documents pertaining to

any future collective bargaining agreement with the additional right
to produce an "impact report" before the contract was signed.

In 1971, fifteen students representing six of the seven city col-

leges of Chicago filed suit in Cook County to end the five-week (AFT)

faculty strike

-*-0^Ibid

10Z,

The judge ordered public negotiations and the strike

.

.

,

p

.

4

faculty members in the AFT unit (involving six of
an agreement
the seven campuses of the City Colleges of Chicago) reached
of strife
period
nine-year
a
ending
system,
with the community college
walkouts.
faculty
in which there were six major
In 1975,
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was quickly ended.

Students have also had an impact on strikes at the

Pennsylvania and New Jersey colleges.
Shark predicts that the outcome of student participation in

unionism may depend on such experiments as the Student Organizing Project at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst, founded in the spring
of 1974

.

The project has been the vehicle for research on the legal

effects of collective bargaining to students, and is working toward es/

tablishing a credit union for students.

At Fitchburg State College,

students were allowed to participate in all discussions of negotiation.
After the collective bargaining agreement had been signed by the faculty
and the Board of Trustees, the students conducted a referendum on ail
of the parts pertaining to student decision-making.

Even Eduardo Robreno,

the NEA representative for college negotiations in Massachusetts, was

quoted as calling the Fitchburg agreement "a truly representative gov-

ernance mechanism" on campus.

The results of the Montana and Oregon

legislation and the Massachusetts State College tripartite governance

contracts have had a large effect on the way faculty view student parti-

cipation in collective bargaining.
In April of 1974, little collective bargaining activity, aside

from the Massachusetts State Colleges, sought to include students in
any phase of the faculty union movement.

Many of the seventy-six sample

attempt to become
faculty expressed concern, however, that students might

were begun.
involved once a union was elected and negotiations

Forty-

saying that they did
eight percent responded negatively to Question 4,

bargaining.
not want students involved in collective

Thirty-five percent
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said that they felt students should have a voice and some chance for
input into areas which conerned them

— the

student/ teacher ratio, work

loads and faculty teaching evaluation— but no formal role.
ty members

Nine facul-

(eleven percent) felt that students should be able to parti-

cipate in collective bargaining through student representation.

Two in-

dividuals felt that students should form their own union.
Some of the "no" vote respondents voiced similar reactions to
•

those of Belle Zeller, CUNY.

/

Basically, they felt that the faculty were

beginning to coordinate themselves through collective action and saw
student involvement as diluting their strength.

One person answered the

question, "No, if students knew that much, they'd be faculty members"

Another responded, "I would think not.

(Number 24).

limited perspective.

Students have a

There's no long term commitment to decisions.

At

the state colleges where they let students be part of the collective

bargaining process, they took no responsibility" (Number 31).
radicals get involved.

.

.

it is such a transient population.

generation of students pushed for the Southwest complex

(a

"A lot of

The last

housing pro-

ject on the Amherst campus), and now this generation is stuck with it
(Number 57).
In response to the first question in Section III (issues in the

election)

,

one faculty member answered that a major issue for him was

student participation in governance:
operations
don’t think that the faculty needs a say in day-to-day
and reteaching
in
involved
of the university; faculty should be
For
administer.
to
people
That is why you hire competent
search.
get
to
want
students
this same reason, it bothers me why so many
Students just haven t had
involved in other than learning.
to be able to govern
enough experience in universities to expect
them (Number 16).
X

.

.

.
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One professor thought that the students should decide on how

they wanted to participate and then present their suggestions to the

faculty for a vote.

He saw two options for students:

sentatives at the faculty bargaining table, or
(Number 53).

(2)

"(1) as repre-

as a separate union"

"Student evaluations are crucial; there is definitely a

place for students in the promotion process, but not in the negotiation

process" (Number 64).
•

/

Few University of Massachusetts faculty felt comfortable with

students as bargainers.

It may have been because they felt that the

issues would force students to side with the administration or simply

because the role reversal was so extraordinary.

Whatever their reasons,

the sample faculty was no exception to a general nation-wide feeling

against student collective bargaining.

— Questions

5

and

6

Familiarity with Grievance Procedures and

:

Administrative Workload

— Question

5

"Are you fully familiar with the grievance procedures?"

:

Questions

5

and

6

did not reveal any terribly surprising data.

were not
Faculty responses demonstrated that a large number of faculty
of the
familiar with grievance procedures, again an indication perhaps

not aggrieved,
size of the university or of the adage that if one is
out about the
there is no real reason why one would bother finding

grievance procedures.

attempt
The rationale behind the question was an

which the faculty member might have
to elicit any untold bad experience
his/her vote.
had, and which could have influenced

In only one case

this point in the interview.
did the story come tumbling out at

The
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individual had been very surly with the researcher but had
agreed to
the interview and was answering the questions with
"yes-no-maybe" an-

swers.

It seemed as if someone had told him to agree to the
interview,

and yet he was regretting it.

Perhaps if this question had not been

asked, the researcher would have left finding out little except that
the individual was not satisfied with the interview.

The faculty member explained that when he had been considered
/

for a promotion two years ago, he was not told by his Dean which evi-

dence he could submit for the record.
this information.)

(He apparently had not asked for

Wien the consideration was made, he felt that his

share of the teaching load (in comparison to other department members)

was overlooked; also, he had not been able to publish anything from his
research.

He explained that he worked sixty-two hours a week on his re-

search and that he was upset because it "hadn't seemed to pay off."

Hie

final straw came when he volunteered to be department chairperson and

was not named to that position.

His bitterness toward the Dean and the

departmental "oligarchs" was intense.
More than half (fifty-four percent) responded that they either
did not know what the grievance procedures were or that they were "vaguely" familiar with them; the remainder said that they were cognizant of
the procedures.

and one

a

Two individuals, one an acting department chairperson

department head, answered that they were "not too familiar

with them," which seemed extraordinary for someone with that kind of

administrative responsibility not to be thoroughly familiar with the
grievance procedures.

:

.
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— Question

6

"How much time would you say you spent on faculty

:

governance matters?"

The majority (sixty-four percent) of faculty members spent less
than fifteen percent of their time doing administrative work.

Of those

who were not department chairpersons or heads (they usually answered

seventy-five percent or more), seven answered that they spent thirty
percent (or more) of their time doing administrative work.

Most faculty

members responded that it really depended on the time of year

— that

in

the fall and winter when the personnel committees had a great deal of

work, it could be as high as fifty percent of their time which was spent
on personnel work alone.

In the spring, they noted that it leveled off

to a minimum.

A few studies have attempted to link the amount of time which
faculty member spends working on

preference.

a

a

committee to that person's voting

This study could show no correlation (beyond that of the

department chairpersons or heads) between administrative time and voting

behavior

— Question

7

:

Quality of Education

entire subject of
The final question in Section III could be the

study

— Question

7

:

the
"How do you think a union contract might affect

'quality of education'?"

question were broken into
The seventy-six responses to this
three major categories.

The quality of education:
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will be negatively affected because the campus will be
politi-

1.

cized over non-educational issues;

will be improved because a union contract will stabilize a pro-

2.

fessor

s

economic and political position, thereby enabling the

individual to put more effort into his/her teaching;

will not be affected at all by a union contract.

3.

Group

1

had about thirty perpent of the vote; Group

cent; and Group

3

had forty-five percent.

2

had fifteen per-

Six individuals stipulated

that it really would depend on the contract and identity of the bargaining agent.

Some of the responses were particularly interesting because they

often related back to the professionalism issue.

Number

2

responded,

"The effect of unionism would be detrimental in the sense that it tends
to minimize the missionary dedication aspect of teaching."

"The quality

of education would suffer," responded Number 6; "it is one more step

toward the organization man instead of the scholarly man, and I'd prefer being associated with the latter."

One faculty member (Number 34) hesitated to answer:

comfortable answering this because
s

I

have no data.

"I feel un-

My bias is that col-

lective bargaining would gradually erode the quality of education and

promote a comfortable mediocrity."

Finally, "the effect would be bad,

I'm refering to the management/labor adversarial position.
not right to have this in a university.
family,

I

It is just

Having grown up in an academic

have ideas about what a university should be" (Number 60).
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"Well", responded one member (Number 52), "it might
increase the

morale around here, and that would have a good effect; on
the other hand,
if it meant wiping out the merit system and going to
a step system, it

might decrease productivity in the area of research."
swered,

Might improve it.

.

.

A "no" voter an-

might perk up some people who have coasted

along for years" (Number 49)
On the whole, the "yes" voters felt that a collective bargaining
/

agreement would not effect the quality of education, and that the two
•

were really not related.

t

To the extent that the contract incorporated

academic governance, it is believed that the quality of education would
be affected.

Six individuals concurred by stating that the quality of

education might be affected positively or negatively, depending on the
contract.

In a tight fiscal period, a union contract could provide a

> far more secure atmosphere for faculty and therefore, a better learning

environment for students.

The reverse effect could also happen if fac-

ulty were forced to spend a great deal of time dealing with the legislature instead of on more scholarly aspects of their careers.

The question is undoubtedly best answered by Number 34 when he
said, "I feel uncomfortable answering this because

I

have no data."

The

problem is that we will not know the affects of collective bargaining
on college and university education for a long time, if ever.

After all,

who can say substantively how collective bargaining has affected the

quality of primary and secondary education?
;

a

There is an urgent need for

study of unionized colleges and universities, as compared to non-

be made.
unionized institutions before any far-reaching decisions can
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Faculty Attitudes Toward the November 15-16 Election
(Section IV of Interview)

The purpose of Section IV was to determine how aware faculty mem-

bers were of the MSP-AAUP and CCF campaigns.
to the faculty,

ers.

Each group presented issues

some of which were thought to be more pertinent than oth-

In addition, as Lozier and Mortimer have pointed out in their study

of the Pennsylvania colleges^ the national affiliation of the bargaining

agent makes a difference in voting behavior and in measuring attitudes.
The Pennsylvania study demonstrated that there were significant differ-

ences in the composite profiles of APSCUF-PAHE and AAUP supporters.
Such differences might have existed at the University of Massachusetts
if there had been more than one union vying for representation.
if the individuals with AFT membership had organized,

In fact,

the NEA affiliate

might have had to respond to an entirely different set of issues from a

competing national organization.
The major issue of Section IV is that of control.

To what extent

did either group (MSP-AAUP or CCF) control the election by the suggestion
of issues?

For instance, if salary and working conditions were clearly

platnot issues, it would have been foolish for either side to build its

form on a salary increase or a decrease in work load.

The subject of

quotas was
tenure and the possibility of administration imposed tenure

Professors emphaclearly something that the Massachusetts Society of
sized.

tenure was an
Faculty’s reactions should indicate, then, that

issue.

third highest importance)
To the extent that it was mentioned (of

certainly not to any large
indicates that the MSP-AAUP was successful, but
no issues at all.
degree, since most felt that there were
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— Question

1

Awareness of Election

:

The first question:

"How did you become aware of the issues sur-

rounding the election?," met with a fairly predictable response
ters.

— newslet-

Most faculty (seventy-nine percent) felt they had been inundated

from both groups by newsletters depicting all of the pertinent arguments
and answers.

Most felt that, there was too much paper; that one-half as

many documents would have been a better use of time and money.

The sec-

>

ond way that faculty said they had become aware of the issues was through
.

r

s departmental meetings held by MSP-AAUP and the CCF.

Faculty also men-

tioned that certain friends who had been more knowledgeable than they

helped them to learn about the issues.

— Question

2

:

Perception of Union Groups

The second question:

"Would you explain your perceptions of the

MSP-AAUP coalition?," received some amusing responses.

There was no

clear case depicting the MSP-AAUP as having a "good" or "bad" image.

Many (twenty-six percent) indicated that the union had done a good job,
and that the campaign had been fair.

Twelve individuals felt that the

MSP-AAUP was not a "good" group of individuals and had not run a

good

campaign (for a variety of reasons).
the emphasis
Nineteen individuals answered the question as if

either MSP or AAUP
were on the word "coalition" and responded that
reasons.
needed the other for prestige and economic

coalition was beneficial to the union cause.
random.

Most felt that the

All other reactions were

.
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*

Th© author found one interesting and fairly humorous pattern:

eight individuals, all male, referred to the Massachusetts Society
of

Professors and AAUP coalition as a "marriage" of some sort.
of necessity,

one individual responded.

tional teeth to AAUP.

.

.

"A marriage

"MSP gave the practical, func-

MSP had the awareness and willingness to oppose

the right injustices and they .perceived the administration correctly"

(Number 23).
ience.

.

.

Another took the view that it was "a marriage of conven-

most professors would prefer to identify with AAUP.

more gentlemanly.

.

.

.

it's

.

the MSP gained respectability" (Number 3).

"It

was just sort of a wedding of people who may not have been in love,"
said a pensive respondent.

held today, they'd win.

"They did a good job.

If the election were

They said tenure was a problem and now we are

finding out that it is" (Number 51)

.

"A marriage which was not made in

heaven" and "a Catholic/ Jewish wedding, but I'm

'not

sure which is which."

Then there were the "uneasy bedfellows" and "odd bedfellows.
is traditionally concerned with faculty academic freedom.

.

.

.

.

.

AAUP

.

MSP is

more militant" (Number 14).
Number 25 was "impressed by the civilty of the campaign.
not aware of any pressure tactics."

I

am

Another "yes" voter felt that the

campaign "was relatively sensible, well conducted.
ill will after the election" (Number 38)

.

.

.

there was zero

Three individuals who were

members of AAUP were surprised by the coalition.
has already been mentioned, was angered by it.

One individual, as

He felt that the Execu-

responsibility of their
tive Committee members of AAUP had "abused the
of the general body
offices" by voting to coalesce without the consent

(Number 31)

.
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In three of the faculty members' responses, one
could detect

the theme of professionalism coming forth again.

wierd.

The lesser of two evils.

.

.

"The coalition was

a pragmatic necessity.

.

.

ulty saw the MSP eroding their personal integrity" (Number 20).
ran a used car campaign and I'm not into used cars" (Number 21).

the fac-

"They

This

individual may have been referring to The Chronicle article describing
/

Eduardo Robreno's campaign style at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, November 12, 1973. 'The article began with:

"A collective bar-

gaining election at the University of Massachusetts' main campus here
this week will test a much-debated proposition about unionizing profes-

sors:

that a faculty can be organized in much the same way as an auto-

mobile factory.

The lead-in was not really the gist of the story

which went on to describe how the Massachusetts Society of Professors
had been formed.

Many faculty working for MSP felt that the story was

unfortunate coming so close to the election date.

There is some ques-

tion as to whether a significant number of faculty saw the article;

both because of its proximity to the election and because few faculty

members read The Chronicle of Higher Education

.

Although three faculty members mentioned how much they respected
the faculty members affiliated with MSP-AAUP
they did not like the MSP "professionals".
said, "I liked the local MSP-AAUP people but

bureaucrats.

...

I

four individuals said that

,

One "affirmative" voter
I

didn't like the MSP

don't trust Robreno; he's a trade union type"

105

"Union is Given 50-50 Chance at University of
philip Sernas.
1973,
Massachusetts," The Chronicle of Higher Education November 12,
,

pp

.

1

& 8
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(Number 61).

Another responded, "I was highly impressed with
my col-

leagues who were in MSP; but
sionals.

I

was not impressed with the MSP profes-

They just didn't know our interests.

lack of academic viewpoint" (Number 56).

I

was offended by their

Not all felt that their facul-

ty colleagues in MSP were good representatives of
the faculty:

was bad leadership in the union.

The faculty who were involved in MSP

had dropped out of research, teaching.
l e ft

for them to do

(Number '69)

MSP had an axe to grind.

"There

.

The union was the only thing

Another (Number A9) responded, "The

Younger faculty were in MSP; the older, more

secure faculty were in CCF.

..."

Number 53 had a unique response:

"MSP-AAUP was an elitist

group of people which had already worked themselves up through the old
system.

.

.

conservative.

.

.

and so much the intellectual bag.

They

saw no connection between themselves and the food services people.
Some of

iny

.

.

.

friends who are more politically into unions said that the

leadership in MSP was too conservative.

I

agreed."

Four faculty members who had voted "no" in November said that

now they might change their votes to yes.

Their reasons?

^ mentioned tenure, another merit; but generally,

One person

it could be speculated

upon that it was the timing of the election which favored the non-union
vote.

Spring means tenure and promotion decisions.

It was evident

from the interviews that many faculty were still uneasy about decisions;
they were angry with the administration for what they felt was a delaying tactic.

Generally, too, tempers seemed shorter, the winter had

taken its toll, and faculty were anxious for change.

In the fall, people
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weie just beginning the year, classes and
students were newer and more
exciting.

During the fall term, the faculty may be
far more willing

to give the administration a chance.

see

attitude.

There is time for a "wait and

By the time spring has arrived, there is
the feeling

that it is too late for anything except a
sudden change.

Questions—3 and

4

Knowledge of Collective Bargaining in

:

Massachusetts
/

Question

'On November 26th, Governor Sargent signed a new law

3:

enabling public employees to bargain for wages and hours.

Would

the earlier passage of this law have effected your vote?"

— Question

4

State College Contract

:

Question 4^

"Prior to November 15-16, had you heard about any of

the state college contracts negotiated in the past sixteen

months?"

Questions

3

and

4

were an attempt to see if the University of

Massachusetts faculty were well informed about issues outside of the

University which might have affected them.

The results indicated that

most faculty were unaware of the new law and answered that they thought
a union could bargain for wages.

Those who had worked directly with

MSP-AAUP knew of the law and its probable passage.

Interestingly, one-

half of the faculty said that they knew about the state college contracts
through one of the two newsletters.

(The law had also been covered in

the newsletters, but apparently did not have as good readership.)
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on6 individual said that if the law had passed before

November 15-16, he would have changed his vote to yes.

He commented

that he didn't mind a union bargaining for wages, but he did not want
it involved in governance.

Without the ability to bargain for wages,

he felt that a MSP— AAUP contract would be almost totally governance-

oriented (Number 52)

Another faculty member answered that he thought

.

if the law had been passed earlier,

differently.

the election would have come out

The MSP-AAUP would have won (Number 12).

Noting the to-

tal responses to these questions, the researcher believes that this was

not the case.

Seventy-seven percent of the faculty were not aware of the present law or new law, and believed that this union, if elected, would be

able to bargain for wages.

Forty-seven percent of the faculty members

knew of the contracts negotiated in the Massachusetts State College
System.

Over half responded that their knowledge came through the news-

letters distributed to faculty during the campaign.
Both campaigns seem to have been as effective as they could have
been, given a clear lack of pressing issues.

No faculty member spoke

of intensive battles between the two factions, which might have occurred.

Having read the literature of the two groups, both seem to have relayed
the issues fairly.

Obviously, each group's bias is clear; but that

only makes for a good campaign.
amount
Three faculty members mentioned that they did not like the
to the Massachusetts
of money which they thought the (MTA) NEA was giving

Society of Professors.

They felt that it was unfair to the other group.

234

Both groups asked for donations and/or dues from its members (MSP had

/

five hundred members at the time of the election).

It

is true, how-

ever, that the MSP membership dues was supplemented by outside funding.
The issue of control is a critical one for a union organizer,
or for an anti-union force.

In Appendix 8,

the question of the Univer-

sity of Massachusetts administration's possible "control" of the elec-

tion is considered and compared to the election at Michigan State Uni-

versity.

The MSP-AAUP coalition can be said to have certainly influ•

r

enced the election more than any other one group.

The items of concern

usually came out first in an MSP-AAUP newsletter, to be answered or contradicted by the CCF.
gy of MSP.

The tenure issue appears to be a campaign strate-

Given another month (and one in which tenure decisions might

have been clearer)

,

MSP might have been better able to substantiate the

claims of tenure quotas, though still perhaps unable to prove it.
The Committee for Concerned Faculty did an excellent job of

counteracting the MSP-AAUP claims, and were particularly adept at using
V

the entire "professionalism" attitude which is pervasive in molding fac-

ulty opinion.

The Tippo letter, printed by CCF, is an example of that.

CCF newsletters consistently pointed out where another college contract
had limited faculty rights and privileges and even abolished tenure
(November 1, 1973).
involving more chan one
It is interesting to imagine an election
agent.

If this had been the case,

the issues would have to have been

needs; because not only
far more closely related to individual faculty's
or not to unionize, but
would a faculty member have to choose whether

.
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the type of representation as well.

Often a multi-agent election has a

second run-off election which can completely diffuse the question of

whether or not to have a union (see Mortimer /Lozier study and Hawaii
elections)

A credit to both organizations was the ninety-seven percent
turnout on November 15th and 16th.

Without a CCF, there certainly would

not have been as strong an "anti-union force" and perhaps faculty would
/

not have been as aware of the two sides.
•

One of the Committee’s most

f

recurring themes, at least in the newsletters, was "if you want to keep
what we’ve won (i.e., through the Morris and Wellman documents and faculty representation to the Board)
of that will be up for grabs."

,

then do not elect a union because all

It is questionable whether that is true

(see James Begin, ACBIS Report, May 1974).

vote-getting issue.

Nevertheless, CCF made it a

CHAPTER

TV

THE CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS

The interviews conducted in April of 1974 with seventy-six Uni-

versity of Massachusetts faculty had one principal aim.

Through ques-

tioning each faculty member, the researcher sought to collect the data
i

which would support or reject the general hypothesis of the study; name*

ly

i

r

that when there were no major issues in a collective bargaining

election, the political and social predisposition of a faculty member

was more influential in determining voting behavior than the indices
of achieved status of the faculty member (i.e., tenure, rank, school

affiliation, etc.).

In Chapter III,

the faculty’s responses to the in-

terviews have both been compared with pertinent national studies as well
as discussed in light of the hypothesis presented here.

The second chap

ter provided a brief historical and legal background for some of the

more critical components of the study; namely:
1.

Faculty attitudes toward traditional academic governance;

2.

The development of the faculty professional association; and

3.

The recent national growth of faculty collective bargaining.

All of the interviews were conducted in the spring of 1974,

months after the election and are, therefore, retrospective.

f

ive to six

The dis-

and
cussion of the interviews has occurred during the years 1976-1977,
sector.
should be viewed in that context in the collegiate
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Although

.

.

«
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collective bargaining is still in its developmental
stage, several trends
are beginning to surface.

These trends were viewed in the context of

the long and prestigious history of higher
learning in both the American

and European university communities.

When the faculty member at the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst feels integrated into
that history,
he or she may be moved to question deeply a change in the
traditional

process of university governance.

A matter of even greater concern to

that faculty member, however,' is the faculty governance system which em-

bodies the tenets and values of this profession.

Where the structure

for making academic decisions is threatened, the effectiveness of the

faculty itself becomes open to serious questions, insofar as its role in

governance is concerned
In the autumn of 1973, the opportunity arose for faculty intro-

spection on these matters.

The Amherst campus faculty was asked whether

they would choose or not choose to form a union.

In order to gather

data on the faculty's reaction to the election, an interview was designed
to elicit faculty opinion on collective bargaining (in general)

,

faculty

governance, the University of Massachusetts situation in the fall of
1973, and specific issues promulgated by the two opposing faculty groups:
the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP) and its affiliate, the

American Association of University Professors (AAUP)

;

and the Committee

of Concerned Faculty (CCF)

Faculty responses to the interview questions provided excellent
data on their attitudes toward unionism, academic governance and the
issues involved in the November 1973, election.

In retrospect, however,

it now seems clear that the researcher should have asked certain

.
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questions pointed more towards evoking data concerning individual predisposition.

Although information gleaned from faculty members' re-

sponses to the first question (When the term collective bargaining is
used, what comes to your mind?) and that on (family or personal) union

membership gave the researcher some basis for inferring the faculty member's predisposition, this one aspect should have been more directly
probed
/

t

The results from the five sections of the interview have been

summarized below in the form of numbered conclusions.

Section V of the

interview, the demographic characteristics of the faculty sample, has

been presented first in this summary as it was in Chapter III.

Each

section of the interview evoked topics which were discussed fully in
the third chapter, but which are summarized here.

Summary of Results

Section V of the Interview

;

Demographic Characteristics

Age

1.

The age range of the sample was twenty-eight years to sixty-

three years.

Median age was thirty— six.

Average age was

thirty-nine.
2.

voting behavior
There was no significant correlation of age to
twenty-eight and fortyfor those faculty between the ages of
five.

forty-six and
Faculty members whose ages were between

.

*

sixty-three years favored

the"
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"no union" by a margin of two to

one.

Sex

Although the faculty sample was not designed to include a representative number of male and female faculty, the sex of the faculty member was correlated to his/her voting behavior.

The number of female fac-

ulty members (thirteen) in the sample was too small to draw any subtan•

if

tial conclusions with regard to the general female voting population.

3.

Seventeen percent of the faculty sample were female.

4.

The female vote showed a heavy "no union" emphasis with sixty-

nine percent (nine people) voting against the union, twentythree percent for MSP-AAUP (three people)

,

and seven percent

not voting (one person)

Academic Rank

5.

Professors constituted 30.3 percent of the total sample.

Asso-

sample.
ciate professors constituted 28.9 percent of the total

samAssistant professors constituted 36.9 percent of the total
ple.

6.

Instructors constituted 3.9 percent of the total sample.

rank and voting
There was little correlation between academic
rank, sixty-five percent
status, although within the professorial

union.
of the professors voted against the

The associate pro-

a significant percentage
fessors, however, favored the union by

*

(fifty four percent to forty-one percent).
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Among the assistant

professors, fifty-seven percent voted against the union, while
all three instructors voted for the MSP-AAUP affiliate.

Tenure

7.

63.7 percent of the total sample was tenured.

not tenured.

35.5 percent was

1.3 percent (one faculty member) was not on a tenH

ure track.
•

8.

<r

There was some correlation between voting behavior and one's tenure status.

Fifty-seven percent of the tenured faculty in the

sample voted against the union reflecting the campus-wide margin, while a slight majority of the non-tenured faculty who
9.

voted chose the union.

If the non-tenured faculty members who

either did not vote or would not say are counted, however, there
is an even split within the non-tenured ranks; and, therefore,

the sample voting results are not reflective of the November

election results.

School Affiliation

With the exception of the School of Food and Natural Resources
(at that time termed Agriculture)

,

there were no terribly sur-

prising results from the cross-correlation of school affiliation
and voting behavior.

Predictions about the University of

Massachusetts' School of Agriculture were apparently predicated
reported in other
on the voting behavior of similar departments
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studies which pointed toward a conservative faculty group
which

would vote against a union.

In both the University of Hawaii

study and the report compiled by Professors Ladd and Lipset ag-

ricultural faculty demonstrated a heavy "no union" choice.

The

University of Massachusetts' Agriculture faculty, however, voted
in a clear majority for the MSP-AAUP affiliate.

The reasons be-

came clear in several interviews with these faculty members.

Time and an expanding university had benefited the liberal arts
faculty, they stated, to a far greater degree than the agricultural faculty.

Faculty members felt that their salaries had not

kept pace with other Amherst campus faculty, nor had their working conditions.

The Social Science faculty's vote predicted to

have been strongly pro-union resulted in an even split between
the MSP-AAUP affiliate and no union.

On the other hand, the

faculties from Natural Science, Nursing and Physical Education

voted predominantly against the union.

Again, faculty interviews

revealed that the reasons for the particular departmental differences were complex and varied, dealing primarily with predisposition toward unionism as a concept versus the faculty's attitude
toward the specific affiliate seeking to represent the University
of Massachusetts faculty.

Tenure Status Wi thin Schools and Voting Behavior

10.

voting behavThe three-way analysis comparing tenure status to
results.
ior within each school showed no surprising

The few

.

•
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exceptions, to which allusions have been made above in the
sep-

arate school and tenure results, are summarized below.
11.

Within the School of Food and Natural Resources (Agriculture),
sixty-eight percent of the tenured faculty as well as sixtyeight percent of the non-tenured faculty voted for the MSP-AAUP
affiliate, providing a direct contrast to most national studies.
In these studies, tenured faculty generally voted against the
/

M

union, and within the institutions whose vote has been analyzed,
r

the faculty in schools or departments of agriculture were anti-

union as well.
12.

The School of Education faculty provided an interesting analysis because one-hundred percent of its tenured faculty voted
for the union and all of its non-tenured faculty voted against

the union.

As was explained in Chapter III, the faculty members'

dissatisfaction of their school administration was considered
to be the primary reason for their voting behavior.

13.

The Social Science non-tenured faculty, who were expected to

vote in favor of a union, were evenly split between the union
and no— union choice.

A plit occurred in the tenured faculty

as well, making the overall group of departments more anti-union

than either the MSP or the CCF groups expected.

14.

The Natural Sciences showed a heavy no-union vote among both

tenured faculty (where seventy— eight percent of the faculty
against
voted "no") and non-tenured faculty (seventy-five voted
the union)

The Number of Years at the University
15.

Faculty members in the sample had spent between one and thirtysix years at the University.

tween five and six years.

The median length of stay was be-

The average length was nine years.

A cross analysis of the number of years spent at the university
with a faculty member's voting behavior showed little correlation.

Divided into length of stay of one to ten years, eleven

to twenty years and twenty-three to thirty years, only in the

period "eleven to twenty years" did a majority of faculty vote
for the union (by a margin of sixty-eight percent to thirty-two
16.

percent).

In both other time spans, a majority of faculty voted

against the union.

Membership in a Faculty Organization

The relationship of individual membership in a faculty organiza-

tion (such as AAUP, MSP-AAUP or an outside union) to a faculty

member's voting behavior was low except in the MSP-AAUP cate17.

gory where the two faculty who held membership in each of the
two organizations voted for the MSP-AAUP option.

As has been

mentioned earlier, membership in AAUP did not necessarily imply
support for the alliance nor of faculty collective bargaining.

Administrative Title

administrative title
There was a high correlation between one's
and his or her voting behavior.

All program directors and

•
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department heads voted againsp the union, while department
chairpersons were evenly split between the two choices.

De-

partment heads are appointed by the administration whereas de-

partment chairpersons are more often the choices of their de-

partmental colleagues (as defined by the University of

Massachusetts Provost Office in 1976; footnote 13, Chapter III).
These results, therefore, might lead one to conclude that de-

partment heads are not as likely to vote for

a

union as depart-

ment chairpersons because they may view their role differently
from that of the department chairperson.

Membership in the Faculty Senate

18.

The question pertaining to faculty membership in the senate re-

vealed a correlation that had not been predicted.

Of the eigh-

teen faculty members who had been members of the senate (past
or present), sixty-eight percent voted for the union.

Since

the purpose of the question was to discover the accuracy of the

hypothesis, that faculty with experience in the Faculty Senate

would be less apt to want a union, the results were most surprising.
fact,

The hypothesis proved to be completely incorrect; in

the reverse could be proposed.

Membership on Department Committee

19.

Membership on a departmental committee proved to be of little
consequence as a predictor of faculty voting behavior.

Of the

*
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twenty-three faculty who were, members of their own department’s
personnel committee, sixty-three percent voted against the union,
not an overwhelming percentage considering its close parallel
to
the total vote.

Section V

:

Summary of Issues
V

l

In other collective bargaining studies involving faculty attitudes
f

and voting behavior, the results have shown that age, academic rank, ten-

ure status, and departmental affiliation are related to a faculty member's
vote.

Those studies (as reviewed in Chapter III and mentioned specifi-

cally in footnote 7, Chapter III), however, have been conducted, for the

most part, on faculties which have recently unionized.

The hypothesis of

this study proposed that when there were no major "bread and butter" is-

sues (i.e., problems directly challenging the stability of the faculty

group)

,

faculty members would vote according to their personal predispo-

sitions, as determined by upbringing and general background.

As a result,

the use of academic demographics by themselves could not predict a faculty

member's vote whenever major issues dividing one group from another were
absent from the campus.
sue,

For instance, if tenure quotas had been an is-

those faculty who were yet to be tenured or who were not on a tenure

track might be more inclined to vote for a union which promised to rid
the University of tenure quotas.

But in the absence of such local

bread

University of
and butter" issues, the demographics of the faculty at the
the outcome
Massachusetts at Amherst could not have been a predictor of

of the election.

As mentioned in Chapter III, although administrators

*
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were sought out for their historical perspective on the study,
they were
not included in the study sample.

Because there were no critical or partisan issues, faculty who

represented a variety of ages, disciplines and levels in their careers

voted alike because their attitudes toward unionism in general were similar, not because they were clustered by demographic statistics around

one side of an issue or another.
i

•

Section

I

of the Interview

r

:

Faculty Atticudes Toward Unionism

Section
v

I

of the interview consisted of questions designed to

learn the faculty member's attitudes toward collective bargaining and

unionism in general.

To the first (what collective bargaining implies)

and second questions (blue collar vs. white collar) concerning a faculty

member's impressions of collective bargaining, faculty responded generally in two ways.

20.

Most anti-union faculty members felt that unions belonged to
the blue-collar segment of the work force.

They contended that

for professional people, the adversary relationship assumed to

characterize a blue-collar union-management work setting was

both unnecessary and uncongenial to their expectations for the

work of a professor on a campus.
21.

giving a
The pro-union voter usually answered the question by

"definition" of the term.

They would generally give a group of

how various
synonyms for co llective bargaining, and then define

.

*

people use collective bargaining to achieve their goals.
the most pai

L
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For

(with one exception), there were very few emotion-

al responses among the pro-union voters, unlike the
responses of

the anti-union voters.
22.

Question

3

queried faculty on whether or not faculty in higher

education should be able to unionize.

This question was similar

to those asked by other national surveys; and as with the other
/

I

studies, the proportion of the faculty at the University of
•

r

Massachusetts answering yes to this question was two-thirds.
Yet, they often added a qualifying phrase such as "but not here,"
or "depending on what is being bargained for."
\

23.

The items which the faculty members felt should be included in

collective bargaining agreement were the traditionally con-

a

tractual items such as salaries, working conditions (teaching
load, student-teacher ratio, hours, etc.) and grievance and per-

sonnel procedures.

One-third of the faculty mentioned governance

as a contract item.

24.

A great majority of faculty responded that a strike should be
used by faculty in higher education if other alternatives have

been exhausted.

Many expressed their opinions about whether or

not a strike could occur at the University of Massachusetts; and
a

few wore concerned about the effects of a faculty str ike.

Many faculty members believed that, whether or not they person-

ally would strike, the faculty as
Issue

a

body would strike to win an

*

25.
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In answer to the question regarding personal or family
member-

ship in a union, over one-half of the faculty members
responded
that either they, or a member of their family, or both had held

union membership at some time.

There was no correlation between

this membership and the individual's voting behavior.

The reac-

tions to this question were never a simple "yes" or "no" answer;

and interestingly, the individuals often gave a synopsis of
4*

M

their family background including an explanation or rationale
as to how past or present union affiliation affected their cur-

rent feelings about unionism.
26.

To the question asking faculty whom they would include or exclude
in a bargaining unit, responses were mixed.

Less than half of

the sample (twenty-six) would have included department chairper-

The great majority,

sons and department heads in their unit.

however, would have included just department chairpersons and

themselves (full-time faculty)

,

and excluded the department

heads (see conclusion 17 for comparison)

.

There was little un-

derstanding among faculty members of the complex subject of the

bargaining unit.

Section

I

:

Summary of Issues
Ybe first section of the interview revealed many faculty attitudes
in
toward both unionism and indirectly toward the faculty election

November of 1973.

.
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One of the dominant themes in the four subjective
parts of the

interview was "professionalism"; and here in Section
it the most often.

faculty mentioned

I,

The notion of individuality, of being one’s own boss

as Number 46 responded, "I choose to spend my time the
way
.

.

.

A professor does nothing you can regulate by hours"

I

want to.

— was

indica-

tive of this "professional" sensibility.
The ability to choose one's colleagues is another feature prized
•

V

in the work place by professionals.

i

Lawyers do it through law examination

boards or law schools, the state bar examinations, and the American Bar
Association.

Doctors have similar routes of selection.

The individual

who seeks the academic life must be able to get through a series of tests
similar to those imposed upon the doctor and lawyer.

Faculty employed at

the University also were required to pass through a series of tests:

en-

trance into college, graduate record examinations, graduate school, prior

teaching experiences and, to some extent, the publishing/research screen.
Once inside the institution, the routines of department affiliation, com-

mittee structure, promotion and tenure patterns all affect the selection
of colleagues, and are perceived by faculty members as critical to their

profession.

As this study demonstrates, the fear of a major change in

this system occurring under collective bargaining was very much on the

minds of the anti-union voters at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
The notion of professionalism was expressed in other ways when

those interviewed discussed the types of faculty who were connected with
the MSP-AAUP affiliate.

1

One person was of the opinion that the faculty

^See Chapter III, pages 163-172.

.
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members connected with the Massachusetts Society of Professors were
those who had not "made it" elsewhere in the University.

In other words,

pro-union faculty were those who had not followed the "professional"
code as it was traditionally hallowed within the highest standards of

academe
One of the sample faculty described the professional as the person with a "code of ethics" in his or her work.

To identify oneself with

the academic profession is to -cloak oneself in the history and set of val-

ues underlying the dogmas of academic freedom and research at the fron-

tiers of knowledge.

When the faculty at the University of Massachusetts

talked about the differences between blue and white collar workers, they

were simply declaring themselves unready for any change in the historical concepts governing their profession.

They were insisting on their

right to sustain the values of their special status as academics.

To

threaten their self-image as professionals by introducing a mode of conduct deemed foreign to it must not occur while the old governance regime
still appeared to function.

Professionalism was not the only potent image of the academic
profession.

For many faculty, the symbols of individualism and autonomy

were also powerful emblems of the professional status.

As Piofessor

of schol
Tippo declared in his letter to the faculty, we are a "community

ars.

.

.

(who) devote their primary attention to

of teaching and seeking the truth.

...

we are all officers of the University."

the ancient functions

We are all decision-makers and
What Professor Tippo repeated

stress in the interviews—
was only what many of the faculty would later

.
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that the need for control over one's own professional life
is critical.

The argument that a group of outside people, felt by certain
faculty

members to have no connection to the faculty, would represent the Amherst
campus faculty to the University administration was an idea both foreign
and odious.

Many faculty knew also that individually, they could negotiate
a variety of personnel and departmental issues with certain administra-

tors

a benefit which they feared would be denied them under union rule.

For many faculty members, their sense of individuality was as important
to them personally as they felt the separate campus autonomy was to the
i

University of Massachusetts system.

The Amherst campus, referred to as

the "Flagship Campus," had a history as the University's birthplace.

Amherst was the center of research, the home of the many graduate schools
and their faculties.

Teaching loads, faculty-student ratios, advising

functions, and committee assignments in a university where faculty are

understood to be scholars presuppose a radically different function
that the job definitions of teaching at the secondary or even community

college level.

Faculty did not want to lose what they felt had been

built up over a long period of time

— the

seniority and the elite posi-

tion in the system of public higher education in the Commonwealth.

In

the words of Professor Tippo, an appeal was made to his colleagues on

November 14, 1973:

"I ask.

.

.

all faculty colleagues who share with

Amherst
me the dream that one day a great state university will arise at
to vote against collective bargaining for the campus.

.
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Many of the comments made by the faculty during their interviews

paralleled national studies on professionalism.

These studies were dis-

cussed in the treatment of the first and second parts of the interview.

Also included in the discussion of the first section of the interview

were related collective bargaining issues such as the strike, the bargaining unit and the question of multiple campus representation.

The

National Labor Relations Board has made a number of conflicting decisions
4*

1

.

regarding the feasibility of single and multi-campus units, as have a

variety of state labor relations boards.

University court cases which

best exemplify this important unit issue (which was later resolved for
the University of Massachusetts in October of 1976) were discussed in

Chapter III.

Section II;

Attitudes Toward the Current (Fall 1973)

University of Massachusetts Situation

Section II of the interview concentrated on the faculty's attitudes toward the current situation in the Amherst campus with regard to

major issues affecting the election, salary, working conditions, and per
sonnel policies.
27.

2

Twenty-four percent (the largest group) of faculty felt that
at
there were no critical issues on the Amherst campus; or

importance
least if there were, they were not of significant
system.
to warrant changing to a collective bargaining

2

See Chapter III, Table 30, page 174.

The

.

•
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second largest number of faculty (nineteen percent) felt that
the growing polarization between faculty and administration
on

the Amherst campus was the major issue.

That the third largest

number (sixteen percent) thought the real issue was whether or
not the faculty actually wanted an outside force (i.e., a union)

speaking for them
itself.

— in

other words, the question of unionization

Only ten faculty members felt that tenure quotas were
/

*

the issue, reflecting the results of a campaign theme by the

MSP-AAUP
28.

Faculty responses to Questions

2

and

3

demonstrated that neither

salary nor working conditions were believed to be unfair or un-

satisfactory.

For the most part, faculty at the University felt

that they had been fairly treated in terms of promotion and tenure.

Those untenured faculty who were concerned about their

tenure status stated that it was because of the period of economic recession and the fiscal crisis in state government, not

because of an inherently unfair system.
29.

Many mentioned that the merit system was confusing and, therefore,
of concern.

This issue, however, probably arose after the elec-

tion and before April 1974 (the time of the interviews), during
a period of merit examination by President Wood and the Univer-

sity Board of Trustees.
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Section II

:

Summary of Issues

Although the faculty on the Amherst campus did not find any
major
issues in the November of 1973 election, many seemed to sense
that all

was not well on the campus.

Indeed, those who articulated the growing

polarization between faculty and administration and those who mentioned
the increasing bureaucracy of the University's central Boston Office were
«*

v

,

forecasting the future quite perceptively.
•

Their sense of disquiet was

r

all the more significant since many of these faculty had been at the
v

University for a number of years and, therefore, were capable of drawing
on a longer experience for comparison.
The study of the college faculty of Pennsylvania State Univer-

sity revealed a faculty which saw the power of their university on the

wane, while that of the state legislature was on the rise.

In this in-

stance, the rupture was between the world of academe and the world of
the legislative authority over the campus budget.

According to Mortimer

(as discussed on page 176 of Chapter III), it was this exact circumstance

— the

decreasing power of university administrators and trustees, and the

growth of the budget authority of the state legislature

— that

would whet,

at least in the public sector, the faculty's appetite for unionization.

Recent history suggests that Mortimer was correct.
A collective bargaining contract has almost always brought about
a

standardized wage scale for employees.

Many of the first contracts

apfor faculty in higher education contained salary agreements which

peared to raise wages.

Such salary increases may be the result of cost
r

Vs

muQ,

X-
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influence a faculty member's vote in November of 1973.

As he or she

<

marked the ballot, the faculty member had to wrestle with one fundamental question:

"Do

I

want a union representing me at this university?"

For most, the answer was no because this researcher believes it would

mean too great a change in the perceived academic environment.

In the

minds of many, a vote for a union would replace the community of academic professionals with a labor-management instrument typical of the assem/

bly line.

\

To some faculty, membership in a union would connote that they
•

r

were merely "teachers" rather than "professors".

"The professor inno-

vates, stimulates and deals with abstract relationships

contrast, conserves and transmits."

— the

teacher, by

3

In the early experience of many faculty, a union drew a sharp

line of demarcation between those who worked and those who managed.
They felt the'ir individuality would be compromised under a union; and
that the image of faculty would be erased once and for all as their role

was transformed from what Professor Tippo termed
sity" to that of mere employee.

officer of the Univer-

As such, the majority of the faculty at

Amherst did not feel under sufficient personal or collective threat to
to equate
vote to adopt a process of governance which most had grown up

with blue collar workers.

"Teachers and Professors" in Anderson and
^Jessie Bernard.
Murray, The Professors page
,
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of living factors alone, however, \ather than the actual result of union<

ization.

Although one study, conducted by staff and faculty at Michigan

State University (see footnote 56 of Chapter III), showed marked in-

creases in unionized faculty salaries at five major universities, that
same study warned that the inflationary factor alone during that time

period increased non-unionized faculty salaries to a similar degree.

Promotion and tenure, the subject of the fourth question in Sec/
t

tion II, is at the heart of any university.
has become a problem

foj:

In the last decade,

tenure

most colleges and universities as the era of

fast growth in the sixties was succeeded by a time of reduced enrollments

and budget austerities.

Many young faculty had been hired and were moving

along the tenure track only to face the harsh reality of a department

which had an overabundance of tenured faculty already ensconced.
In 1973,

produced

a

the Committee on Academic Tenure in Higher Education

major set of recommendations on the granting of tenure.

If

union were to adopt the basic tenor of this report, the collective

a

bargaining agreement would not radically alter any of the current practices defining the award of tenure.

Yet because the Commission did

probrecommend increased rigor in the area of performance appraisal, the

collective barlem of teacher evaluation itself would be at issue under

gaining.

Many faculty might believe that peer review, the judgemental

concept, would
appraisal of one's colleagues and a treasured academic

face dilution within an academic union.

Section II of the inBased upon the responses of the faculty to
no major local issues to
terview, one can conclude that there were

.
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Section III
Faculty Pe rceptions of University Governance
:

In Section III, faculty members were asked about
perceptions of

the Amherst campus governance system.

In the first two questions, fac-

ulty were asked to discuss the areas over which they felt they
should

have governance influence and the actual extent of that influence.
/

Question
'

30.

r

1
.

f

Respondents felt that for faculty governance, the three critical realms were curriculum, personnel policies and teaching

loads

Question
31.

2

Opinions varied, however, as to the extent to which the faculty's

authority should be final

.in

each of these areas.

Of those who

felt that "personnel policies" should be subject to faculty au-

thority, fifty-five percent felt that the faculty should have

final authority over these matters, although they also thought
that the administration should be able to review their decisions.

Since they believed that their current control was suf-

ficient, control over curriculum was not an issue in the fac-

ulty's minds.

The growing bureaucracy and size of the institu-

tion was of concern to a number of faculty who cited poor com'(-munications rather than administrative incompetence as the rea-

son for their concern.
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Question

3
r

The question asked faculty to weigh the effectiveness
of the cur-

rent faculty governance system— namely
32.

,

the Faculty Senate.

Sixty-four percent of the respondents felt that the Faculty
Senate did not provide an adequate voice and platform of repre-

sentation for faculty concerns.

Their answers were often apol-

ogetic descriptions of 'the faculty senators’ lengthy and bogus

discussions on "less than relevant issues.

Many felt that given

a faculty member’s priorities in terms of teaching and research,

little else could be expected.

Question

33.

4

To the question on student involvement in collective bargaining,

forty-eight percent of the faculty responded negatively, saying
that they did not want students involved in collective bargain-

ing at all.

Thirty-five percent of the respondents said that

students should have a voice and some chance for input into
those areas which concerned them

— specifically,

student-teacher

ratio, work loads and faculty teaching evaluation.

Only eleven

percent of the faculty felt that students should be represented
in the actual negotiations.

Question

34.

5

Question

5

sought to reveal the degree of familiarity faculty

members had with the university grievance procedures.

Few
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faculty members were fully knowledgeable about personnel policies and grievance procedures, including even some department

heads and chairpersons.

Those faculty who had personally

brought a grievance to the University's attention were naturally
the most familiar with the actual grievance steps.

Question

6
9

35.

"

The majority of faculty (sixty-four percent) spent less than fif-

teen percent of their time on tasks involving faculty governance

matters.

Department personnel committee members stipulated that

during certain times of the year, as much as fifty percent of
their time was spent evaluating colleagues for promotion and/or
tenure.

Question

36.

7

Question

7

asked for faculty opinions on how collective bargain-

ing would affect the quality of education.

egories of response.

There were three cat-

First, forty-five percent of the faculty

felt there would be no effect of collective bargaining on the

quality of education.

Second, thirty percent believed the qual-

campus
ity of education would be negatively affected because the

will be "politicized" over non-educational issues.

Third, fif-

would be improved
teen percent believed the quality of education
teaching (if
because faculty could put more effort into their
security).
union contract had stabilized their economic

a

.
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Although the faculty in the second group were, for the
r

most part, anti-union, there were also a few pro-union
voters
who felt that education would be adversely affected.

The first

group included both pro and anti-union voters; and the third
group was largely made up of pro-union voters, although it did

include two or three anti-union voters.

Section III

:

Summary of Issues

|

Faculty governance has not been strongly affected by unionization,
at least in the relatively short history of collective bargaining on col-

lege campuses.

In the research by Begin, Clark and Fisk on college gov-

ernance before and after collective bargaining, although some of the
studies showed a change in the faculty's attitude toward governance before and after unionization, the procedures themselves had not radically

altered
Several contractual agreements did modify governance systems
through the inclusion of third party binding arbitration.

The traditional

system of peer review concerning faculty grievances was supplemented by
an outside arbitrator.
not without flaws.
ty "oligarch"

— the

Of course, many have argued that peer review is

Burton Clark has discussed at some length the facul-

professor who gained departmental authority through

the role
seniority and scholarship, and then dominated junior faculty in

of the quasi-administrator.

Clark and McConnell both regard this measure

be preferred over what they
of nower as unfortunate, yet nevertheless to

261

envision would happen under collective bargaining.

unionization would.

.

.

In McConnell's words,

"doom the system of shared governance."

Accord-

ing to most studies, however, whenever a true system of shared governance

existed before the advent of collective bargaining, it existed afterwards
as well.

In some cases, a union contract created a system of government

more equally shared by faculty and administrators.^
Student representation $nd participation in academic collective

bargaining had recently (1972-1973) become an issue both in New York City
and in the state of Massachusetts.

In three non-traditional faculty con-

tracts negotiated with the Massachusetts State College faculty, students

not only participated in the negotiations but were awarded

a

degree of

participation in the governance structure subsequently incorporated into
the contract itself.

As has been noted earlier, several student groups

(Maine, Oregon and Montana) have succeeded in getting state laws passed

which will have a significant impact on the future of collective bargaining.

Thus, as a result of the changing pace of collective bargaining, it

may not be inconceivable that a college president will have to consider

managing five different unions:
(1)

Administrative staff;

(2)

Faculty;

(3)

Students;

(4)

Hourly employees; and

State College Contracts.
^See Chapter III, page 200, Massachusetts
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(5)

Teaching assistants.^

Although faculty governance and student participation were of concern
to faculty in 1973,

they were by no means issues which would have forced

faculty to unionize.

Section IV

:

Attitudes Toward the November Election

i

In this section,

faculty were questioned on their general impres-

sions of the actual election, the MSP-AAUP and CCF groups, and their

overall knowledge of collective bargaining issues.
37.

Seventy-nine percent of the faculty responded that they obtained

most of their information concerning the election from the newsletters distributed by both the MSP-AAUP and the CCF.
that there was "too much paper"

overloaded.

— in

Most felt

fact, that they had been

The department meeting with experts from the two

organized groups was the second most noted vehicle of communication.

38.

Faculty impressions of the Massachusetts Society of Professors
and the Committee of Concerned Faculty were, for the most part,

favorable.

There was often a distinction made between the MSP-

AAUP professional staff faculty working for that organization,

with equal numbers of faculty noting positive and negative

The University
See Chapter III, page 217 for a description of
of Wisconsin, Teaching Assistant Negotiations.
5
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factors about each group.

Many anti-union voters felt that

the staff and faculty involved in
MSP-AAUP lacked the academic

star

quality which they felt was evident within
the CCF fac-

ulty.

They said that they were influenced
personally by that

apparent contrast.
39.

Questions

3

and

4

attempted to discern the faculty's knowledge

of outside, yet related, collective bargaining
issues.

Both

the new collective bargaining law and the Massachusetts
State

College contracts had been mentioned in the MSP-AAUP and CCF
newsletters; and yet there was very little awareness of either

development on the part of most faculty.

Those faculty who had

worked with the MSP-AAUP organization during the campaign were
more knowledgeable about these two issues than any other identifiable group.

Section IV

:

Summary of the Issues

The control of an election is usually in the hands of those people

who can best articulate the real and felt desires of the voting population.

The faculty at the University of Massachusetts clearly had two

conscientious and active groups seeking to articulate a strategy for victory:

for the union, the Massachusetts Society of Professors/AAUP affil-

iate; and against the union, the Committee of Concerned Faculty.

The

problem for the union group was that there were no major local issues
* with which they could dramatize for a doubting faculty the need for so

5

fundamental a change.

It is possible that with a lower turnout at the
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polls, the forces seeking a union would have won.

Yet the voice of oppo-

sition proved loud and clear during the open and vigorous
debate between
the two groups, bringing ninety-seven percent of the faculty
to the ballot box and a verdict from a true majority.

Both sides sought to give

the impression that the pro-union forces began.

ances, their aid from the outside

— from

the National Education Association

and the Massachusetts Teachers Association

campus union could rely upon.
a "foreign entity"

— and

For the MSP-AAUP alli-

—was

a sign of the strength a

For the CCF, these forces were "outsiders"

enabling them to carry an "underdog" image as

they worked to get out their vote.
The question of who really controlled the Amherst campus arose in
two ways during the campaign by the union coalition.

In the newsletter

of the MSP-AAUP,

How much do you ac-

the faculty were asked to consider:

tually decide about your own destiny here?

The newsletter drummed away

at the theme of the increasing centralization of the University in the

bureaucracy of One Washington Mall^ and the consequent removal of real
authority from the Amherst campus.

The Hay Report substantiated those

claims and became a critical issue in many faculty members' minds.

Nev-

ertheless, neither of the campaigns could, by themselves, dictate, the

election outcome since there was no single overriding issue of concern
to the faculty.

6

Boston.

downtown
The address of the University President's Office in
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Conclusions

What do these conclusions indicate about the 1973 election
at
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst?

None of the demographic data could have predicted faculty
voting

behavior.

With perhaps the two exceptions of tenured faculty in the

School of Agriculture and Natural Sciences division, few departments or

schools voted heavily in one direction or another.

No faculty profile

of the pro-union or anti-union voter can be compiled from these figures.

Among the sample faculty, there were strong sentiments both for
or against the concept of collective bargaining, as well as the particular

group seeking to become the faculty's bargaining agent

— MSP-AAUP.

No faculty member indicated that he or she was indifferent to the out-

come of the election.

Four to five months after the election, only a

few respondents felt that they would then like to switch their "no rep-

resentative" vote, although they often revealed they knew of several faculty like themselves who, at the time of the interview , would have voted
for the union.

Both pro and anti-union voters said that the lack of lo-

cal issues was the principal reason why the MSP-AAUP was not elected to

represent the faculty at the University in 1973.

Attitude changes come only slowly when there are no critical
reasons to do otherwise.

This study gives evidence that change, partic-

ularly when it relates to an individual's or a group
esteem, proceeds at an even slower pace.

s

status or self-

In the absence of major campus

issues involved in a collective bargaining election, the predisposition

y
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and socialization, or political culture of a faculty member rather than

his or her achieved status will be more influential In determining voting behavior

firmed

.

The hypothesis of this study has thus been proven con-

.

There were several faculty members in the study whose opinions

were in sharp contrast to the majority of their faculty colleagues.
Two faculty members in the School of Agriculture placed themselves on
the conservative end of the political spectrum.

class, rural, farm-based families.

They came from working

In youth, their lifestyle had been

independent and isolated as opposed to the gregarious lifestyle of the
urban dweller.

These faculty members both commented that they did trust

unions; that under any other conditions, they would have voted against
the union; but that the University administration had so mistreated and

angered them, that they felt a union was their only method of retaliation.

In other words, the issue for them was critical enough to make

them vote contrary to the presumed predisposition of people with similar
rural, independent, conservative backgrounds.

The two tenured faculty in the School of Education had a similar
type of conflict.

Both stated that they had no real desire to see a

union on the campus, but felt such animosity toward their dean that a
University *
vote for such an "outside" force would be a vote against the
felt aradministration which had allowed the dean to amass powers they

bitrary and excessive.

Again, the immediate issue for these faculty

predispositions hostile to a
members was important enough to supersede

campus union.

These four examples, however, were the exception.

Tn
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this sample, they accounted for two of the ten schools and only four of
the seventy-six faculty.

In the majority of cases, faculty members repeated in their own

words the following comments:
was going to vote until

I

I

did not really know how

actually got into the election room.

filled with such conflicts.

thing."

"You know,

.

I

.

was

heard many of my friends say the same

For the Amherst campus faculty
,

I

I

,

there was little reason to

change "academic business as usual" unless they began with the belief
(

that a union would simply be a better form of government.
did,

Many persons

in fact, believe that collective bargaining had brought workers a

better life, including a more equitable level of wages and improved

working conditions.

These faculty believed fundamentally in the power

of unions and saw that the faculty at the University had little signif-

icant power.

Without a strong reason to vote against this particular

union, in most instances (though not all) they felt that they had to

vote for the MSP-AAUP option.
Under stress, an individual will often revert to his or her con-

ditioned responses; i.e., those actions which make that person tne most

comfortable and which result in the lowest risk solution.

An example

for him
of the faculty member who chose the path of least resistance
in the interview
is illustrated in his response to the first question

comes to your mind?)
(when the term "collective bargaining" is used, what

he felt the most comThis individual selected the type of system which
beliefs.
fortable with and which upheld his political

Number 11 answered

working class, fighting oppres"Men in coal fields, salt of the earth,
sion

— all

very positive things, lump in the throat.
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Later, during the interview, he added:
cific form it took here,
group.

I

had some problems;

They were reactionary kinds of people.

just couldn

t

"...

didn't like the MSP

I

.

.

bring myself to vote against a union

denying all of the feelings that

I

but in the spe-

in the end though,

— it

I

would have been

have inside about unions."

The vote

for a union presented the leqst conflict for this individual.
The faculty member who chose the academic profession precisely
to escape his union background in the working class ("When I walked out

of that part of my life") had sought to leave behind him what he viewed

was the enforced society of the working class.

election for

self-image

A vote in the November

union would have entailed the denial of his most basic

a

— the

self-made professional.

For such an individual, the

issue that would be critical enough to change his vote would have to

challenge the very roots of academe and his place within the academic
institution.

In selecting the college teaching profession, a person

chooses an orientation toward life.

It is not the argumentative/defense

posture of the lawyer, nor the healer/hero sensitivity of the doctor.
It is a combination of inquisitor, knowledge seeker, imparter of wisdom,

and a sense of collegiality and individuality relatively free of external demands.

The traditional notion of collective bargaining

— that

of individ-

ual dependence on an organization to negotiate for the group's needs— is

antithetical to the idealized notion of the college professor, indepenmemdent in his or her research, and dependent only upon other faculLy

equal level.
bers who can discuss discipline-oriented concepts on an

As

threatened, a faculty
long as these qualities of academe are not directly

:
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member fully socialized into this traditionally academic lifestyle will
be unlikely to opt for a change from the tradition of peer governance to
that of collective bargaining.

Yet if one's predisposition is such that

unions are beneficial for individual members, then a vote in favor of

a

7
faculty union is entirely likely, in the absence of local issues
which

would argue otherwise.

In capsule form, the results of the interviews

confirm the original hypothesis of this study.

-V

*

Compared to the other

9

studies reviewed, this study possesses distinctive characteristics and
I

;

The first is the faculty sample.

findings.

Other surveys were conducted

with
(1)

Faculty who previously had chosen a union and were being queried on the reasons for their selection of that union;

(2)

Faculty who may never have actually voted in a collective bar-

gaining election.

g

For the first series of studies
a union

or

— it

— on

faculties who had already adopted

is obvious that there had been issues of enough importance

to mobilize a faculty to unionize.

In the second type of study, one of

hypothetical
which was conducted by Everett Ladd and Seymour Lipset,
members who,
questions on collective bargaining were asked to faculty
unionized institutions.
for the most part, were unlikely to come from

Negotiations"; Haehn, "A
Moore, "Attitudes Toward Collective
Mortimer, "Anatomy"; Seidman, Kelley
Study of Trade’ Unionism"; Lozier and
"Collective Bargaining.
and Edge, "Faculty Choices"; Falcone,
7

8

Union s, pp. 36 40
Ladd and Lipset, Professors and

However, no distinction between faculty from non-unionized and
those
from unionized institutions was made in the Ladd and Lipset study.

Be-

cause their research was gathered in 1969 and 1972, it can be assumed
that the number of unionized faculty was small.

Faculty (in the 1969

study) were asked to respond to the statement, "Collective bargaining

by faculty members has no place in

a

college or university."

second study, in 1972, faculty were asked a similar question:

In the

"Do you

9

agree or disagree that the recent growth of unionization of college and

university faculty is beneficial and should be extended?"

This type of

analysis, although tremendously valuable, does not determine how those
same faculty members would actually vote in an election because faculty
in the Ladd/Lipset Survey were being asked to hypothesize, not choose

between harsh realities.

Similarly, a considerable majority of Univer-

sity of Massachusetts faculty in the study sample responded that faculty

should be able to bargain collectively; yet they did not choose that
route for themselves.

The difference between theoretical and actual

responses to faculty collective bargaining is often vast because it is
easy for a faculty member to agree that faculty members as a group should
be able to unionize, and at the same time, to resist such a course of

action for himself or herself.
As the researcher tried to fully develop in Chapter III, the

mystique of the professional in American society often appears to have
become almost a "class consciousness."

In this way, some faculty mem-

in order to
bers may have chosen their professional livelihood precisely

escape a working class upbringing.

As a convert, such an individual may

status of the "academic".
strongly identify with the idealized professional

In keeping with their notion of professionalism,
the faculty at the

^University of Massachusetts voted not

to unionize in November of 1973

because the majority was afraid of losing what sense of professional

autonomy it felt remained.

Chancellor Bromery and Professor Tippo were

correct in their assumption that the Amherst faculty wanted to consider

themselves part of an elite core of faculty in higher education, like
the Michigans, Harvards and Berkeleys where faculties showed no desire

for collective bargaining.

^tatus and status quo alike were being chal-

lenged by the NEA affiliate.
What the election and this study also demonstrate, however, is
that a growing number (albeit a minority) of faculty saw beyond the is-

sues of "professional" elitism toward what they felt to be a more important issue at hand

— that

of the depletion of faculty power, vis-a-vis

both the Amherst administration and the central administration in Boston.
Yet the faculty’s decreasing ability to control the "bread and butter"
.I

issues affecting them most directly was only beginning to surface in
the fall of 1973.

For those faculty either affected directly by that

powerlessness or who perceived that it was so, a union with national
strength such as the MSP-AAUP seemed to be the only solution.

Their

vote was a strong statement on behalf of a newer view of the status of
the faculty.

Many faculty members remarked in their interviews that

they had hoped the union would lose, but only by a small margin.

In

this way, the administration would get the message that the faculty was

beginning to flex its muscles
*

— that

it had the power to change the sys—

time to
tem of governance, but that it was willing to continue one last

try to make the traditional academic structure work.

Ironically, only
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three years later the number of faculty who saw this increased
power-

lessness would become the slight majority; and in February of
1977,

would vote to adopt a bargaining unit to represent their professional
interests.
In the early 1970's, the rise of faculty movement for unionizing

the campus was not a simple power struggle between the "haves" and "have

nots,

between management and labor, between trustee and teacher.

It

was a struggle between a somewhat idealized conception of the university
faculty, a self-regulating elite capable of collegial governance, and a

viewpoint

— perhaps

no less idealized

— of

the values of collective bar-

gaining as a means to preserve and extend faculty privilege.

Institu-

tions of American higher education are torn between the conflicting her-

itages of the aristocratic ethos of the European colleges and universities
and the democratic ethos of American civil society.

wanted higher education to promote
ply reward the intellectual elite.

a

Most Americans have

more equitable society, not to simThus, the evolution of the American

college has been a history of strain between these two forces.

The early

colleges trained ministers, and then later expanded this role to include
other professions and the liberal arts.

Yet in later years, the demo-

critic ethic grew more influential as it was argued that the more citizens who received a college education, the better educated and informed
a society would be.

Only then could democracy work effectively.

From

this philosophy came a great deal of the legislation in the late 1800

univerand early 1900' s, such as the establishment of the Land Grant

admissions—
sities; and much later, the G.I. Bill; and finally, open
education in America.
all part of the expanding enrollments of higher

s
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As the numbers of students and teachers in higher
education grew,
so too the budgets of the campuses grew.

As their financing became a

sizeable proposition, especially in the public institutions, control
of
the academic profession became a critical issue.

Even as late as the

1960 's, state governments had little difficulty in providing
ever in-

creasing allocations toward their colleges.
proven to be a different story.

The 1970's, however, have

The fiscal crisis in state governments

and the general downturn in £he national economy have both slowed the

rate of expansion within public higher education and brought much closer

supervision by state government.
The long history of unionism in the American work force provided

inspiration for the elementary and secondary level teachers in public ed-

ucation who badly needed to increase their economic and professional
power.

Laws which once covered only industrial laborers began in the

years after World War II to give real clout to white-collar workers,

both in the private and public sectors.

Thus, the 1950 's and 1960 's

provided an era of slow but steady growth for the union movement, and

provided ample opportunity for the professional to organize as well.
In order to understand the mood of the faculty in the 1973 elec-

tion, it has been necessary to trace the historical development both of
the American college and of the labor movement on the campus.

Quite

simply, the interview evoked faculty attitudes towards their profession;
and without an historical context from which to interpret and understand

difficult
these attitudes, the outcome of the election would be far more
to explain.

—
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V.

In the earlier discussion of professionalism, in Chapter III,

one important feature of professionalism was noted.

The professional

owes a duty not only to his or her client, whether patient, defendant

x

or student, but also to his or her professional colleagues and to the

principles of their respective code of ethics.

As Platt and Parsons

argue, it is the "professionalization of the faculty role" that funda-

mentally shapes not only the university system itself, but all of higher education.

/

The main institutional structure of the arts and sciences sector of
the university community has come to be organized about the patterns
of tenure and academic freedom, together constituting a pattern of
institutionalized individualism. Furthermore, the keystone of this
structural arch is the core academic profession. The central definition of the roles of its members is that they are exercising a fiduciary responsibility on behalf of the other sectors of the society.
Fiduciary responsibility must be grounded in commitment to values;
in this case, the value of cognitive rationality.

As Platt and Parsons add, academic professionals are presumed

especially in the higher echelons of academic life

— to

be committed to

these values of cognitive rationality and to their "fiduciary responsi-

bility" on behalf of these values.
tionalized individualism

,

Central to this role is its institu-

they argue, which is a "privileged status" de-

fined both by academic freedom and academic tenure.

Since tenure and academic freedom in different ways build in exemptions from pressures which operate in other organizational settings,
there must be a presumption that the model incumbent can be trusted
controls
to perform his expected functions without the detailed
enforcement
bureaucratic
competition,
market
for instance, through
operates
which
constituency
defined
to
a
or democratic accountability
9
in other sectors.

9

Cambridge, Massachusetts:
p.

123.

The American University.
Harvard University Press, 1973, Chapter IV,

Ta.lcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt.
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This conception of the role of a faculty member as
a special

kind of

professional" was suggested again and again in the interviews

with the University of Massachusetts faculty.
bargaining

,

Yet, through collective

these assumptions came more and more under challenge.

When

"push" comes to academic "shove," at least on the battleground of salary
and working conditions, the prized role model of the scholarly "individua l"

the tradition of academic man

—may

be set aside in order that more

egalitarian tools can be used against those who would tamper with faculty
'

perogatives or benefits.

7

To this degree, at least, democratic account-

ability in the words of Platt and Parsons takes the place of institutionalized individualism.
The critical questions of course remain.

Can a union contract

on a campus uphold a system of democratic accountability while permit-

ting the older values of the individual scholarly professional to be

sustained?

Will the bargaining tables become the final arbiter of aca-

demic values?

The fundamental question which follows is whether increased

unionization of faculties will affect the traditional measures of "quality" in higher education in America.

another:

Yet, related to this question is

is this "quality" under siege anyway, though from other sources?

At the time of the interview, in the spring of 1974, the Amherst campus

faculty did not know the answers to these questions, although many had

strong opinions.

At the present time, many of these same faculty, now

unionized, probably have no more definitive answers.

One must assume,

however, that the 1977 faculty group felt sufficiently dissatisfied with
choose
changes in the general campus "climate" to justify a majority to
a bargaining agent as their representative.

It should be noted here that

.
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the faculty voting in the February of 1977 election was not the same

faculty group as voted in November of 1973.

In fact, some might argue

that the inclusion of the Boston campus faculty of the University of

Massachusetts lent a different perspective on the election and, therefore, may have altered the outcome of the vote.

However

*

since no study

has been made of actual faculty voting behavior in the 1977 election (by

campus), this theory must remain pure conjecture .^) It may be that it was
Q

not faculty attitudes toward unionism which had changed as much as their
'

tf

attitudes towards the conditions of their "profession" had changed in
the wake of the growing academic austerities.

The study of the 1973

elections permits the speculation that more faculty in 1977 were like
their colleagues in the schools of Education and Agriculture three years

before.

They felt greatly enough angered by the current situation to

risk changing the status quo

.

)

In summary, it would seem that the intru-

sions into the Amherst campus by 'the office of the University President,
the increased influence of the governor's office on the University's bud-

get, and increasing bureaucratization of the campus itself provided the

sparks that illuminated urgent and critical need for change.
In 1973, what had seemed a status quo worth preserving had pre-

sumably come by 1977 to be an illusory dream.
a path into the unknown,

demic groves.

A union might be seen as

leading far from the secure environs of the aca-

In 1973, the faculty was not ready to forsake their sense

fundamental a step into
of privilege and academic community and take so
an unknown world.

Four years later, issues which were believed by the

would cause them to
majority, to adversely effect the lives of faculty,
growing labor force in
unionize and become part of a slow but steadily

America
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Letter to Faculty

Dear

During the month of April, I will be interviewing between 70 and
80 faculty members at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst campus,
on their perceptions of the MSP/AAUP election, November 15 and 16, 1973.
The material gathered from these interviews will be the basis for my
dissertation in the area of collective bargaining in higher education.
I am a candidate for the Ed.D. at the School of Education, University
of Massachusetts.
*

v

In constructing a stratified sample for by study I chose tenure
status and school affiliation as the two variables. Within those
I will be calling you within the next
parameters the sample is random.
ten days, and it would be very helpful to me if we could arrange a
time and place at your convenience for the interview. All the interviews
will be completely confidential.

My dissertation committee consists of the following members:

William Lauroesch, Chairman
Joseph D. Burroughs, Human Development
Robert R. Wellman, School of Education
Donald E. Walters, Negotiator for the Massachusetts State
College System.
Please feel free to call me or members of my committee if you
have any questions.
Sincerely,

Anne L. Bryant
222 Northeast Street, Apartment 12
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
413 253-7089
wf
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2

Faculty Interview
April, 1974

Par t
1.

.

I

:

Attitudes Toward Unionism

When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what
comes to your
mind?
Is there a distinction in your mind between
collective bargaining
(union) for blue collar workers and white collar workers?
If yes,
what is the distinction?

3.

Should faculty at a university/college be, involved in collective
bargaining?

4.

Should collective bargaining in higher education
all of the following:

include any or

V

a.

Economic Issues:

b.

Working Conditions:

c.

Job Security:

d.

Governance

wages, salary, equity

work load, advisee load

promotion, grievance, tenure

5.

Should faculty in higher education be able to strike?

6.

Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member of a
local or national union?

Mother

Father

Sibling

Wife

Child

Which union?
7.

Who would you include in a bargaining unit?
(Explain generally what
a bargaining unit is to the faculty member.)

Part II:

1.

Faculty Attitudes Toward Current University of Massachusetts/
Amherst Situation

What did you perceive to be the major issues affecting the MSP-AAUP
election on November 15-16?
Could you state which of these affected your vote (prioritize and
discuss)
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b.
C

•

2.

Is salary an issue to you?
Are you satisfied with your current salary
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst?

3.

Are you satisfied with your current working conditions at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst i.e., teaching load, number of advisees,
time for research, etc.?
,

1.
4.

Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in terms of promotion
and tenure at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst?

5.

Do you think that the personnel policies are fairly implemented at
this University?
(Are they effective?)
*»

i

P art

III

:

Faculty Perception of University Governance and the Effect of
Collective Bargaining on University Governance

In what areas should faculty have influence in university governance?

2.

Should faculty have final authority over these matters, or should they
make recommendations to the:

Chancellor,
3.

President,

or the Board of Trustees?

In your opinion, does the present system of faculty governance provide
for faculty voice over these matters adequately?

Fairly Well

Very Well

Not Very Well

4.

Do you think that students should be involved in collective bargaining?

5.

Are you familiar with the grievance procedures at the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst? Do you feel that these procedures are effective?

6.

faculty
Would you rate the amount of time/interest which you spend on
governance matters?
1

hour/month
less than above.

1

hour /week

1

hour /day

more than above
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7.

Do you think that a union contract might affect the quality
of education
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst?
(Try to have faculty member
define "quality of education.")

Faculty Perceptions of Local Campus Issues and the Effect on
Their Vote
1.

How did you become aware of the issues surrounding the election?
From another faculty member?
At a department meeting?
Through a CCF or MSP-AAUP newsletter?

Collegian?
University bulletin?
Other?
2.

Would you explain your perceptions of the MSP-AAUP coalition?

3.

On November 26, 1973, Governor Sargent sighed a new law enabling all
public employees to bargain for wages and hours. Would the earlier
passage of this law have affected your vote at the University of

Massachusetts/ Amherst?
Yes
4.

No

Prior to November 15-16, 1973, had you heard about any of the state
college contracts negotiated in the past 16 months? If yes, what
had you heard?

P art V

:

Faculty Demographic Data

1.

What is your age?

2.

What is your sex?

3.

What is your academic rank?

Instructor

Assistant Professor

Associate Professor

Professor

Lecturer

Other

Yes

No

4.

Are you tenured?

5.

If no, what is the nature of your contract?

.
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6.

What school are you affiliated with?
Food and Natural Resources
Business
8.

7

Engineering
Health Sciences
Natural Science
Education
Physical Education

Humanities
Social Science
Home Econoraics/Human Development

How many years have you been at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst?
Are you a member of a professional organization?

Name

•9.

10.

Do any of the following pertain to you?

Department Head

Department Chairman /woman

Cluster Chairman/woman

Program Director

It would be helpful to this analysis if you would tell me whether you
voted for or against the MSP-AAUP coalition. It will be kept in confidence as will the entire interview.

Yes

No
Yes

No

11.

Are you a member of the Faculty Senate?

12.

Are you a member of a University-wide committee?

Yes

No

13.

Are you a member of a departmental committee?
Personnel?

Yes
Yes

No
No
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Statement on Collective Bargaining
O
O
The statement which follows was prepared by the Association's Committee N and
approved jor publication by the Council in October, 1972. It supersedes the Statement
of Policv on Representation of F.conoinie and Professional Interests, approved by the

Council

I96S and amended

in

in

19 69.

and upon moral suasion, can be effecsupplemented by a collective bargaining agreement

Collective bargaining, in offering a rational and equitable

fcssional traditions

means of

tively

distributing resources and of providing recourse

for an aggrieved individual, can buttress and

the sound principles and

and given the force of law.

complement

practices of higher education

which the American Association of University Professors

Where

has long supported.

Policy for a Chapter

Association will pursue collective bargaining as a major
additional

way

and

provide assistance on a selective basis to

will

it

of realizing

its

A.

goals in higher education,
inter-

1.

in

American

faculty

community

collective bargaining, there

a

is

cation.

in

From

organization

formulating and implementing the prin-

ciples that govern relationships of

academic

3.

the Asso-

life,

ciation has the unique potential, indeed the responsibility,
to achieve

through

its

chapters a

mode

To

To

the extent that the Association

is

influential

in

Dismissal Proceedings, the 1971 Statement on Pro-

means

to achieve a

universities: the

number

enhancement of academic freedom and

tenure; of due process; of sound academic government.
Collective bargaining, properly used,

means

to achieve

is

strengthen the influence of the faculty
of an institution's

essentially another

these ends, and at the

same time

to

in the distribution

economic resources. The implementaupon pro-

tion of Association-supported principles, reliant

the

Renewal or Nonrcncwa!

of

of the Association.
4.

t’nc

of basic ends at colleges and

in

Faculty Appointments, and other policy statements

Create an orderly and clearly defined procedure
for
faculty governmental structure
the
prompt consideration of problems and grievances
of faculty members, to which procedure any
affected individual or group shall have full access.

within

shaping of collective bargaining, the principles of academic
freedom and tenure and the primary responsibility of a
faculty for determining academic policy will be secured.
The long-. uncling programs of the Association are

faculty

Obtain explicit guarantees of academic freedom and
tenure in accordance with the 1940 Statement of

cedural Standards

organizations lacking the established dedication to principles developed by the Association and widely accepted
principles

all

on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the
12I8S tatemcnr on Procedural Standards in Faculty

leave the shaping of colle’ctivc bargaining to

by the academic community endangers those

by

Principles

of collective bar-

gaining consistent with tlx best features of higher education

within the institution democratic struc-

Establish

members in accordance with the Statement on y
Government of Colleges and Universities.

vantage point as the paramount national

its

will seek to:

tures vvhjch provide full paiticipaiion

keeping with the standards of higher edu-

in

it

promote the economic and professional
of the faculty as a whole in accordance

Protect and

with the established principles of the Association.
2.

pressing need to develop a specialized model of collective

bargaining

a chapter of the Association attains the status

interests

large segments of the

manifest an interest

When

of representative of the faculty,

ested local chapters. 1

As

Which

Achieves Representative Status

appropriate, therefore, the

B.

In any

arrangement,

agency shop or compulsory dues check-off
a chapter or other Association agency

should incorporate provisions designed to accommodate
affirmatively asserted conscientious objection to such an

arrangement with any representative.

which
C. It is the policy of the Association (with
chapters should comply whether or not they are acting in
faculty
a representative capacity) to call or support a

work stoppage only in extraordinary situwhich so flagrantly violate academic freedom or the
reprinciples of academic government, or which are so
persuasion, and
sistant to rational methods of discussion,

strike or other

ations
1

Operating procedures for assisting chapters interested in
ha,
tiring arc available from the Associations

collective

g

Washington Othcc.

conciliation, that faculty

members may

feel

impelled to

express their condemnation by withholding their services,
be
either individually or in concert with others. It should

assumed

that faculty

strike only

if

members

institution (or a controlling

as a legislature or governor)

which undermines an
process.

will exercise their right to

they believe that another component of the

agency of government, such
is inflexibly bent on a course

essential

element of the educational

(See the Association’s provisional Statement on

Faculty Participation in Strikes.)

'
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This Agreement is entered into by the local chapter of
the Massachusetts Society of Professors, hereinafter called the
MSP, as a local affiliate of the Massachusetts Teachers
Association, hereinafter called the MTA and the local chapter of
the American Association of University Professors, hereinafter
called the AAUP.
,

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS it is apparent to the membership of the Massachusetts
Society of Professors of the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst that the American Association of University Professors
carries with it great prestige in the minds of the University
of Massachusetts faculty, and
,

WHEREAS it is apparent to the membership of the American
Association of University Professors of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst that the Massachusetts Society of
Professors carries with it great power, expertise, and resources in the matter of collective bargaining through its
affiliation with the Massachusetts Teachers Association and
through the latter with the National Education Association, and

WHEREAS the membership of the AAUP and the membership of the
MSP accept the principles of the AAUP "Red Book','' while maintaining that for certain matters, including the rights of nontenured faculty, the "Red Book" must be strengthened and extended and,
WHEREAS it is clear to both parties that the organization of the
faculty of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for the
purposes of collective bargaining is a matter of pressing and
urgent need, such that rapid certification of an effectual
legal bargaining representative is the most important consideration /
BE IT RESOLVED, THEREFORE, that the membership of the Massachusetts
Society of Professors and the American Association of University
Professors at the University of Massachusetts at. Amherst will act
jointly in the natter of collective bargaining according to the
articles of association agreed to as follows:

ARTICLE I
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Public Higher Education in the Commonwealth is a highly complex
entity, necessarily subject to political influence, and constantly
involved in changes vital to its playing a continuing role of
service to the Commonwealth. The University faculty must play
processes
a strong and important role in the structures and in the
of change in public Higher Education.
that a united faculty, with its role in these structures
We believe
bargaining,
and process es established legally through collective
in the
standards
professional
high
uphold
to
must constantly seek
University, while
face of the pressures of stress and change in the
and
contributing its expertise and experience to the formulation
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execution of educational policies in the Commonwealth.
he belie ve that as the situation on every campus is unique, a
collective bargaining organization should reflect the needs of
the particular campus, with no strictures imposed by state or
national organizations.

We believ e that a collective bargaining organization should be
governed by the highest standards of professional conduct, and
that it should work for structures and changes consonant with
those standards.

Wc
ie vo that a balance of powers between the faculty and the
administrative structure of the University, given a legal basis in
a binding contract, is the best assurance of fruitful cooperation
between these two entities in the University.
Wc believ e that a legally binding contract is the firmest safeguard
of academic freedom and due process for all faculty, both tenured
and untenured, in a public system of higher education.

v

We bel eve
collective
of faculty
University

that a legally binding contract, developed through
bargaining, is the firmest assurance of full utilization
experience and expertise in the formulation of
policies.
t

Wc believe that the principles which have in the past resulted
in our huid-won Personnel and Governance structures, principles
which
are presently implemented through Personnel Committees,
^
through the evaluation of faculty on the has;.. vL individual perv formancc, and through the Faculty Senate of the University, must
in the future be given the legally effective status which a
v Collective
Bargaining contract can provide, if these principles
are to continue to serve the cause of quality education and academic
frecdoirt at the University.
'

A RT I C PH II_
mbITrship

mi-.

A.

For the purposes of effective servicing of a contract, political
strength, and expertise in all matters relevant to concerns of
faculty in collective bargaining, the local bargaining agency
will be affiliated with the Massachusetts Teachers Association.
Membership in the MSP-AAUP-MTA bargaining unit will be open to
pny academic professional employee at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst in the following categories:

Professor
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Instructor
Librarians of ranks I through V
Chairpersons and Heads of Departments
Certain Program Directors
legal conThis bargaining unit membership will be subject to
firmation-

B.

C.

current
Members of the MSP-AAUP-MTA will pay the appropriate
dues. (Sec Attachment A: "Dues Structure")
requirement
Payment of MSP, or AAUP, and Mi' A duos will be a

.
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D.

for membership commencing July 1, 1973.
Members of the MSP or AAUP at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst at the time of the ratification of this Agreement,
will automatically become members of the combined MSP-AAUP-MTA.

ARJIOT

l^H

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A.

B.

General Assembly:
1. Membership: the combined membership, in Rood standing,
of the MSP-AAUP-MTA shall constitute the General Assembly.
2. The General Assembly shall have the power to ratify a
collective bargaining agreement.
3. Voting ri gilts in the General Assembly slial 1 be on a "oneman - one vote" basis.
4. The General Assembly shal 1 meet at least once during each
academic semester.
5. Signatures of 5 ?s of the members of the General Assembly
shall be sufficient to call a special meeting.
The Chairperson of the General Assembly shall call such a meeting
within two (2) weeks of receipt of written petition as
described herein.
6. Twenty-five percent (25*0) of the membership of the General
Assembly shall constitute a quorum.
Executive Board:
1. The MSP-AAUP-MTA Executive Board will be 'formed within
three (3) weeks of the ratification of this Agreement.
2. There will be ten (10) members on the Executive Board.
Seven (7) members will be designated by the membership
of the MSP-MTA, three (3) by the membership of the AA'JP-MTA,
to serve until three mon :hs before the expiration of the
At that time there
first Collective Bargain. ng contract.
shall occur the annual election of the Executive Board
with its membership to be based proportionally on the
membership of AAUP-MTA and MSP-MTA. At no time, however,
shall representation of either the MSP-MTA or the AAUP-MTA
be less than one member of the Executive Board.
3. The Executive Board will supervise and set general policy
for the purpose of MSP-AAUP-MTA joint certification as a
collective bargaining agent.
4. Upon certification, the Executive Board will supervise
and set general policy for the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement.
5. The Executive Board will supervise and set general policy
for the enforcement of the negotiated collective bargaining
agreement
6. The Executive Board will be responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the MSP-AAUP-MTA and for the general supervision
7.

8.

of officers and staff.
Members of the Executive Board will serve from time of election
until April 15, 1974. Thereafter the AAUP-MTA and the MSPMTA will conduct elections every year, according to the procedures outlined in Article II and in Article III. Such
elections shall be conducted no later than April 1.
committee
The Executive Board shall advise and consent on all
Chairperson.
the
by
appointments made

.

.
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C.

Officers:
1. The Executive Board will select from within
its own
membership a Chairperson, a Secretary and a Trcusurcr.
2.
lhe duties of the Chairperson shall include:
al To act as spokesman for the General Assembly.
To chair meetings of the executive Board.
c) To chair meetings of the General Assembly.
d) To call meetings of the General Assembly as specified
in Article II A.
e) To appoint special committees for research and negotiations
in connection with collective bargaining or any other
matter with the consent of the Executive Board.
3. The duties of the Secretary shall include:
a) The responsibility for recording and maintaining
the minutes and documents of the Executive Board and
the General Assembly.
b) lhe coordinating of secretarial and other support resources
for the General Assembly and the Executive Board.
c) To serve as Acting Chairperson in the absence of the
Chairperson
4. The duties of the Treasurer shall include the maintenance
of financial records, and the periodic reporting of the
financial status of the MSl’-AAUP-MIA bargaining unit.

M

ARTICLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS

,

The Executive Board shall have the power to interpret this
Agreement
B. The Agreement shall go into effect upon ratification by the
respective chapters and signature of appropriate MTA officers
and appropriate AAUP officers.
C. The MTA agrees to undertake responsibility for financing and
staffing of the certification process and the negotiation and
servicing of the contract.
Financing and staffing will be
provided by the MTA consistent with MrA financing and staffing
policies.
D. This Agreement shall remain in effect for the duration of the
joint certification of MSP-AAUl’-MTA.
E. Amendments to this document shall be made only upon recommendation
of the Executive Board to the General Assembly at regularly
scheduled meetings. Ratification of such proposed amendments
by the General Assembly shall require a two-thirds (2/3)
affirmative vote. All amendments shall be distributed to the
membership at least two (2) weeks ahead of meetings. Upon
commencement of the second (2nd) collective bargaining contract,
amendments to this document may be recommended directly to
the General Assembly upon written petition of five percent (5%)
of the membership.
F. If an election for the determination of a collective bargaining
agent on the University of Massachusetts at Amherst campus is
not^ held before March 1, 1974, this Agreement will be submitted
to the membership of the participating organizations for re-

A.

ratification.

.

Name

Address
I certify that I desire to be represented by
an exclusive
bargaining agent for the purposes of collective bargaining
and the settlement of grievances, according to law, and
hereby designate and authorize the MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY
OF PROFESSORS-MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCI AT ION- AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS /AMHERST CHAPTER, its
agents or representatives, to petition for recognition and/
or certification by election in order that it may act in
that capacity on my behalf.

recognize my legal right to revoke thi3 authorization at
any time by written notification to the State Labor Relations Commission.
1

Signature

Date

Witness
(

This is NOT an application for membership in MSP-MTA- AAUP

Name.

Address
I certify that I desire to be represented by an exclusive
bargaining agent for the purposes of collective bargaining
and the settlement of grievances, according to law, and
hereby designate and authorize the MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY
OF PROFESSORS-MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION-AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS/AMHERST CHAPTER, its
agents or representative^, to petition for recognition and
or certification by election in order that it may act in
that capacity on my behalf.

recognize my legal right to revoke this authorization at
any time by written notification to the State Labor Relations Commission.

I

Signature

Date

Witness
This is NOT an application for membership in MSP-MTA-AAUP

/

.

::

::

ATTACHMENT "A"

The following dues structure will be obligatory:

I.

Effective immediately upon ratification by both parties:
Local AAUP:

$18.00

Local MSP:

$3.00

MTA:

$00.00

MTA:

$15.00

-

Effective July

.

1,

1973:

Local AAUP:

$4.00

MTA:

$76.00

National

optional

•

Local MSP

$3.00

MTA:

$76.00

-

National

Upon signing of first collective bargaining contract

optional

l

Local AAUP:

$4.00

Local MSP:

$3.00

MTA:

$76.00

MTA:

$76.00

National

$20 00-$36 00

National

$25.00

.

.
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Board of Trustees Statement on University
Governance
I.

TRUSTEE POLICY ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

A.

ENDORSEMENT OF AAUP STATEMENTS ON GOVERNANCE

1.
The Board of Trustees has all authority, responsibility, rights, privileges,
powers and duties of organization and government of the University of Massachusetts as
provided in Chapter 75 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth. Nothing in the
following statement shall be taken as contravening that authority or any applicable
federal or state law or regulation; anything contravening such authority, law or
regulation is void.
2.
Nevertheless, as an established university discharges its obligations and responsibilities to society by the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, the variety
4.
and
complexity of its tasks require and ensure the interdependence of the governing
board, the administration, the faculty, and the students, a; well as other groups.
The Board of Trustees has long recognized this interdependence both among campuses
within the system and among the various components within a campus, and now formally
/ adopts the principle of joint effort in governing the University.
,

Joint effort in University governance will take a variety of forms depending on
the issue and the situation,
lhe administrative officers or the Board may in some
instances propose recommendations for the consideration 'o f the faculty and/or students
before taking final action. The faculty and/or students may in other instances propose recommendal ions subject only to the endorsement of the administration and the
Board.
In all instances, however, the principle of joint effort requires that components within the University remain sensitive to the intercscs of other components.
3.

The Board of Trustees therefore endorses in principle the 1966 Stat eme nt on
Government of Co lleges and Un iv ersi ties adopted by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council of Education, and the Association of Governing
Coacds of Universities and Colleges, and the 1970 statement on Student Participation
in Col lege and Urnve rs tv Governm ent formulated by the three aforementioned organizations, insofar as both are consistent with this Trustees' Statement on University
Governance.
Tn endorsing these two statements, the Board, while retaining its ultimate legal authority in governing the University, recognizes that the faculty, the
students, and other groups within the University have tne right, the responsibility,
The Board will
and the privilege of advising on policies affecting the University.
ensure these rights, responsibilities, and privileges through the various governing
bodies --both representative bodies such .as senates and assemblies, and administrative
bodies such as departments, schools, and colleges --established by its by-laws and
i

other actions.

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN GOVERNANCE
The Board of Trustees recognizes that while it must exercise general authority
1.
over the University, certain components of the University, such as the President s
office, the campus administrations, and the representative and administrative governing bodies of the faculty and the students have, by virtue of interest, training,
Subject tc preceand experience, u special concern and competence in certain areas.
dents established by components on each campus and/or the restraints and procedures
specified in their constitutions, these components shall have primary responsibility
Whenever the phrase 'primary
in their areas of special competence and concern.
mean the capacity to initiate
shall
it
statement,
this
in
appears
responsibility"
procedures
recommendations after appropriate consultation, in accordance with the
Such recommendations will be overruled only by
specified in section II. D below.
contravene the
written reasons stated in detail. While it in no way is intended. to
the following is
governance,
in
Trustees
of
Board
the
of
participation
and
authority
major areas ot University .) e:
a general statement of primary responsibility in the
,

its cential
By virtue of its professional preparation and
exercise primary responsibility
will
faculty
the
teaching,
and
learning
'rn with
matter and methods ot instruction,
jeh academic matters ns curriculum, subler.t
which
C tly
libraries, and other aspects of University life
arch admissions

fiCAPKMIC MATTERS:

<W

,
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relate to the educational process.
Student* shore this concern and they will be
assured the opportunity of participating In developing academic policies and
In evaluating degrees, programs, and courses.
FACULTY STATUS: The faculty will hove primary resoonsiblllty for matters of
faculty status, such os appointments, re -appointments jiromot Ions tenure, and. salary
adjustments.
Students will also be assured the opportunity of participating in the
evaluation of a faculty member's effectiveness.
3.

,

,

STUDENT AFFAIRS: Students will have primary responsibility for services and
activities which ore designed primarily to serve students or those which are financed
primarily by students, managing student political affairs and organizational matters,
and setting standards for student behavior, conduct, and discipline.

4.

PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND BUDGET: The President is responsible for exerting educational leadership in the planning and development of the University, both before
the Board of Trustees and on the various campuses.
He shall coordinate the planning
and development on the separate campuses, keep current a University master plan, and
ensure that all appropriate components of the University have the opportunity to make
recommendations before planning and development decisions are rendered. The President
is also responsible for coordinating, preparing, and presenting to the Board of
Trustees the University's annual budget request. He 6hall represent the budget request approved by the Board to the Governor and the General Court.
Tne Chancellors
are responsible for coordinating, preparing, and presenting to the President budget
requests from the campuses.
The President is responsible for continually improving
the budget process and developing a calendar which allows adequate time for consultation and study by all interested components of the University.

5.

RESPONSIBILITIES, DUTIES, FUN CT IONS
11 .
THE PRESIDENT. THE CAMPUS ADMIMS1 RATOi-S
SITY GOVERNANCE

,

,

AND PROCED'.B S OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
AND THE CAMPUS GOVERNING BODIES IN UNIVER-'.r

The Board of Trustees is the final authority in all matters concerning the University
of Massachusetts and may establish the general policies governing the University,
pursuant to Chapter 75 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth. Hie authority of the
Board shall include, but is not limited to, the following specific powers:
A.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

The Trustees will consider, upon the recommendation of the appropriate faculty
1.
and student governing bodies and/or other appropriate groups, the academic plans,
personnel policies, and admissions policies of each campus and of the University as a
whole; plans for the establishment of new campuses, schools, institutes, and colleges,
and plans for the closing of already established units and programs.
The Trustees will consider, upon the recommendation of the appropriate governing
2.
body(s), the establishment of degrees.
Hie Trustees will consider' the budget requests of the University and the capital
In addition, they will consider
outlay budget requests and major amendments thereto.
new student housing and ocher loan construction programs, accept gifts, and approve
Further they will consider
service agreements, rental agreements, and leases.
policies governing the solicitation of grants and research contracts*
3.

Treasurer, and the
Hie Trustees will appoint the President, the Chancellors,* the
their perSecretary of the University, set their salaries, end periodically evaluate
will seek nominaformance. When appointing the President or a Chancellor the Board
representative of the
tions from a search committee appointed by the Board broadly
to and the composiappropriate constituencies. The Board will determine the charge
of the appropriate
tion cf the search committee after seeking the recommendations
components of the University.
campus governing body(s) and, when appropriate, other
to the search committee
representatives
student
and
faculty
The Board will appoint
upon nomination by the appropriate governing body(s).

4.

Dean of the Medical School wherever
Hie term "Chancellor" shall include the
appropriate.
*

.
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The Trustees will consider long range development
and design plans for each
campus in relation to long range academic plans
and any major amendments to these
plans.
They will approve consulting architects,
landscape architects executive
dCSiFnS £01
bUlldin£S
°‘ h “’
of
‘

^

puS^on

3

the

T UStCCS Wl11 conslder al * policies concerning the
University’s relationship
^
with local,
state, and federal governments and all policies
concerning public information.
In this regard the Beard will consider
1.
policies concerning the University’s
relationship with other segments of higher education.
The Trustees will make the final selection of all honorary
7.
degree recipients and
will name all buildings and facilities.
B.

PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY

The President is the principal academic and executive officer
He will exercise executive authority over the campuses comprising
subject to the direction of the Board of Trustees.
He will serve
and interpreter of the University and represent it to the general

of the University.
the University
as chief spokesman
public and its

representatives
The President will be responsible for presenting policy recommendations to the
2.
Board of Trustees and ensuring that the campuses develop ways of implementing
Trustees' policy.
He will develop, coordinate, and keep current a master plan of the
University,
lie will be responsible for the coordination and preparation of the annual
budget request and its presentation to the Board of Trustees and to the Governor and
the General Court.
He will also be responsible for the allocation of the appropriated
budget and all other funds.

The President will appoint, promote and grant salary adjustments to personnel in
the President's office.
He will supervise the operations of the officers and 6taff
in the President's office.

3.

4.
The President will appoint the Vice Presidents with the concurrence of the Board
of Trustees.

The President will appoint members of the faculty to tenure with the concurrence
of the Board of Trustees.
5.

The President will coordinate the work of all campuses of the University and
6.
promote the general welfare of the University as a whole and in its several parts,
lie will ensure as much campus autonomy as possible commensurate with achieving the
The
central purposes of the University or fulfilling his duties as specified herein.
President will establish and maintain an effective communications system within the
University that allows for the prompt identification of needs and problems and their
analysis.
In particular, the President, in concert with the Chancellors, will ensure
that all appropriate components of the University have the opportunity to make recommendations prior to the establishment of policy.
The President may refer for Investigation and report any matter of institutional
7.
concern to administrative staff, governing bodies, faculty, or students. The channel
for official communications between the President and the verious campus groups in
such matters will be through the Chancellor.
C.

CAMPUS CHANCELLOR

lie
The Chancellor Is the chief academic and executive officer of the campus,
1.
of the
will exercise executive authority over the campus subject to the direction
various
President. He will be responsible to the President for administering the
schools, colleges, divisions, departments, and other units on the campus.

campus to the
In the formulation of policy the Chancellor will represent his
he will ensure
policy
of
adoption
the
upon
and
Trustees,
of
Board
President and the
to the Prespresent
and
coordinate,
develop,
He will
its implementation on campus.

2.

The Chancellor will also coorident immediate and long range plans for the campus .
request of the campus
dinate, prepare., and present to the President the annual budget
expenditures.
and oversee campus
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Hie Chancellor will appoint the Vice Chancellors.
the Trovost, and the Dean, of
the campus with the concurrence of the
President and the Board of Trustee*, set their
pcriodlcal
vall,atc
performance. When appointing, a Vico Oiancell^'-tf"'
Jy ^
Cdlor
with 5.
line responsibilities,
a Provost, or a Dean, tho Chancellor
will seek
nominations from a search conmittec broadly ropresontativc
of the constituency of the
r
° be ®PP°^ted.
The Chancellor and the appropriate governing
body(t), representative and/or administrative, will mutually spree
upon the composition and the
charge of the search committee. The Chancellor will
appoint faculty and student
C
ntaLiVCS t0 thG SUarCh committce u pon nomination by
the appropriate governing
3.

J

“

.

body (->
U.

The Ctiancel lor will nppolnc, promote, and grant salary
adjustments to professional
and non-prolcss tonal personnel on campus.

The Chancellor will coordinate the work of the various units
of the campus and
promote the general welfare of the campus as a whole and in its several
parts.
Hs
will ensure as much autonomy as possible to the various units of the campus
commensurate with achieving the central purposes of the campus and the University as
a
1.
whole
or fulfilling his duties as specified herein.
He will assist the President in
maintaining an effective communications system within the campus that allows for the
prompt identification of needs and problems and their analysis.
In particular, the
2.
Chancellor will assist the President in ensuring that all appropriate components of
the campus have the opportunity to make recommendations prior to the establishment
of
policy.
5.

The Chancellor may refer for investigation and report any matter of institutional
concern to administrative staff, governing bodies, faculty, and students.
6.
3.

D.

CAMPUS GOVERNING BODIES
I

Faculty and students may be organized into governing bodies, such as senates and
assemblies, departments, schools, and colleges. The constitutions of the major governing bodies must be approved by the Board of Trustees.

When appropriate, governing bodies shall have the privilege of recommending
policies and procedures affecting the campus and the University as a whole, including,
among other matters, academic matters, matters of faculty status, and student affairs.
Also when appropriate, governing bodies will have the privilege of contributing to
long range planning, the preparation of the annual budget request, and the allocation
of available resources.
The Chancellor, the President, and -the Board of Trustees may approve recommendations from the campus representative governing bodies at any time.
Subject to precedents established by components of each campus and/or the restraints and procedures
specified in their constitutions, and in accordance with the preceding statements of
primary responsibility (Section I.B of this statement), recommendations adopted by the
campus representative governing bodies will become policy unless (1) disapproved or
sent back for reconsideration by the Chancellor within twenty days of receipt of notification from the governing body; (2) disapproved, sent back for reconsideration, or
deferred by the President within twenty days of receipt of notification of the Chancellor's approval or within twenty days following the expiration of the twenty dey
period for the Chancellor's consideration; (3) disapproved by the President during a
special thirty dav deferral period (if the President chooses to defer his decision he
vill notify the governing body; the deferral period will begin at the end of the President's initial twenty day period of consideration); (A) disapproved by the Board of
The governing bodies will notify
Trustees within these specified time limitations.
the Chancellor, the President, and the Board of Trustees of their actions as soon as
possible after their adoption. Any matter not acted upon within seventy days of receipt of notification by the Chancellor of an action by a governing body will be taxon
When a recommendation is disapproved, the govas approved by the Eoard of Trustees.
erning body vill receive r/ritten reasons in detail for the adverse decision.
III.

MULTICAMPUS COMMITTEES

University of Massachusetts has developed Into a multicampus
In order to coordinate
in Amherst, Boston, and Worcester.
campuses
institution with
the Board of
the various campuses of the University with the President's office,
the following
Trustees establishes the following University committees, and also
groups:
procedures for forming multicampus ad hoc committees and study
In recent years the
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MULTICAMPUS BUDGET COMMITTEE

A.

The Multicampus 3udget Committee will advise the President on budget requests
1.
and
budget allocations In light of the long range plans and objectives of the University.
2.
The Multicampus Budget Committee will be composed of no more than two faculty
members end two students each from the Arrhcrst, Boston, and Worcester campuses chosen
by the respective governing bodies. The President of Llie University or his representative, the Chancellor of each campus or his representative, and the Chairman of
the Multicampus Planning Committee will serve on the Committee ex officio
The
Committee will elect its own Chairman from among its non-e_x o fficio members. Members
will report periodically to their respective constituencies on the deliberations of
the Committee.
.

The Multicampus Budget Committee will meet with the Multicampus Planning Committee
at least once a year to discuss matters of mutual concern.
3.

B.

MULTICAMPUS PLANNING COMMITTEE

3.
1.

The Multicampus Planning Committee will advise the President on the development,
coordination, and updating of a master plan for the future development of the University.
2.
The Multicampus Planning Committee will be composed of no more than two faculty
members and one student each from the Amherst, Boston, and Worcester campuses chosen
by the respective governing bodies. The President of the University or his representative, the Cnar.cellor of each campus or his representative, and the Chairman of
the Multicampus Budget Committee will serve on the Committee ox officio
The Committee will elect its own Chairman from among its non- ex officio members. Members
will report periodically to their respective constituencies on the deliberations of
the Committee.
.

The Multicampus Planning Committee will meet with the Multicampus Budget Committee
at least once a year to discuss matters of mutual concern.
C.

MULTICAMPUS AD HOC COMMITTEES AND STUDY GROUPS

From time to time multicampus ad hoc advisory committees and study groups may be
1.
established by the President for the purpose of studying and making recommendations
on special problems and issues of University wide concern prior to action by the
The composition, charges, and membership of suen
President and the Board of Trustees.
ad ho c coaimit tees and study groups will be drawn up in consultation with the appropriate campus governing bodies and the Board of Trustees.

Multicampus £d hoc committees and study groups will seek the advice of and, when
2.
appropriate, submit their recommendations to the appropriate governing bodies and
administrative officials for comment and action prior to presenting a final report to
Members will report periodically to their
the President and the Board of Trustees.
respective constituencies on the deliberations of the committee or study group.
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION

procedures of University
Provisions for implementing the foregoing policies and
of Trustees.
governance shall be subject to the approval of the Board
V.

APPROVAL AND EVALUATION

amend, or revoke the foregoing^
The Board of Trustees reserves the right to alter,
§
i
at any
whole,
in
or
part
in
Governance,
Statement on University
procedures of Uni
and
policies
foregoing
the
the Board of Trustees will evaluate
versity governanci two years after their adoption.
.

#

Voted hy the Board of Trustees
1973
April
4,

,
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APPENDIX 6

Political Orientation Scale

The 1969 Survey

Disagree,
no place on campus
for faculty collective bargaining

All faculty (n=60,028)

Academic discipline
social sciences (n=7,053)
humanities (n=10,434)
natural sciences (n=12,783)
business applied (engineering,
business adm. agricultural,

Agree
faculty strikes
can be legitimate action

59

Self -characterization
of politics as"left"
or "liberal"*

47

49

70
65
55

63
56
45

69
60
42

47

34

28

*

,

eto.)

(n=8 229)
,

T

The 1972 Survey

Do you agree or disagree that the recent growth of
unionization of college and university faculty is
beneficial and should be extended?

Agree

All faculty (n=471)

Academic discipline
social sciences and
humanities (n=182)
natural sciences (n=103)
business applied (engineering, business adm., agricultural, etc.) (n=110)

*"rlcw

Uncertain;
conflicting
assessments

Self -characterization

Disagree

of politics as "left"
or "liberal"*

43

13

44

49

55
40

12
14

34

64

46

43

28

15

57

23

would you characterize yourself at the present time?"

APPENDIX
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Condensation of Labor Relations Commission
Definition of University of Massachusetts
Bargaining Unit

:

*

:
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COMMONWEALTH

01'

MASSACHUSETTS

BEFORE THE LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

********* *************** * ^T**************^
In the matter of
*
*
*

*

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS,
Employer

*

£

*

and

*
*
*

*
*

Date Issued:

*

*

*

SCR-2079,
SCR-2082

*

*
'*

Case? Nos.

*

October 22, 1976

^

*

MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY OF PROFESSORS/ *
*
FACULTY STAFF UNION
MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION/NEA,
Petitioners *
*

*
*

and

*

*

*
AMHERST AND BOSTON CHAPTERS OF THE
*
*
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION CE
*
*
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
*
Interveners *
* * * * * * * * * * * *******************************

*

Commissioners participating
James S. Cooper, Chairman
Madeline H. Miceli, Member

Appearances
Arthur P. Menard, Esq.
Nicholas DiGj.ovanni, Jr., Esq.
Joan G. Dolan, Esq.
Carolyn I. Folovry, Esq.

)
)

Counsel
Counsel
Counsel
Counsel

for
for
for
for

the Employer
the Employer
Petitioners
Interveners

AMENDED ORDER AND
DIR ECTI ON OF ELECTIO N
The original Order and Direction of Election in this matter

neglected to include all positions listed in the Decision as included

within the appropriate unit.

Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify

that the positions of Staff Associates and Staff Assistants are in-

cluded in the Direction of Election only for the purpose of participating in the election process.

Persons holding those gob titles shall

vote subject to Commission challenge.
Page

1

of

Pages

;

;

:
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University of Mass.
Amended Order

SCR-2079,
SCR-2082

Now, therefore, in accordance with the evidence
and the stipulations
of parties, the Commission concludes:
1.

That a question has arisen concerning the representation
of certain employees of the University of Massachusetts
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Law;

2.

That the unit appropriate for collective bargaining is
as follows:
All faculty including:
Full Professors;
Associate Professors;
Assistant Professors;
Instructors;
Faculty of Stockbridge College;
Program Directors (not otherwise excluded)
Non-tenure track faculty;
Lecturers
Faculty on terminal contract^
Full-time faculty whose titles have
been changed
Visiting faculty in their second year
of teaching at the University;
Part-time faculty who have taught at
least one course for three consecutive
semesters or who have taught at least
one course for two consecutive semesters
and who are teaching their third consecutive semester;
Department
chairmen;
^
^Cluster chairpersons;
Faculty members of Campus Governance
and Personnel Committees;
Librarians I-V;
Coaches who hold faculty rank;
Staff Associates and Staff Assistants
in the following programs
(at the specified locations)
v

'

.

At Boston:

Tutorial Program; Academic, /vdvisors;
University Year for Action; Vocational
Counseling Evaluation- Instructional
Specialists; Media Services; Cooperative
Education; Spanish-Speaking Student
Advisor; Center for Alternatives; Foreign
Student Academic Advisor.
.

;

Page

2

of

5
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:

;

.
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University of Mass.
Amended Order
At.

Amherst:

SCR-2079,
SCK-2082

University Without Walls;
Communications Skills Program;
Women's Studies; Student
Development Center; Center
for Instructional Resources
and Improvement; Student
Center for Educational Research;
Language Laboratory; University
Year For Action; Center For
Outreach; Bilingual Collegiate
Program; Special Students'
Program; Media Center; Cassiac;
Inquiry Program.

Excluding
Deans, Associate and Assistant Deans,
Provosts, Assistant and /associate
Provosts
Teaching Fellow, Teaching Associates,
and Students;
Professors emeriti who are not eligible
in another category;
Director and Associate Directors of the
Amherst Library;
Director and Associate Director of the
Boston Library;

,

3.

Extension Specialists;
County Extension Agents;
Visiting faculty employed by the federal
government;
Director of Control Services;
Director of Athletics;
Trainers and Physiotherapists;
Director of Public Health;
Director of Nursing;
Clinical nursing faculty and preceptors;
Adjunct faculty;
Director of the Center for International
Agriculture
Professor Adam Yarmolinsky and Professor
Franklin Patterson and all other
employees

That an election shall be held for the purpose of determining
whether or not a majority of the employees in the aforesaid
unit desire to be represented by the Massachusetts Society
of Professors/Faculty Staff Union/ Massachusetts Teachers
Association/Ma tional Education Association or the Amherst
and Boston Chapters of the American Association of University
Professors or by no employee organization, for the purposes
of collective bargaining.

Page

3

of

5
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University of Mass.
Amended Order

SCR- 2 07 9,
SCR-2002

That the election shall be conducted by secret ballot
on site, but that the mail ballets shall bo sent to members
of the bargaining unit who are on sabbatical leave for
the Fall Semester of 197G or who are absent fron the
campus because of official University business for the
Fall Semester of 1976, provided that the Employer shall
submit a list agreed upon by the Petitioner and the
Intervenor of persons eligible for absentee ballots on
or before October 26, 1976.

4.

That the list of eligible voters shall consist of all those
persons included within the above-described unit whose names
appear upon the payroll of the Employer for the week ending
October 15, 1976 and who have not since quit or been discharged for cause.

K5.

By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the Commission by

Chapter 150E of the General Laws as aforesaid,
IT IS HEREBY DIRECTED, as part of the investigation authorized by
•

\

the Commission, that an election by secret ballot shall be conducted

under the direction and supervision of representatives of the Commission

among the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit at such time and
place and under such conditions as shall be contained in the Notice of

Election issued by the Commission and served on all parties and posted
on the premises of the Employer together with copies of the specimen

ballot.
In order to assure that all eligible voters will have the opportunity

to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to

vote, all parties to this election should have access to a list of
v

voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DIRECTED that three

^ of an election eligibility

(3)

copies

list, containing the names and addresses

of all the eligible voters must be filed by the Employer with the

Page
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5
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University of Mass.
Amended Order

SCK-2079,
SCK-2082

Executive Secretary of the Commission, Leverett Saltonstall building,
100 Cambridge Street, Room 1604, boston, Massachusetts 02202, no

later than seven

(7)

days from the date of this decision unless otherwise

extended by order of the Commission.
The Executive Secretary shall make the list available to all parties
to the election.

Since failure to make timely submission of this list

may result in substantial prejudice to the rights of the employees and
the parties, no extension of time for the filing thereof will be granted

except under extraordinary circumstances.

Failure to comply with this

direction may be grounds for setting aside the election should proper
and timely objections be filed.

\
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APPENDIX

8

A Comparison of The Michigan State University
Collective Bargaining Election a nd
The University of Massachusetts Election

It is the opinion of several faculty at the University
of Mass-

achusetts y Amherst that their administration was following a road-map

which had already been tested and found sucessful by the administration
of Michigan State University during a campus-wide faculty election at

that university the previous fall, October, 1972.

The results of the

Michigan State University election provided an overwhelming victory for
the "no-union" side:

1,213 (no union) to 438 (MSU Faculty Associates)

with AAUP getting only 280 votes.

Eighty-two percent of the MSU faculty

voted during the two-day election.

A comparison of the two campaigns may prove interesting, (whether or not the two institutions actually collaborated on administrative

tactics.)

Certain aspects of the Michigan election appear to correspond
1

to events in the election at Amherst.

Those aspects, of the Michigan

election which are particularly reminiscent of the Amherst election are

summarized below.
1.

The ballot gave the faculty at Michigan State University (MSU) a

choice among three alternatives: "no agent," "the MSU-Faculty Associates" (an affiliate of the Michigan Education Association, MEA it-

Material supplied by the Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service was most helpful in gathering these facts, particularly a report by G. Gregory Lozier, "A Classic Vote for No Representation: Michigan
State University", (Washington, D.C.: ACBIS, January, 1974).
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self an affiliate of the National Education Association,

(NEA)

,

or

a local AAUP bargaining representative.
2.

To become better prepared for the election period and
potential

bargaining sessions afterwards, the administration hired an assistant vice president for "Personnel and Employment Relations."

function was similar to the assistant to the Chancellor

University of Massachusetts/ Amherst

His

at the

both individuals having trade

,

union backgrounds.
3.

NEA paid for one full-time staff member for the two months of the
k

x

fall campaign; NEA sent two staff members from Washington D.C. for
the final month of the election.

The NEA and MEA provided funds

for offices at a local motel plus additional monies for printing

advertisements and for clerical help.
4.

Although the AAUP was involved in the campaign for unionization,
several members, in fact many of the "staunchest" members of AAUP became active in the "no union" campaign.

5.

The MSU "anti-union" faculty formed a group called the "Committee of

Concerned Faculty" five weeks before the election.
nected to the administration.

They were not con-

The Michigan CCF strategy was to go

after the heavily "discipline-oriented" faculty and by doing so re-

cruited many of the faculty "stars" to their side (prestigious and

more highly paid faculty at MSU).

All costs to the "no-union" cam-

paign were covered by voluntary contributions from faculty members

who were willing to support the CCF group.

collected from $5 to $25 donations.
Faculty Associates dues structure.

Approximately $1,875 was

This was in contrast to the MSU-
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6.

The campaign was based on two issues:
salaries (which were of concern
to some MSU faculty) and the question of
unionization itself.

Many

of the Michigan CCF newsletters stressed
the adversary nature of col-

lective bargaining on administration/faculty relationships.

The issue

of Michigan State University as a potentially "great"
university (and

great

universities don't unionize

)

was also pointed out by the group,

administration said little in order that it would not be accused
of unfair labor practices and also because it did not wish to become
a target in the election.

(The reality is that if a union does win

the election, the administration must deal with the faculty in negotiat—
v

ing the contract and, therefore, does better to assume a very quiet

platform during the pre-election period.)
8.

The administration did not remain completely silent, however, using
the period just prior to the election for optimum influence.

9.

The administrative viewpoint came in the form of "questions and answers"
from the provost,

(a

memorandum to department chairmen to urge faculty

to vote) and then, just before the election, a letter from the president.

The provost's responses to the questions stressed faculty individuality
vs. what he feared would be the union's lowest common denominator ap-

proach and the existing (and recently improved) system of academic governance at MSU.

The Michigan president's letter stressed the importance

Oswald Tippo's letter ended with "I ask all faculty colleagues
who share with me the dream that one day a great State University will
arise.
")
.

.

.
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of an informed faculty which would vote.

He reminded the faculty

that it was fifty-one percent of the faculty who vote d

,

not fifty-

one percent of the faculty which would determine the outcome.

He

also mentioned the recent improvements in faculty governance.
10.

The newsletter of the Michigan CCF took on the form of questions and

answers usually in direct retaliation to MSU-Faculty Associates'

newsletters
11.

A letter from the president following the election stated, "I see in
the vote an expression of confidence in the efforts of many individuals
to build a workable system of academic governance at this university,"
b (October
25,

1972).

Are all of these elements coincidental?

Perhaps, but doubtful.

The role of the administration is an extremely touchy one during an elec-

tion campaign.

It is a period when cases of unfair labor practice most

often are brought about, particularly charges by the employee group against
the employer, often legitimately but sometimes as a delaying mechanism.

Since the administration in a

public institution of higher education is

but a part of management, it often finds itself in the awkward, middle-

man position during a pre-election period.

The state legislature, the

board of higher education, and/or the board of trustees are also involved
in the eventual negotiations.

Therefore, while having to continue to

administer university business during the campaign, the administration
it
must also gear up for a potential bargaining situation; and while

on
may fa^or or oppose such a change in procedure, it cannot campaign

b Bromery s letter stated "In my view the election results indicate
governance and^the tradecisive support for the present system of faculty
Novem
administration.
and
dition of collegial relations between faculty
'

ber 19, 1973.
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behalf of its position.

In addition at most major universities a large

percentage of the administrative policy-makers have risen from the ranks
of the institution

s

faculty.

Many will hope to return to the faculty

at some point making the conflict inherent in an "adversarial" relation-

ship (between faculty and administration), a threat to the administrator's

personal stability and comfort.

Whether this adversarial relationship

would or would not occur with the advent of collective bargaining is not
significant; it is usually perceived by the administration to be an

<-

eventual certainty.
The campaigns of the two institutions were remarkably similar,
and it would make sense with the success of the Michigan State University

election for the University of Massachusetts administration to follow

advice given by that institution.

After all, the MSP-AAUP had the ad-

vice and assistance of a national organization (NEA) which had organized
hundreds of collective bargaining elections all over the country.

The

University of Massachusetts administration would have been foolish not
to have at least noticed the Michigan election.

V
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST

•

BOSTON

•

WORCESTER
/

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

WHITMORE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
amherst, Massachusetts 01002

November 12, 1973

Dear Faculty Colleague:
On November 15 and 16, you, the faculty will decide freely
and democratically whether or not you wish to be represented by
a labor union for ourDOses of collective bargaining’.
Surely this
is the most vital question the faculty has been asked to answer,
and it is my hope that every member of the faculty will exercise
his or her right to vote.
*
i

During the last few months the union and many faculty members
opposed to collective bargaining have conducted a vigorous campaign.
The faculty has been exposed to countless debates over the merits
and demerits of faculty unionism.
For our part we have urged the
faculty to inform itself fully about this complex subject.
(

In recent weeks the faculty of Syracuse University rejected
unionism; in recent months the faculty of Michigan State University
decisively rejected unionism; and at the University of Michigan
there was not even enough support for a faculty union to call for
Even the National AAUP is deeply divided on this issue.
an election.
It is of special note that not a single Big Ten university, not a
single Ivy League university and, in fact, not more than a handful
of universities across the country have voted in favor of faculty
Faculty unions have been chosen at community colleges and
unions.
unlike universities -- are
state colleges primarily, for they
most like the primary and secondary schools where teachers' unions
are especially strong.

—

At other institutions the advent of a faculty union eliminated
the faculty senate as a governance body or created, competition between
We have recently initiated a new
the faculty senate and the union.
governance system under which our faculty senate has significant decision
doubt the compatibility of our present form of faculty
I
making powers.
governance with faculty unionism.

Under collective bargaining the administration and the individual
problems.
faculty member are not legally free to work out individual
may
himself
Under most union contracts, the individual faculty member
him
for
process it
not process a grievance; he must ask the union to
Unionism may
representatives.
relations
with the University's labor
freedom.
individual
result in a substantial loss of

/
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Experience at other institutions shows that scholarly distinction
yields to seniority and standardization under collective barqaininq.
This explains, in oart, why faculty unions have become strong
primarily at community colleges and not at the major universities
where the traditions of scholarship and peer evaluation are valued.
Throughout the campaign the MSP-MTA-AAUP has often said that
"the issue" is tenure.
They have asserted that there are hidden
tenure
and
quotas
now
that
a faculty union will avoid tenure quotas.
'f
There is no tenure quota system now of any kind, and the campus
administration has consistently and effectively opposed tenure quotas.
The President and Trustees of the University have clearly and officially expressed their support of the Amherst campus administration
Ironically, the City University of Mew York -- which has
position.
had the longest experience with faculty unionism -- has just announced
* a "50% tenure quota system" even under a collective bargaining contract.

f

There is no evidence at any college or university in America that
faculty unions have enhanced academic excellence. The oDposite appears
to be the case.
I
have been a teaching member of the faculty for more than six
It is a faculty which I deeply respect, for both its impressive
years.
accomplishments and potential.

urqe you to consider long and carefully your decision of
Your future professional life depends on your
November 15 and 16.
A simple majority of those voting will decide your future.
vote.
It is, therefore, imperative that you exercise your right to vote.
I

Sincerely,

'J[ Cl).
uph W. Bromery
Randolph
Chancel lor
RWB-.sjs

^—

O
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WORCESTER

8 03

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

WHITMORE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS 01002

iiovember 19, 1973

Dear Colleague:
Last Thursday and Friday the faculty voted in
extraordinary
numbers on the question of collective bargaining
representation.
Approximately 97% of the faculty cast a total of 1404 ballots.
While most of the faculty voted on the campus, many voted by
absentee ballot from their sabbatical sites here and abroad.
The results of the election, as you have undoubtedly learned,
were as follows:
510 "yes" votes

votes in favor of collective

bargaining representation by
the MSP-AAUP.
718 "no" votes

votes against such representation.

174 "challenged" votes

votes challenged on many grounds,
most commonly on grounds of
alleged managerial status.

2

"voided" votes

The "no" votes constituted a majority of all votes cast. They
were sufficient in number to make it unnecessary to resolve the
challenged bal lots
In my view the election results indicate decisive support for the
present system of faculty governance and the tradition of collegial
Considering the
relations between the faculty and administration.
fact that slightly more than 36% of the faculty voted in support of
a faculty union, I also view the election results as a mandate for
the administration to strengthen its commitment to the principle
of self-government on the campus.

During the last few months the faculty has been divided over the
Sincere and thoughtful faculty members
issue of union representation.
have actively debated the merits of collective bargaining as an alterThe debate has been lively
native to our present governance system.
But the faculty has now expressed its judgment.
and responsible.
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Let us put aside the intense and occasionally hostile feelings
that were generated by the collective bargaining debate. We all
have much to do as teachers, scholars and concerned members of
a university community.
Let us turn with vigor to the unending
task of defining the aspirations of the campus and planning
strategies for achieving them.
In many ways the campus has benefited from the collective
barqaininq debate, for it has required us to examine closely and
critically issues that might otherwise have received little
attention.
The administration and faculty have learned much about
themselves and about our campus as an educational center. These
lessons, I hope, will contribute valuably to our work in the years
ahead.

From the outset of the collective bargaining debate I emphasized
the importance of broad participation in the election, for the results
of that election -- whatever they might have been -- would inevitably
My hopes for nearly
be of vast importance to the entire campus.
complete participation have been realized. This faculty has met
its responsibility as a self-governing body.
My wife joins me in extending to each of you and your families
our warmest wishes for a happy Thanksgiving.

Very truly yours

D

r.

/>

Randolph W. Bromery
Chancel lor

>

\

